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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 GROWTH AND DEBT
Recent economic developments have been characterized by large shifts in the
distribution of debt and wealth: on a country scale within the private sector and
between the government and the private sector, and on a world scale among developed
countries and between developed and less-developed countries. There are many
indications that these shifts have exerted a pervasive influence on long-term
movements in economic growth. Even the seemingly steady growth of the sixties was
associated with significant shifts in financial positions. Behind the facade of
continuing high growth in most European countries there was a gradual deterioration
of the financial position of firms. That this initially did not lead to a slowing down
of growth was due to a strong urge to grow, apparently based on over optimistic
expectations about future demand and profits, and on an underestimation of the risk
attached to it. When in the 1970's profits fell and risk increased, the financial position
of firms proved too much weakened to absorb these shocks smoothly. As a result
investment collapsed more than might have been expected on cyclical grounds alone.
A further complicating factor was that the slow-down of economic growth caused
government budget deficits to rise, even without any discretionary expansionary fiscal
policy. As these deficits had to be financed by issuing debt, the burden of interest
payments increased as well, thereby raising the deficits even further. The fear of ever
increasing interest payments and debt has become a serious embarrassment for
'Keynesian' demand management policies.
These events caused, both in theory and in practice, a shift in attention from the
effects of demand management to the long-term implications of fiscal and monetary
policy, Following the provocative analysis of Blinder and Solow (1973) there has been
a wave of modelling of the dynamics implied by the government budget constraint (cf.
Tobin and Buiter 1976, Turnovsky 1977, Christ 1978, 1979, Tobin 1982, Rau 1985 to
mention but a few). Nevertheless, despite the intrinsically long-term nature of the
accumulation of debt practically all these analyses start from more or less modified
ISjLM models. However, in our opinion the basically static ISjLM framework is not
very suitable for this analysis. As is well-known, the accumulation of debt and wealth
is a very slow process which takes decades rather then years. Therefore it seems
natural to start the analysis from a model which gives special attention to medium
and long-term economic dynamics.
2 CHAPTER 1
The IS/LM model has been developed for the analysis of short-term equilibrium.
It concentrates therefore on the relations and mechanisms which are important from
a short-term point of view, and it hardly pays any attention to processes that
determine the evolution of the system in the longer term. Modifying the IS/LM model
by just adding the government budget constraint while maintaining the basic structure
of the model is in our opinion not sufficient to provide an adequate framework for
analysing the dynamics of asset and debt accumulation. In most of the studies
mentioned above this leads to the odd construction that the dynamics of debt and asset
accumulation are analysed with reference to a stationary economy; i.e. an economy in
which autonomous expenditure, labour supply and often even capital stock are
supposed to be fixed.'
1.2 A POST-KEYNESIAN APPROACH
In this book we shall analyse the accumulation of debt and wealth starting from the
post- Keynesian theory of growth and income distribution. This theoretical framework
allows us to investigate the dynamics of government debt simultaneously with the
evolution of the distribution of income and wealth between different classes.
Moreover, it provides a good starting point to analyse the dynamic interaction
between growth, asset accumulation and the fiscal policy of the government. The basic
characteristics of the post-Keynesian approach are discussed briefly below.
Differential saving
One of the corner-stones of post-Keynesian theory is the classical proposition that on
average a higher fraction is saved out of profits than out of wages. As a result,
aggregate savings depend on the distribution of income over wages and profits.
Whereas this proposition is "considered to be true by most macroeconomists"
(Malinvaud 1986, p.II 0), it is neglected in the IS/LM model which assumes a uniform
rate of saving for all types of income. This is unwarranted, especially in a long-term
analysis with an endogenous distribution of wealth, because it conceals the role of
distribution effects in the determination of the income-expenditure equilibrium.
Dynamic explanation of income distribution
A second characteristic of the post-Keynesian approach is the dynamic explanation
of income distribution. This is often summarized in the statement that the profit rate
is determined by the growth rate rather than vice versa (Kaldor 1966, Asimakopoulos
1986). This theorem distinguishes post-Keynesian theory from both Marxian theory,
1 CC. Blinder and Solow (1973) in their first model, Turnovsky (1976), Christ (1978,1979), Calvo (1986),
Rau (1985).
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according to which profits are determined by the surplus left by the given wage rate,
and neoclassical theory, which explains the profit rate from the marginal productivity
of capital. Basically, the post-Keynesian approach originates from a synthesis of the
classical and Marxian notion that profits are the main source of savings, and the
Keynesian proposition that in aggregate savings adjust to investment. Taken together
these notions imply that profits will always adjust to the level just sufficient to
provide the savings necessary for the financing of planned investment. This is the
essence of Kalecki's famous "capitalists get what they spend" formula and Keynes'
parable of the widow's cruse.
In the long term the distribution of income is determined by the dynamics of
saving, investment and labour market disequilibrium. It cannot therefore be reduced
to a simple (marginal productivity) rule of distribution. The profit rate is in post-
Keynesian theory essentially a dynamic concept.
Choice of technique
It is often suggested that the assumption of an exogenous technique of production is
also essential to post-Keynesian theory. Many post-Keynesian authors do indeed
assume fixed coefficients of production, but certainly not all of them. For example,
throughout the whole of his work Kaldor emphasizes the endogeneity of production
technique.
As is argued by Darity (1981) the assumption of a fixed technique is not binding
at all. The important point is that, even if one accepts a well-behaved production
function, it does not automatically follow that income distribution is determined by
the marginal productivities of labour and capital. As mentioned by Eichner (1985, p.
161), the distribution of income in post-Keynesian theory is explained "by a set of
macroeconomic conditions rather than by the microeconomic factors emphasized in
neoclassical theory." Ultimately, the problem is not so much whether or not a well-
behaved production function exists, but rather whether the neoclassical state to which
the marginal productivity theory of distribution applies has any theoretical or practical
relevance (cf. Robinson 1971). Outside the (stationary) neoclassical state the causation
runs from income distribution to the choice of technique rather than the other way
around. In the present book it is therefore assumed that, if the technique of
production is endogenous at all, it reacts only slowly to changes in factor prices.
Besides, the optimum technique of production can be shown to depend more on
variables other than factor prices alone as will be see in chapter 4.
1.3 METHOD AND SCOPE
The post-Keynesian theory of growth and distribution may be conceived within the
sequential analytical approach (cf. Malinvaud 1980, Kuipers 1981) with three distinct
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levels of modelling. Each of these levels can in principle be investigated independently
of the other levels.
The first level, the short period, refers to the determination of income-expenditure
equilibrium. On this level capacity is given, and it is assumed that prices and wages
are rigid and that equilibrium is achieved by quantity adjustment. This analysis builds
on the 'classical' contributions of Kalecki (1933,1938,1943) and Keynes (1936).
On the medium period level income-expenditure equilibrium is taken for granted.
Nominal wages are still assumed to be fixed, but capacity is now endogenous. As to
the price level two views seem to exist. Some economists, such as Kalecki (I933,1935)
and Harrod (1939), consider prices to be slow in comparison to the 'accelerator-
multiplier' dynamics of investment and demand; while others, such as Robinson (1962)
and Kaldor (1956,1957) consider prices, and thus income distribution, as sufficiently
flexible to avoid these quantity dynamics. In their view the medium period is thus
characterized by the dynamics of growth and income distribution. In both approaches
the central question is the same, namely whether medium-period dynamics leads to
a steady (warranted) growth where expectations of demand and profits are
continuously fulfilled. Weshall follow the first approach and assume that the medium
period is characterized by sluggish prices and disequilibrium between demand and
capacity.
Finally, on the long period level both income-expenditure equilibrium and
warranted growth are pre-supposed. Now wages and prices are assumed to be flexible.
Also the distribution of wealth is now endogenous. The analysis then concentrates on
technical change, on labour market disequilibrium and wages and on the accumulation
of debt and wealth. The central question is whether the system tends to a 'golden age'
with a constant rate of unemployment and a constant distribution of income and
wealth. This level encompasses the analysis of the 'Marxian' dynamics of labour
market disequilibrium and income distribution (following Goodwin 1967) as well as
the analysis of Pasinetti processes of accumulating wealth and debt.
In some respects these levels are different from the levels distinguished by Malinvaud
and Kuipers. Malinvaud concentrates on the short period and medium period levels
and largely neglects the long period. Kuipers has extended Malinvaud's analysis to the
long period, but defines this long period somewhat differently than we have done
above. In the first place as he does not pay attention to the accumulation of financial
assets, this criterion is invalid for his analysis. Kuipers distinguishes the long period
from the medium period by the endogeneity of price-expectations, which he considers
to be fixed in the medium period. Although we agree with Kuipers (and Malinvaud)
that the adjustment of production technique to changes in factor prices is essentially
a long-term mechanism, it is in our view not very probable that this is caused by
rigidity of expectations on factor prices. Instead, it seems more natural to explain the
rigidity of production technique by adjustment and development costs. Following
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Malinvaud (1980, p.ll) we consider lagged adjustment of (price) expectations as a
medium-term phenomenon.
This book concentrates on the medium and long period level. The short period is
neglected in most of our analysis. Not because it is unimportant or uninteresting, but
because of the simple fact that it takes us too far from our main concern: the long-
term evolution of debt and wealth positions.
1.4 WHY STUDY LONG-TERM DYNAMICS?
In a world characterized by a succession of shocks and fluctuations one might wonder,
remembering Keynes, why should one be concerned about the long run? As will be
seen the process of changing debt and wealth normally takes place slowly; after a
disturbance of long-term equilibrium it may take many decades before a new steady
situation is reached. Nevertheless, these long-term processes may play an important
role in the modelling of the medium and the short period. Besides the argument that
"growth models ... should be introduced in any satisfactory theory of medium-term
evolution" for reasons of analytical clarity and robustness (Malinvaud 1980, p.II), it
also seems natural to assume that the long-term consequences of current decisions are
taken into account when making these decisions. For instance, if one is aware that the
cumulative process of growing debt and interest payments will sooner or later
accelerate and grow out of control, it may be sensible to take on no debt at all, even
if one knows that the growth of debt may in principle be sustained for a long time.
However, as has become clear from recent theories on individual behaviour, it is
impossible to calculate the risk-discounted optimum when the economy is
characterized by true, Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty/ (cf. Weintraub 1979, Blatt
1983, Eichner 1985). In that case one has to revert to more conventional decision rules.
The emphasis on uncertainty as opposed to risk (that is 'uncertainty' with a known
probability distribution) is a distinctive feature of post-Keynesian (microeconomic)
theory in comparison with the neo- and new-classical economics.
In Keynes view uncertainty is especially crucial with respect to decisions
concerning the accumulation of wealth: "The whole object of the accumulation of
wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and
sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable
subject for the methods of the classical economic theory" (Keynes 1973, p. 113).
2 In post-Keynesian literature, Keynesian and Knightian uncertainty are often lumped together under
the title 'Keynes-Knightian' uncertainty. According to Hoogduin this is not justified: "Whereas Knight
mainly focuses on the distinction between numerically measurable and not numerically measurable
probabilities, Keynes stresses the slight amount of knowledge on which probabilities often have to be based"
(Hoogduin 1987, p. 63).
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This may explain why agents when deciding on debt and savings often adopt
certain rules or norms on 'proper' financial behaviour. Despite the Modigliani-Miller
hypothesis on the irrelevance of the method of financing investment, it is well-
established that firms hold on to certain norms for their external debt as a guideline
for their investment and financial decisions. Similarly, despite the Barro hypothesis
on the neutrality of government finance (the 'Ricardian' doctrine, Tobin 1980) there
exists an ongoing discussion on the proper norms for the government budget deficit.
Finally, norms exist also with regard to the external position of countries as a whole.
In the Netherlands we have long been accustomed to norms for the structural
government budget deficit (3 to 4 per cent of national income) and the desired excess
in the balance on current account (not less than I percent of national income).
Such behaviour, which is familiar in practice, seems at variance with the standard
neoclassical conception of the rationally thinking and calculating homo economicus.
The emphasis on convention and norms rather than on sophisticated risk- and time-
discounted optimality calculations in the explanation of economic behaviour in
general, and of investment behaviour in particular, has always been one of the
principal themes of post-Keynesian theory. A well-known example is Kaldor's pay-
back period in his explanation of investment. As has recently been shown by Blatt
(1983), a modified pay-back rule may indeed offer a better criterion for investment
than the standard (neoclassical) present value criterion when the economy is
characterized by Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty. Similar views are found with
regard to pricing and the financing of investment in Wood (1975), Eichner (1976),
Cornwall (1983), Moss (1984).
An additional reason for the use of rules and norms is related to the decision-
making process. Especially in organizations with a complex and costly decision making
process, rules and norms may offer an attractive 'second-best' solution to discretionary
decision-making. This even more so, if due to Keynesian or Knight ian uncertainty
no precise (numerical) assessment can be made of the costs and benefits of certain
decisions. In these circumstances, a rule which is at least consistent from a long-term
point of view, is often preferred to a continuous process of discretionary decision-
making.
The stress laid on norms does not mean that behaviour is fixed for ever. It is
evident that in the long term these norms must be founded on an economic assessment
of costs and benefits. Thus, as has been shown by Blatt, the length of the pay-back
period is also ultimately related to average risk and profitability. Therefore, in order
to explain why short-term behaviour follows certain decision rules, it is necessary to
view this against the background of a long-term theory explaining the rules. As a
corollary, a major change or break in economic development will lead to a revision
of all current norms and rules. Consequently, the short-period model will change as
well.
In the three levels of analysis distinguished, there is thus a certain hierarchy.
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Short-period behaviour is not truly independent of the long-period consequences of
this behaviour. Short-period dynamics is therefore contingent on the set of rules and
norms based on long-period considerations.
1.S OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
Chapter I begins with a brief review of alternative theories of differential saving, and
then as a first step in the analysis investigates the consequences of the introduction
of the government budget constraint in a generalized Pasinetti-Kaldor model. It will
be shown that this model in its 'classical' post-Keynesian form yields a highly unstable
dynamic system, which can produce a stable 'two-class' solution only under very
special, unrealistic assumptions.
In order to develop a more sophisticated macroeconomic model chapters 3 and 4
consider the long-term determinants of growth on the basis of a microeconomic model
of a representative (corporate) firm. Following our main interest, this model
concentrates on the long-term relationships between profits, finance and the growth
of the firm. Chapter 3 develops a basic model for an equity-rationed 'managerial'
firm. It is shown that this firm faces a trade-off between growth and risk. This
'growth-risk' frontier is the basis for the determination of the optimum rate of
growth. Chapter 4 relaxes the assumption of full equity-rationing and introduces an
(imperfect) equity market. As a result the conflict of interests between managers and
shareholder must be taken into account too. Furthermore, this chapter introduces costs
of growth and examines the consequences for the growth strategy and the adjustment
process.
Thereafter we shall return to the macroeconomic level and complete our model for
the closed economy. This model will be used to investigate the dynamic relationships
between growth, income distribution and the financial positions of the government,
firms and the social classes distinguished. Particular attention is given to the stability
of the system for alternative fiscal and monetary regimes. Chapter 5 concentrates on
the medium period and chapter 6 on the long period.
In chapter 7 the analysis will be generalized for the open economy. Because in an
open economy the equilibrium generating role of income distribution is impeded by
the existence of foreign competition in goods and financial assets, we shall concentrate
on the balance of payments as an outlet for internal disequilibrium between
investment and saving. As a consequence the dynamics of the government budget
constraint is intimately linked to the dynamics implied by the balance of payments
constraint; that is, one should consider the development of public debt in relation to
the evolution of the net foreign creditor or debtor position. This chapter will be
concluded by some considerations with respect to economic policy in the presence of
external and internal disturbances.
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Our method is mainly theoretical. Where necessary mathematical techniques will be
used to assess the dynamic characteristics of the models to be developed. Each model
will be considered in turn to establish whether a unique path of steady growth exists
or not. Next the dynamics of the models will be examined, as far as possible by
analytical means and in most cases illustrated by numerical simulations. Furthermore,
when possible, the impact of the choice of the parameters of the model on the general
stability of the system will be assessed as well as the impact of alternative fiscal and
monetary regimes.
CHAPTER 2
PASINETTI PARADOXES AND THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the long-term dynamics of public debt in a two-class post-
Keynesian model. Our concern is twofold. In the first place we are interested in the
dynamics arising from the government budget constraint when analysed on the basis
of a post-Keynesian model where the distribution of income between wages and
profits is the key mechanism for savings-investment equilibrium. This point of
departure of our analysis is radically different from most other macroeconomic
investigations of the dynamics of public debt which adopt the ISjLM framework in
which income distribution plays no (explicit) role at all.'
Secondly, we wish to examine the consequences for the consistency of the post-
Keynesian model when the government budget constraint is introduced. As is well-
known, Pasinetti's model, as well as more general models based on it, is subject to
rather stringent conditions which must be satisfied for an interior 'two-class' solution
to be f'easible.f If these conditions are not satisfied, one of the social classes will
disappear in the long run, and what is more serious, the distribution of income over
workers and 'rentiers' will no longer operate as a mechanism ensuring equilibrium
between savings and investment. The possibility of such an 'anti-Pasinetti' state led
Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) to conclude that a more general theory of income
distribution is required, based on the principles of the neoclassical marginal
productivity theory. We shall re-examine this conclusion with reference to the
generalized post-Keynesian model to be developed in this chapter.
The chapter is built up as follows. First, there is a brief review of several
alternative views on differential savings (section 2.2). Particular attention is given to
the role of retained earnings (section 2.3). This discussion of differential savings
provides the starting point for our modified post-Keynesian model (sections 2.4-2.7).
The basic difference with traditional post-Keynesian models concerns the inclusion
1Among the classical papers on this subject are Christ (1968), Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and
Buiter (1976).
2 The debate was initiated by the famous article of Pasinetti (1962) and its discussion by Samuelson
and Modigliani (1966). There have been many attempts to generalise Pasinetti's model and to criticiEe the
conclusions of Samuelson and Modigliani with reference to their 'anti-Pasinetti land,' see, forinstance, Laing
(1969), Chiang (1973), Pasinetti (1975, 1983), Baransini (1975), FaEi and SaIvadori (1981), Darity (1981),
O'Connell (1985).
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of the government sector. In most other respects it follows the 'classical' post-
Keynesian model, assuming constant propensities to save, a fixed technique of
production, a given ('natural') rate of growth, etc. Some of these assumptions will be
relaxed in section 2.8 when wealth and interest effects are introduced in the saving
function and the technique of production is related to factor prices. However, the
analysis stays confined to the evolution of debt and wealth in a steady state world with
a given 'natural' rate of growth. The dynamics of investment and income distribution,
the role of money and the international aspects are considered in later chapters.
2.2 A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF DIFFERENTIAL SAVING
One of the basic theorems of post-Keynesian theory is the proposition that savings-
investment equilibrium is ensured by shifts in the distribution of income between
wages and profits. According to Robinson (1956) excess demand for goods causes
sellers' markets to emerge with rising prices and profit margins, and correspondingly
falling real wages. As the (marginal) propensity to consume out of profits is supposed
to be less than the propensity to consume out of wages, this shift in income
distribution reduces aggregate demand and thus restores equilibrium between
aggregate demand and supply. In the opposite case of excess supply, buyers' markets
will arise, leading to falling profits and rising real wages, and thus to a rising
demand.f
Other authors have suggested that there also exists a direct link between profit
margins and (planned) investment (cf. Eichner 1976, Harcourt and Kenyon 1976).
Building on Kalecki's mark-up hypothesis they argue that rapidly growing firms will
set higher profit margins than similar firms with a low rate of expansion because they
have a larger need for investment funds.4 Thus in this theory also, investment
3 Actually this mechanism requires considerable homogeneity of consumption and investment goods, as
otherwise it is difficult to understand how an increase in demand for investment goods leads to a rise in
prices of consumption goods, and thus to lower real wages. In 'Accumulation of Capital' (1956) Robinson
is much more prudent on this point than in many later (one-sector) representations of the post-Keynesian
model.
4 Eichner motivates this relation between pricing and investment on the basis of a smaller price-
elasticity of demand for the firm's products in the short term than in the long term. This implies that the
firm can increase its net returns in the short term by raiaing its profit margin at the expense of lower returns
in later years. Therefore it is attractive for firms to raise their profit margin as long as the implicit costs of
this internal method of finance are Ie.. than the costa of external finance. In the case of an upward sloping
supply curve of external finance it i. obvious that the optimum profit rate is positively associated with the
volume of investment.
Note that the underlying trade-off between short-term and long-term price-effects on demand is very
similar to the well-known J-curve effectofthe balance of payment •. Eichner'. theory is thus built on a 'J-
curve effect' in net return. and a (non-Modigliani-Miller) rising supply curve of external finance.
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generates (part of) its own savings.5
It is obvious that this post-Keynesian distribution mechanism hinges on two
propositions: the sluggishness of nominal wages and the higher propensity to save from
profits than from wages. In most of the (older) post-Keynesian theories, nominal
wages are therefore taken to be given historically. Robinson supposes that workers do
not resist inflationary erosion of their income as long as the share of wages is not
pressed beyond some minimum (the 'inflation barrier,).6 With regard to the
proposition of differential savings, the post-Keynesian theory evidently builds on the
classical theories of Ricardo and Marx, according .to which workers consume the
whole of their income, while capitalists (and 'rentiers') save the larger part of their
income. In Marx' view wages serve for the reproduction of labour power only, and
thus leave no room for saving, while profits in the capitalist system provide both the
motive and the finance for the accumulation of capital.
Life cycle-hypothesis
It needs little argument to show that this class-related explanation of differential
saving is at variance with mainstream (micro)economic theory which takes the
individual as the unit of analysis, and denies the existence, or relevance, of social
classes. It is often thought, and claimed, that the life-cycle theory of saving has finally
rejected the 'outdated' idea of differential saving. As, for any individual, saving is
just deferred consumption, there is, according to this theory, no reason to assume that
consumption is systematically higher for one group than for another group. Whether
income is high or low, individuals aim at an optimal spread of consumption over their
lifetime. In fact, a shift in distribution from wages to profits may even produce a
(temporary) reverse effect on savings: a rise in profits increases the income of the
pensioned people, who consume their full income or even dissave, while the fall in
wages affects the younger people who are still saving for their own old age. This shift
in the intergenerational distribution of income thus gives rise to a 'perverse
neoclassical saving function' (Marglin 1984, p.45).
However, this representation of the life-cycle model is too simple; it neglects the
existence of liquidity constraints and of intergenerational transfers, gifts and bequests.
If these aspects are taken into account as well, the life-cycle model can be shown to
be fully consistent with differential saving, and even to give a justification for it. For
example, it can be shown that it is sufficient to introduce two classes (or groups)
5 There is no reason to assume that this mechanism is in itself sufficient to generate all the savings
required, unless one follows Pasinetti (1981) and presupposes full internal financing. This theory is therefore
less general than Robinson's mechanism sketched above. Moreover, this mark-up mechanism applies
exclusively to investment; if excess demand arises from sources other than investment, such as government
expenditure, private consumption or exports, this mechanism fails completely.
6 This term was first introduced in Robinson (1956). A similar process was described earlier by Kalecki
(1954, pA8).
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with different attitudes towards inheritance. (See Appendix 2.A for a proof on the
basis of a simple two-class life-cycle model).
Macroeconomistsview
Contrary to the above negative (microeconomic) view on differential saving is the
much more positive standpoint of most macroeconomists, According to Malinvaud
(1986. p.110) "the prevailing [macroeconomic] view is definitely in favor of the truth
and significance of the proposition." Therefore it is, in his view, necessary to
reconsider the significance of differential saving and to work on a justification from
the mainstream point of view. Malinvaud distinguishes three possible (complementary)
explanations for the proposition that the marginal propensity to save is less for wages
than for profits:
I. Pure distribution effect: Wage-earners generally face stronger liquidity constraints
than profit-earners, so that they react more strongly to changes in their actual
income than profit-earners. Moreover, because profits have a higher variability
than wages, a wage change is considered to be more permanent and thus has a
stronger effect on consumption than the opposite change in profits.
2. Retained earnings: Because of the 'corporate veil' and perturbations in the stock
market valuation of shares, a change in corporate retained earnings is generally
valued less than a similar change in wages or distributed profits.
3. Differential taxing: When profits are more heavily taxed than wages a shift from
wages to profits leads to higher aggregate savings."
At this stage it is important to note that these explanations of differential saving all
relate to differences in the type or source of income. No attention is paid to the fact
that differences in savings propensities may also arise from different attitudes
amongst the recipients of the income, i.e. amongst different social classes. In this
respect they are in contrast to the classical explanation discussed above.
Kaldor and Pasinetti revisited
A similar conflict in the explanation of differential saving is found within the post-
Keynesian school between Kaldor and Pasinetti. While Pasinetti adheres to the
classical proposition that differences in savings propensities should be related to social
groups with different attitudes towards savings, Kaldor explicitly rejects this idea and
regards "the high savings propensity out of profits as something which attaches to the
nature of business income" (1966, p.310). Thus, in contrast to Pasinetti who attributes
the higher propensity of rentiers to save to Ita stronger tendency for people in the
higher income brackets (normally wealth owners) to plan for inheritance" (1983,
p.IOO), Kaldor explains the higher savings out of profits from the necessity of
7 This i. true only if lubjects do not lee through the 'government veil..' According to the well-known
'Ricardian equivalence' theorem, changes in government savings are fully compensated by private savings
if all subject. take full account of future taxes (cf. Barro 1974, Tobin 1980).
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corporate firms" to plough back a proportion of the profits earned [...J in order to
ensure the survival of the enterprise in the long run" (1966, p.310). In a formal
manner the alternative saving functions may be modelled as:
S = s,(y-1r) + s21r
S = sw(y-1r+Z,1r)+ sc(l-z,)1r
(Kaldor) (2.la)
(2.lb)(Pasinetti)
where 0 ~ s, < s2 ~ 1 and 0 .s Sw< Sc.s I, and
z, = share of workers in total wealth
'11" = rate of profit
s" s2 = savings propensities from wages and profits
sw' Sc = savings propensities of workers and capitalists
S = aggregate saving (ratio to capital stock)
y = production (ratio to capital stock)
Throughout the following all stock and flow variables are expressed as ratios to capital
stock. The first equation relates savings propensities to wages (y-1r) and profits '11",
whereas the second equation relates them to the income of workers, including their
share in profits (y-?r+z,?r), and the income of rentiers (1-z,)1r. For simplicity it is
assumed that sw=s, and sc=s2 and s, and s2 are used for Swand Sc below.
In the short run, when the distribution of wealth is given, these functions are not
essentially different from a macroeconomic point of view. In both cases aggregate
savings are positively associated with the share of profits; only the slope is different.
(Kaldor) (2.2)
dS
d1r = (I -z,)(s,-s2) (Pasinetti)
However, despite this short-term similarity there is an important difference between
these two saving equations from a long-term point of view. Because savings add to
wealth one must in the long-period take account of the evolution of the distribution
of wealth as well. This has led Pasinetti to his famous signalling of a logical 'slip' in
Kaldor's model, because it allows for the savings of workers but disregards the
accumulation of wealth ensuing from it. Therefore, Pasinetti considered his function
as a 'repaired' version of Kaldor's.
Kaldor did not accept Pasinetti's model as an improved version of his own model.
Nor did he agree with the 'schizophrenic' interpretation of his savings function
suggested by Meade (1963), Samuelson and Modigliani (1966). According to this
interpretation workers have different savings propensities with regard to wages and
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to profits.8 As mentioned above, Kaldor argues that the higher savings propensity out
of profits must be explained by the fact that not all profits are distributed to its
formal owners, the shareholders. Unfortunately, Kaldor never worked out this view
more explicitly.f
A generalized savings function
There have been many attempts to integrate Kaldor's idea of undistributed profits
with Pasinetti's long-term model in order to obtain a 'general' post-Keynesian model
(e.g, Chiang 1973, Darity 1981, Marglin 1984). These attempts generally lead to a
mixed savings equation like
(2.1c)
where 8 = fraction of profits distributed (0 < 8 < 1)
z, = share of workers in total capital - -
z2= share of rentiers in total capital
z = z, + z2
Usually it is assumed that z=l, which means that workers and rentiers own the whole
capital stock. Although this is not strictly necessary, as will be seen below, we shall
for the moment follow this common proposition. This generalized function (2.1c) is
'Kaldorian,' as the effective savings rate of workers is different for wages and profits,
51 and 8s1 respectively, while at the same time it is 'Pasinettian,' as it distinguishes
two classes with different propensities to save, s1 and s2' If all profits are distributed
(8=1) and z= 1 this equation reduces to the simple Pasinetti equation (2.1 b). If,
alternatively, savings propensities are identical for both classes (s1=s2) we obtain a
quasi-Kaldor function where the propensities to save out of wages (s,') and profits
(s2') are equal to
S1' = s1
52' = s, + (I-s,)(1-8)
Whenever profits are not fully distributed (8<1) this result implies that s2'>s1'.
BA modem motivation for this interpretation may be found in the argument of Malinvaud (1986) that
the higher savings propensity of profits may be due to their higher variability (see above). In our view this
explanation is valid in the ehort term only; in the long run subjects are able to discern between temporary
and permanent shifts .in profits and adjust their consumption accordingly.
9 It is often suggested that Kaldor's neo-Paainetti theorem is an elaboration of this idea. However, the
mechanism underlying this theorem is totally different from the post-Keynesian income-distribution
mechanism. Instead of wagea and profits it attributes a central role to the valuation of shares in maintaining
income-expenditure equilibrium. In essence it ia a sophisticated venion of the common interest mechanism
with respect to savings-investment equilibrium showing a close resemblance to Tobin'. q hypothesi •.
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There exist, however, some fundamental problems with regard to this generalized
function that often seem to go unnoticed. These problems arise from the ambiguous
interpretation of the fraction of profits distributed (J. Basically, there are two
alternative interpretations: one relating to different returns on financial assets and
capital stock, and the other relating to retained earnings.
I. According to the first interpretation, (J measures the ratio between the rate of
return on the financial wealth of workers and rentiers and the real profit rate. As has
been suggested originally by Laing (1969) and elaborated by Pasinetti (1975,1983) and
Fazi and Salvador (1981) the reward on financial assets of workers (and rentiers) is
generally lower than the return on capital. However, if one adopts this interpretation
of (J, the question arises where the difference between total profits and distributed
profits remains. In fact, this interpretation is only consistent if one allows for a third
class, namely the capitalists, who organize the production and to whom accrue the
undistributed profits. In that case, however, it can no longer be automatically assumed
that the shares of workers and rentiers in total wealth sum up to unity. On the
contrary, one should also allow for the accumulation of wealth by the capitalists
(hence z-c I). If this is not recognized properly one falls into a 'slip' similar to the one
as Pasinetti blamed Kaldor for.
2. The second interpretation of equation 2.1c is that workers and rentiers do indeed
own the entire capital stock, and that profits have a smaller impact on consumption
because only a fraction of profits is distributed to the shareholders. This interpretation
seems more in accordance with Kaldor's views and fits in with Malinvaud's second
('corporate veil') explanation above. However, it is not right in that case to conceive
of (J as the fraction of distributed profits as Chiang (1973), Darity (1981) and Marglin
(1984) do, for this would imply that shareholders do not receive any capital gains at
all, or alternatively, that capital gains have no effect on their consumption. Retained
earnings are thus simply assumed to vanish. This is clearly unwarranted with reference
to modern society where most of the savings of workers and rentiers consists of claims
to pension funds and life assurance. The next section takes a somewhat closer look at
the impact of retained earnings on consumption and savings.
2.3 A DIGRESSION ON RETAINED EARNINGS AND AGGREGATE SAVINGS
As is known, the income of shareholders consists of dividends and capital gains. If we
express the total value of shares as a ratio q to capital stock net of borrowing (1-a)
total income on shares ys may be represented as
Ys = 6 + jq(l-a) (2.3)
where 6 stands for the pay-out of profits (dividends), j for the rate of increase of total
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share value and a for (net) external debt of the corporate sector. Adding this share-
income to wage-income and interest-income we obtain for total income perceived by
workers and shareholders yp
yp = y - 11" + ra + 6 + jq(l-a) (2.4)
In order to concentrate on the role of retained earnings we assume for simplicity that
the firm keeps its debt ratio constant and does not issue new shares. Then the budget
constraint of the corporate sector is10
11" - 6 - ra - (l-a)i = 0 (2.5)
where i stands for net investment. Since i is expressed as a ratio to capital stock it
stands for the growth rate of capital stock as well. After substitution of this constraint
into equation (2.4) perceived income becomes
yp = y + (jq-i)(l-a) (2.6)
Note that yp is independent of the pay-out rate (6); this implies that no income
vanishes directly as a consequence of corporate retention. Nevertheless perceived
income may be different from actual income (=y) if the growth of share value differs
from the growth of capital stock (jq#i). This may occur if q#l or j#i; that is, if capital
stock or its rate of growth are under- or overvalued.
Now consider the relation between income distribution and aggregate savings.
Following Kaldor it is assumed that there is one, non-schizophrenic, class which saves
a given fraction (s) of perceived income irrespective of its source. Nevertheless, a shift
in income distribution may have an influence on aggregate savings, namely if it gives
rise to a change in perceived income. Thus, since consumption equals (l-s)yp
aggregate savings (S) is given by
S = y - consumption = sy - (l-s)(jq-i)(l-a) (2.ld)
This equation shows that aggregate savings differ from planned savings (sy) by a
factor measuring 'unintended' consumption due to the wrong perception of corporate
income. If jq exceeds i capital gains are overvalued, so that perceived income exceeds
actual income. As a result consumption will be greater, and savings correspondingly
lower.
10 This equation follows from the budget constraint Da=lI'-6-ra-(1-a)i and the condition of a constant
debt ratio Da=O, where Da=da/dt. Thi. assumption ease8our exposition; it i. not essential to our argument.
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In order to examine whether savings are positively related to the share of profits,
one should look in more detail at the determination of the factor (jq-i). Imagine that
at a certain moment real wages fall and profits rise while all other factors remain
unchanged. If firms hold on to a given debt ratio they must either raise the payout
of profits or speed up their rate of investment. In the first case the actual income of
shareholders increases by the same amount as wages have fallen, so that total income
is unchanged. However, if the rise in profits is thought to be permanent, the valuation
of shares will be revised upward, thereby causing an increase in perceived income. As
a result the higher profits now lead to a fall in aggregate savings. This effect is
contrary to the anticipated effect we were seeking: a shift in income distribution
causes a reverse Cambridge-effect.
If, alternatively, the extra profits are used to increase investment the sum of wages
and distributed profits will indeed fall. Then whether total perceived income will fall
or rise depends on the degree to which the growth in capital stock is reflected in the
growth of share value. In the short run this depends on many expectational and
psychological factors, which we shall not try to unravel here."
It is evident that the mere existence of retained earnings does not provide a sufficient
justification for the post-Keynesian proposition of differential saving. Some other
factors have to be taken into account as well. One might follow Malinvaud and add
liquidity constraints and informational imperfections to the model. Because this
approach stresses disequilibrium and market imperfections as the principal cause of
differential or 'forced' savings, it seems more appropriate in the short period than in
the long period.
As our main interest is the long-term evolution of savings and wealth, in the
subsequent section another approach will be used to explain, following Pasinetti,
differential saving in terms of different attitudes towards saving between social
classes. However, we do not agree with Pasinetti's view that the propensity to save is
a purely psychological concept which has to do with the attitude towards provisions
for old age and inheritance only (Pasinetti 1983, p, 100). In this respect we have
sympathy for the arguments of Kaldor (and Marx) that differences in savings
propensities also arise from the institutional organization of the economy. The basic
error of Kaldor's model is, however, that it rejects the idea of social classes altogether
and conceives the corporate sector as an anonymous and non-owned Moloch who
absorbs retained earnings without ever giving anything back in return. As we have
seen this view is unwarranted. Even in modern society there exists a class of managers
and owners with a distinct role in the economic process and with a different attitude
towards saving from the workers. For workers savings concern primarily deferred
consumption and provision for old age, and for the better-off employees maybe for
11 See Malinvaud (1986) for a discussion of these short-period factors.
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inheritance as well. For the class of owners and top-managers saving is, however, also
a means for maintaining and, if possible, increasing their power and status. They save
for the intrinsic benefits of wealth as well.
Therefore the subsequent analysis adopts a savings function with two different
classes, workers who receive interest on their savings and a corporate class of owners
and managers who appropriate profits after payment of interest to the workers. As the
interest rate is in general lower than the profit rate, this conception allows for
differential rewards on savings by workers and on the wealth of the owners of the
capital stock. As all profits, after payment of interest, accrue to the corporate class
there are no vanishing retained earnings.
2.4 THE PASINETTI PARADOX
As was shown above (section 2.2) the Pasinetti and Kaldor savings equations are not
essentially different from a short-term point of view. However, in long-term






(Pasinetti) (2.7b)11' z1 = i --s2 s2-s,
As we have mentioned as investment (i) is expressed as a ratio to capital stock it
represents the growth of capital stock as well. The result (2.7b) for Pasinetti's model
has raised much controversy as it suggests that the long-term profit rate is
independent of saving by workers. This is known as the Pasinetti paradox.'3
The solutions for both the Kaldor and the Pasinetti model are, however, subject
to rather stringent boundary conditions arising from limits for the distribution of
12These equations are obtained by solving the conditions for flowequilibrium i=S and stock equilibrium
Do1=sl(y-lr+sl11")-ir;1 = o.
13 For a proper understanding of this reault it must be recognised that this equation is merely a
condition and not a causal relationship. In fact, the steady state profit rate depends on both the propensity
to save of workers and of rentiers, as well as on the distribution of wealth, thus rewriting (2.7b):
In the steady state the distribution of wealth turns out to be precisely such that this relation after
substitution for the steady state share of wealth (zl) produces equation (2.7b).
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income.l" It is evident that profits cannot fall below zero. For wages also there will
exist a positive minimum (inflation barrier). In addition Pasinetti's model requires that
the wealth of rentiers should not be negative. In summary these boundary conditions
for both models can be written as
(2.8)
where e stands for the minimum share of wages. Solving these conditions we find
SlY~ i~ {es, + (l-e)s2}y
slY .s i~ (l-e)s2Y
(Kaldor) (2.8')
(Pasinetti)
This result brings out that the boundary conditions are more restrictive for the
Pasinetti model than for Kaldor's whenever es,fO.
These conclusions are corroborated if, not wages, but the total income of workers
is bound by a minimum. In the present model, where a considerable part of workers'
income may consist of interest income, this alternative condition might, from a
theoretical point of view, be more appropriate than Robinson's inflation barrier which




The lower boundary for i is again the same for both models, but the upper boundaries
have changed significantly. Kaldor's model no longer yields an upper boundary for
i at all. This is not surprising if one remembers that in Kaldor's model all income
accrues to the workers either as wages or as profits. The share of income of workers
is thus always unity. Likewise in the Pasinetti model the upper boundary proves to be
less restrictive.
14 The stringency of the boundary conditions has been raised originally by Tobin (1960) with reaped
to Kaldor's model and by Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) for PasineUi'a model.
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2.S A GENERALIZED MODEL WITH GOVERNMENT
The introduction of the government sector has several important consequences for the
post-Keynesian model. In the first place it adds a new possible cause of differential
saving, namely different tax rates for wages and profits. If profits are taxed at a
higher rate than wages, a redistribution from wages to profits will increase aggregate
savings even if there is no difference in the propensities to save. This was also noted
by Malinvaud (l986) (see section 2.2). Secondly, it complicates the long-term
dynamics of the model as the accumulation of public debt must be taken into account
as well.
The model is set up as follows. Besides the government sector there exist two
classes: workers who receive wages and interest on their accumulated savings, and
capitalists who appropriate the difference between profits and interest paid out to
workers. One part of this residual consists of the return on their financial assets and
the other part consists of an 'entrepreneurial' reward for organizing the production
and bearing the risks attached to it. In order to avoid the complications connected
with the valuation of shares workers are supposed not to own shares, but loans only.
The government sector receives taxes and finances its deficit by issuing loans to
the private sector. Taxes are supposed to be levied at fixed rates on wages, interest
income of workers and net earnings of capitalists. Expenditure of the government is
taken as a constant fraction of total production. There is no government production.
In all other respects our model follows the 'classical' post-Keynesian model: the
rate of growth is determined by the 'natural' rate of growth, the technique of
production is fixed and distribution of income between wages and profits always
ensures savings-investment equilibrium. Then expressing all stock and flow variables
as ratios to capital stock the model can be written as follows
S = s1{(l-TO)(y-7I) + (l-T1)(a+b)r) + s2(l-T2)(7I'-ar)
T = TO(y-7I')+ T1(a+b)r + T2(7I'-ar)
i + g + rb = S + T








D(a+b) = s1{(I-To)(y-7I')+ (l-T1)(a+b)r) - (a-b)l
Da = -s2(l-T 2)(7I'-ar)+ (I-a)i
Db = g + rb - T - ib
where s1and s2are the savings propensities of workers and capitalists respectively , TO'
Tl' T2 the tax rates on wages, interest income of workers and net earnings of
capitalists, T total taxes, g government expenditure, b government debt, a the net debt
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of capitalists and r the (real) interest rate. The subscripts I and 2 refer to workers and
capitalists. The D operator represents the first derivative with respect to time.
Throughout the following it is assumed that workers save less than capitalists: s,<s2·
The savings equation 2.le differs from the simple Kaldor and Pasinetti equations
(2.1a and b) in two respects. First, it distinguishes between the profit rate on capital
(11") and the rate of return on financial wealth (r), and secondly, it takes account of
(differential) tax rates on wages, interest income and net corporate earnings. Equation
2.10 defines total taxes. Equation 2.11 represents the condition for equilibrium
between investment and savings. Equation 2.12 states that the profit rate is equal to
the interest rate plus an entrepreneurial premium which is related to the (given) rate
of growth (=i). This equality can also be interpreted as the condition for growth
equilibrium, defining the profit rate in relation to the interest rate which is necessary
to sustain a certain growth rate i.'5 It is not unreasonable to assume that the profit rate
should be higher if the growth rate is higher. For the moment it is not necessary to
explain how this condition is ensured, we simply assume that it is.'6
These relations together form the static part of the model. The budget constraints
for workers (2.13), capitalists (2.14) and the government (2.15) complete the model;
they determine the dynamics of the system over time. Of course, only two of these
differential equations are independent.
Statics








For the sake of brevity the symbol c; is introduced representing the rate of
consumption per category of income. Note that the denominator of (2.16) represents
the effect of the interest rate on aggregate savings (dS/dr). Throughout the following
15 This equation follows from the investment function i = (1r-r)N and the condition for growth
equilibrium according to which i must be equal to the given ('natural') rate of growth.
16 The determination of growth will be dealt with extensively in chapters Sand 4. In chapters 5 and
6 we shall discuss how the 'natural growth' equilibrium is achieved. An intuitive explanation for eq. 2.12
is that a higher interest rate cause. investment and growth to slow down, thereby leading to higher
unemployment, and thus to lower wages until the profit rate has increased sufficiently to maintain the
original rate of growth.
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the analysis it is assumed that dS/dr>O; that is, the analysis is confined to the case with
a normal, positive, Cambridge relation between profits and savings, thus
(2.17)
In the case of a reverse Cambridge effect (dS/dr<O) a rise in profits and the interest
rate in response to excess demand would lead to even lower savings and thus to a
further increase in demand.l" A reverse Cambridge effect will thus have a
destabilizing effect on the income-expenditure dynamics in the medium and the short
term.'8
As can be seen from (2.17) the Cambridge effect will be positive if either co>c,
or c,>c2 (provided that a-el ) or b<O, thus if
l. capitalists have of a higher propensity to save than workers (s2>s,);
2. profits are taxed at a higher rate than wages (1"2>1"0);
3. interest income of workers is taxed more heavily than wage income (1",>1"0);
4. the government is a net creditor (b<O).
In each of these cases a shift from wages to profits leads to an increase of aggregate
saving. For the last possibility (b-en), which is of course not very likely in practice,
this can explained as follows. When the state is a net creditor a rise in the interest rate
leads to a shift of income from the private sector to the state. As government
expenditure is assumed to be fixed, the ensuing fall in private sector consumption
implies an increase in aggregate saving. Conversely, if the state is a net debtor the
higher interest rate leads to a higher private sector income and thus tends to lower
savings.l? If this destabilizing effect of public debt is strong relative to the stabilizing
impact of the simultaneous shift from wage-earners to profit-earners, this may give
17 Note that in the present analysis the growth rate is exogenous, This assumption will be relaxed in
ch.5.
'8 This assumes that the interest rate varies with the proCit rate according to eq. 2.12. As this equation
concerns long-term equilibrium this condition i8not generally true in the short period. Note that the partial
effects of ". and r on savinge are:
as/a". = 82(1-"2) - 81(1-"1)
as/ar = -{82(1-"2) - 81(1-"1)}a - sl(I-"l)b
As both". and r probably respond positively to excess demand it can de seen that the profit rate is generally
stabilizing while in this model the interest has a destabili&ing (positive) impact on demand. Therefore it
depends on whether r or ". reacts stronger if short-period equilibrium i8 stable or not. But even if the
condition for short-period stability is less restrictive than condition 2.17, it is probable that this long-
period condition will be relevant for the system'. stability in the medium or the long term.
19 While the case of the state as a net creditor is not very likely, a similar effect may in the short run
arise due to pension funds. It is well-known that these funds, which in practice belong to the greatest
investors, are very reluctant to pasa changes in their returns to their contributors. As a result a rise in
property income does not lead to an equivalent rise in disposable private income, and thus to an increase
in aggregate savinge. This is of course only true if individuals do not look through the 'pension fund veil'.
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rise to a reverse Cambridge effect. Hence public debt should not be too large, thus
rewriting equation 2.17:
I
b < C {(cO-c1) + (c1-c2)(1-a)}
1
it can thus be seen that there exists a maximum for public debt beyond which the
Cambridge effect becomes reversed.
Unfortunately, the model described above gives no neat solution for the steady state.
Solving the differential system for Da=O and Db=O it yields a cubic function with
three possible solutions. In order to grasp the basic features of the model we shall
therefore examine two simplified cases: first, a quasi -schizophrenic Kaldorian version,
where differential saving arises from differences in tax rates. And secondly, a
Pasinetti version with different savings propensities for capitalists and workers. In
both cases for simplicity it is assumed that the profit rate is equal to the interest rate
(~=O).
2.6 DIFFERENTIAL TAXING
The schizophrenic interpretation of Kaldor's savings equation by Samuelson-
Modigliani and others, according to which differential saving is due to different
attitudes of individuals towards wage income and profit income, is generally rejected
(cf. Kaldor 1966, Pasinetti 1983). However, if one recognizes that taxes may also cause
differences in effective propensities to save this version of Kaldor's model become
more relevant again. As known, wages and profits are treated differently in most tax
systems. If profits are taxed at a higher rate than wages there will exist a positive
Cambridge relation even if workers and capitalists have the same savings propensities.
In this section we will analyse a simple quasi-schizophrenic Kaldorian model with:
I. s1 = s2 = s
II. TO < T 1 = T 2
(uniform savings propensities)
(lower taxes on wages than on profits and interest).
Steady state
Denoting the uniform savings rate by s the model yields the following unique steady
state solution.20
20 The solution for Da=O and Db=O yields a second solution at an infinite interest rate and an
undetermined debt ratio a. This solution i. neglected as it make. little sense economically.
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i {i + g - 'oY - s{1-,o)y}







This solution implies the following remarkable results:
I. capitalists vanish in the long run;
2. the size of public debt is negatively associated with government expenditure;
3. the size of public debt is independent of the tax rates.
This last 'Pasinetti paradox' for public debt is apparently due to the fact that the
impact of the tax rates on the interest rate, and thereby on public debt, is such that
it precisely offsets the direct impact of the tax rates on public debt.










-.5 t, ~ Db=O
Explanation: This figure is based on the following numerical values: i=4%; y=O.4;4>=0;
s,=s2=5=O.l; '0=0.15; ',='2=0.2; g/y=0.16.
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Dynamics
The dynamics can be discussed with reference to the phase diagram (figure 2.1),
which shows the Da=O and Db=O curves in the {b,a} plane. The r=oo boundary
represents the condition for a positive Cambridge effect (eq, 2.17). Only the region
below this boundary is relevant. The peculiar shape of this diagram is due to the fact
that, because workers and capitalists have the same net saving rate with respect to
profits, Da and Db are independent of the net debt of capitalists (a). Steady state
equilibrium is represented by point A. This equilibrium can be seen to be stable,
locally as well as globally, for any starting point below the r=oo boundary.
The exact conditions for local stability of solution A can be derived from the
linearized differential system.
[
Da ] H.[a - as]
Db b bs
where the subscript s denotes the steady state equilibrium and the elements of the H-
matrix are given b
h" = - i + s(l-T,)r
h12 = - s(l-T,)(l-a)ar/ab
h21 = 0
h22 = - i + (l-T,)r + {(l-T,)b - (T,-To)}ar/ab
where ar/ab is determined by eq. 2.16. Solution A is locally stable if the real parts of
the eigenvalues, evaluated in A, are negative, or by the Routh-Hurwitz conditions if
Trace (H)
Det (H)
h" + h22 < 0
h'1·h22 - h'2.h2' > 0
Since h21=0 the conditions require simply h'l<O and h22<O, which implies
i > 0 (2.20)
i - s(l-T,)r > 0
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After substitution for r and taking account of the condition for a positive Cambridge
effect condition (2.20) c~n be solved into21
y-g
(2.20')i >
This condition is satisfied if the rate of investment (and government expenditure) is
sufficiency high in relation to the rate of saving.
A remarkable consequence of these conditions, when they are superimposed on
the solution for government debt (2.17), is that any stable equilibrium must be
characterized by a negative government debt. As a corollary the steady state budget
deficit must permanently show an excess of income over outlays. This is evidently odd
in practice. It is apparently due to the destabilizing impact of public debt, which
tends to raise expenditure, and thereby the interest rate. This gives rise to a further
increase in debt service and thus of the budget deficit as well. In case of a creditor
position for the government an increase in this position leads to a lower interest rate,
and therefore to a smaller surplus on the budget.
2.7 DIFFERENT SAVINGS PROPENSITIES
These rather discomforting results are not specific to the Kaldor variant discussed
above, but are obtained for other versions of the general model as well. As an
alternative we shall now consider a Pasinetti variant where differential saving is
caused by different savings propensities of workers and capitalists. This model is thus
characterized by:
I. s2 > s1
II. 1"0 = T 1 = 1"2 = 1"
(higher propensity to save of capitalists)
(uniform tax rates)
Steady state
Under these propositions the model has two steady state solutions: a two-class
'Pasinetti' solution and a dual 'anti-Pasinetti' solution where the capitalists have
21 Substitution of r in (2.20) yields: i>O and
As a positive Cambridge eCCectin the steady state requires (eqs. 2.17 and 2.18):
it can easily be seen that both the numerator and the denominator of the above equation must be >0, hence
equation 2.20'.
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disappeared. Itmay be noted that this second solution is 'anti-Samuelson-Modigliani'
as well because income distribution is still an effective mechanism for ensuring
savings-investment equilibrium, no longer indeed through redistribution between
capitalists and workers but now through redistribution between workers and the state.
These solutions are:





s2 (l-s2)x - (l-s,)(g-ry)
1 - i (1-s2)(s2-s1)a







where x == i+g-ry-s1(l-r)y. With respect to the first solution we can observe that
I. income distribution exhibits the familiar Pasinetti feature that the interest rate
(== profit rate) is determined by the growth rate and the net savings rate (1-r)s2;
2. public debt is negatively associated with government expenditure (for any i>O),
just as in the Kaldorian model discussed above;
3. the size of public debt is independent of savings of workers.
According to the dual solution, where capitalists have disappeared, the interest rate
as well as the debt ratio depend on the savings propensity of workers. Further, this
solution implies a normal, positive, relation between public debt and government
expenditure (for any b-O).
Boundary conditions
These results are again subject to several boundary conditions (eq. 2.22 below). For
the first (Pasinetti) solution the boundary conditions with respect to the wealth of




respectively. These conditions are satisfied if investment is sufficiently high. For the
dual solution, on the contrary, the inflation barrier (y-x-ra ~ X) requires investment
to be low:
i+(g-1"y)-(l-1"){I-(I-s,)X}Y ~ 0 (2.22b)
Figure 2.2 Phase diagram for the Paslnetti variant
b
a
Explanation: This figure is based on: y=O.4; i=0.04; 1=0.2; g/y=0.21; s,=0.05; s2=0.3.
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Dynamics
The dynamics of this model can derived from the phase diagram (figure 2.2) showing
the Db=O and Da=O conditions in the (b,a) plane. Note that Da=O is also satisfied for
any point on the a=l line as well. The condition of a positive Cambridge effect is
again limited by the (r=oo) curve; only the area below this boundary is relevant. Apart
from the singularity point [a=L, b=Il) the system has two solutions, one at a=O.3
(Pasinetti state) and the other at a=l (dual state). In both cases public debt is negative.
As can be seen from the diagram the second solution is locally (not globally) stable;
the first solution is characterized by a saddle-point configuration and is thus unstable.
As to the adjustment trajectory we can distinguish the two cases:
1. if the system starts from a point right of the separatrix S-S, but below the r=oo
boundary, it will tend to the anti-Pasinetti state (II). During this adjustment
process the share of wealth of capitalists shrinks asymptotically to zero.
2. if the starting point is left of the S-S curve, public debt will grow for ever,
pushing up the interest rate further and further, leading to an ever greater wealth
of capitalists (path T - T in the figure).
Note that for any starting point with a positive public debt (be-O)the system can never
reach the stable solution (II).
The conditions for local stability can be obtained from the linearized system (2.23)
evaluated in its steady state solution (as,bs)
[
Da] = H. [ a-as]
Db b-bs
(2.23)
where the elements of the H-matrix are
h11 = - i + s2(1-r)r - (1-r)(I-a)s2ar/aa
h12 = - s2(1-r)(I-a)ar/ab
h21 = - (l-r)bar/aa
h22 = - i + (1-r)r + (1-r)bar/ab
where ar/aa and ar/ab are again determined by equation 2.16. The resulting stability
conditions22 are given in table 2.1 together with the other constraints for this model.
22 See Appendix 2.B for the derivation of these conditions.
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a < I :
y-1r+ra>x:
11.+).. > 0
where Jl. = g-ry,).. = i-s,(I-r)y and u = (I-r)(l-x)
These results are illustrated graphically in figure 2.3 which shows all possible
combinations of p. and )...For simplicity the boundary conditions with respect to the
minimum wage share have been neglected.
Figure 2.3 Long-term characteristics of the Pasinetti variant
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The characteristics of both solutions in each of the six regions in this graph are
summarized in table 2.2. On the basis of these results we can conclude that:
I. there is no feasible Pasinetti state which is both stable and satisfies the boundary
conditions; the first solution in each region is either characterized by negative
wealth of capitalists (I-a<O), or by instability, or a reverse Cambridge effect.
2. in contrast, the dual solution may satisfy the stability conditions as well as the
boundary conditions, but only when J,l and), lie in zone I or II, i.e. if
-)./s,<J,l<).( I-s2)/(s2-s,). These regions are however quite restrictive: if, for
example, the rate of investment falls below s,(I -r)y the model can never satisfy
these conditions. Further, note that in the stable regions I and II public debt is
always negative.
Table 2.2 Characteristics of the Pasinetti model
zone Solution I Solution II
b I-a Cambridge stability b Cambridge stability
effect (+=stabIe) effect (+=stable)
I - + + - - + +
II - + - + - + +
III +/- + - + - + -
IV + - - - + - +
V + - + + + - +
VI +/- - + + + - -
Thus, any stable long-term equilibrium, if it exists at all, is characterized by the
disappearance of capitalists (a=l) and a net creditor position of the government (b-etl).
This conclusion is the same as the conclusion reached for the Kaldor variant above.
These unsatisfactory results in the two simplified variants considered above are not
really changed for more general examples. Numerical simulations for the general
model, within a fairly wide range for the parameters, did not yield any stable solution
with positive government debt and positive interest rate. Apparently the 'classical'
post-Keynesian model, even in its hybrid version above, is too rigid to yield
satisfactory results when the government budget constraint is superimposed onto it.
In this respect our analysis gives support to the Samuelson-Modigliani criticism of
Pasinetti's model, that the distribution-mechanism is too restricted to ensure savings-
investment equilibrium within a reasonably wide range of possible parameter settings
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of the model. However, we do not agree with their inference that the natural solution
for these problems is to assume a variable technique of production. There exist other,
more obvious, remedies. In the first place, one may introduce a more flexible savings
function including interest and wealth effects. Further, one should relax the
assumption of exogenous investment and also government behaviour should be
modelled more carefully. Finally, one cannot truly discuss the short and long-term
dynamics of private and public debt without introducing a monetary sector in the
model. These latter modifications will be discussed in later chapters. By way of a pre-
view of the consequences to be expected we shall now, in this final section of the
present chapter, examine the implications for our 'classical' post-Keynesian model if
a more sophisticated savings function and a variable technique of production are
introduced.
2.8 INTEREST AND WEALTH EFFECTS
While maintaining the basic structure of our model we shall now introduce interest
and wealth effects in the savings equation and make the technique of production
dependent on the factor prices (represented by 11"). Again choosing linear relations the
equations for the savings of workers (S,) and capitalists (S2) and the production
technique (y)23 become
s, = s'o + s,{(I-To)(y-1r)+(I-T,)(a+b)r) + s,r<I-T,)r - sh,(a+b)
S2= s20 + s2(l-T 2)(1f+ar) + s2r(I -T2)r - s2il-a)




while the budget constraints (2.13) and (2.14) now become
Da + Db = S, - (a-b)!
Da = - S2 + (l-a)i
(2.14')
(2.15')
where sio = autonomous saving of class i (i=I,2)
sir = interest effect on saving of class i
siz = wealth effect on saving of class i
23 Note that y i. the reciprocal of the capital output ratio (K!Y) for which it is asaumed that K!Y =
(l-/J.fr)!yo·
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All other equations remain the same. For the steady state the model again gives three
possible solutions. Unfortunately the price of greater flexibility of the model is, as
always, a loss of transparency.
As it is not rewarding to examine this model analytically we shall present some
numerical exercises. In general, it has become clear from the numerical simulations
that this model yields 'normal' solutions for a wide range of parameter settings. This
is apparently due to the mitigating influence of interest effects on saving and the
choice of technique. However, inclusion of the wealth effects clearly proved to worsen
the stability of the model.
Dynamics
Figure 2.4a shows the phase diagram for a 'Pasinettian' set of parameters with uniform
tax rates and different saving rates for workers and capitalists. As the figure brings
out this model has two solutions in the relevant region where a-cI, one of which is
stable and the other is not. The stable solution (A) is characterized by a positive public
debt (b/y=1.39) and a positive (real) interest rate (r=1.4%). Moreover, this solution
satisfies the boundary conditions for any reasonable minimum for the income of
workers.
Whether the system actually tends to this stable solution depends on its initial
position. Particularly if the system starts with a large initial public debt it may
develop into a unstable process of continuously growing public debt and falling debt
of capitalists (the C-C path in the figure). If public debt is even so large that the
starting point is above the {r=oo}boundary the system is subject to a reverse
Cambridge effect as well.
Adjustment process
Now imagine that the system is in its stable equilibrium (A) and that government
expenditure is raised from 0.24 to 0.25. As figure 2.4b brings out the system will tend
gradually to the new equilibrium (A') with a higher b and lower a. If, however,
government expenditure is raised further to 0.26, the stable solution disappears and
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Explanation: i=4%; s,=0.1; sz=O.4; TO=T,=TZ=0.2; Yo=O.4; /3=0; </>=1; s,r=sZr=2;
slo'sZo,slz,s2z=0; g/y=0.24, 0.25, 0.26
Figure 2.5 shows the adjustment trajectories following the rise in government
expenditure from 0.24 to 0.25 and 0.26 respectively on a time axis. If government
expenditure is raised to 0.25 the simulated time path shows a slow and gradual rise in
public debt (b) and the interest rate (r) and a fall in debt of capitalists (a) to their new
steady state values. This is shown by the solid curves. In the second case, when g is
raised to 0.26 the adjustment process (dashed line) also happens to be as slow and
gradual for many years. However, after several decades this gradual process changes
quite abruptly into a accelerating process with a sharply rising interest rate and a
polarizing distribution of wealth.
Minimum growth rate
These exercises bring out that the system yields a stable steady state equilibrium as
long as g does not exceed a certain limit. Similarly, one can establish a boundary
below which the growth rate i should not fall for a stable equilibrium to exist. For
example if g=0.25 there is a stable solution as long as i>3.4%. Thus for i=4%, as in the
example above, it does indeed possess a stable solution. However, when g=0.26 the
critical value for i rises to 6.3%, which exceeds the growth rate in our example, so that
the system becomes inevitably unstabte.i"
24 In chapter 6 it will be shown that this critical growth rate corresponds to the bifurcation point of
a catastrophe manifold.
36 CHAPTER 2
Table 2.3 Partial effects on the minimum growth rate necessary for stability









Explanation: These effects have been calculated with reference to the steady state
given in figure 2.4. One should be careful to compare the magnitude of these effects
as an equal change in each variable may entail very different impacts in absolute
amounts.
*) In order to make these effects more comparable to the other effects they have been
multiplied by 100 as they are attached to the interest or growth rate.
Table 2.3 gives the partial effects of each parameter on the growth rate which is at the
minimum required for a stable solution to exist. This partial effect is thus a measure
for the stabilizing or destabilizing impact of those parameters. If a parameter has a
stabilizing influence, an increase in this parameter will reduce the critical growth rate;
if a parameter has a destabilizing impact it raises the minimum growth rate. The
results corroborate our observations above. Government expenditure (g) and the
wealth effects (s1z' s2z) turn out to have a strong destabilizing impact on the system.
All other variables appear to mitigate the intrinsic instability of the system, including
the substitution coefficient of production technique (f3).
The destabilizing impact of the wealth effect on saving is remarkable as in most
other investigations of the dynamics implied by the government budget constraint it
proved to be an essential stabilizing factor (cf. Blinder and Solow 1973. Tobin and
Buiter 1976. Christ 1979, Rau 1985 and also Asada 1987). This contrary result is a
consequence of our focus on long-term growth equilibrium. Most other investigations
have concentrated on a short-term Keynesian world with price rigidity and without
growth. We shall return to these matters in later chapters. when the medium-period
dynamics. so far neglected in our model, are explicitly taken into account.
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2.9 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have examined the dynamics of long-term asset accumulation on
the basis of a simple two-class post-Keynesian model including a government sector.
This model has been built on two central relationships: the relation between income
distribution and aggregate saving which ensures saving-investment equilibrium, and
the relation between the budget constraints and the growth of wealth (or debt) which
determines the long-term dynamics of the model.
Our discussion of differential saving revealed that the mere existence of retained
earnings is not a sufficient explanation of a higher propensity to save out of profits
than out of wages. Therefore, we developed a synthesis between Kaldor's view that
differences in savings propensities must be explained from the nature of business
income, and Pasinetti's standpoint that savings propensities should be attached to
social groups or classes. The latter implies that one may not neglect the role of
accumulating financial wealth or debt of firms and their owners.
Introduction of the government budget constraint gave support to the Samuelson-
Modigliani (1966) argument that the post-Keynesian model is too rigid to yield
acceptable solutions for long-term equilibrium. It was found that a stable solution, if
it exists at all, is always characterized by the disappearance of one class (the
'capitalists') and by a negative public debt. This is, of course, not very likely in
practice.
In the final section it was shown that this counter-intuitive result may be remedied
by introducing interest sensitivity of savings. In this respect we followed a different
route from Samuelson and Modigliani who argued that the limitations of the post-
Keynesian model should be solved by introducing a well-behaved production
function. The numerical exercises in our final section indicated that a flexible
technique of production may indeed mitigate the intrinsic instability of the system,
but that it is by no means a necessary, or even the most important factor.
The model considered so far is too simple to give an appropriate account of the
dynamics of public debt in a two-class model. The assumption of an exogenous
growth rate and the neglect of the monetary sector is especially unsatisfactory. In the
ensuing chapters we shall therefore develop a more sophisticated model with
endogenous investment and a proper representation of medium-term dynamics.
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Appendix l.A A Iife-cyc:le model of differential saving
This appendix shows that a life-cycle model of saving can be fully consistent with the
Cambridge savings equation if two distinct classes (workers and capitalists) are
introduced with different attitudes towards saving and bequests. The model is a simple
overlapping generations model with two classes (workers and capitalists) and two
generations of each class (young and old) living at anyone time. Following Pasinetti
1983 we assume that workers save only for their old age, whereas capitalists save for
inheritance too. Choosing suitable dimensions the budget constraints for each group
can be written as:
young workers: W = Cwy+ Zwo(+1)
pensioned workers: (l+r)Zw/(i+n) = Cw/(l+n)
young capitalists: (l+r)ZCY= CCY+ Zco(+l)
old capitalists: (1+r)Zcc/(l+n) = Ccc/(l+n) + ZCY
where consumption of group i,j
wealth of group i,j (beginning of period)
population growth
profit rate or interest rate
wage
w.c for workers and capitalists respectively
y.o for the young and the old respectively
X in the next period
j
xr-n-
Young workers receive wage-income only. Pensioned workers consume the whole of
their capital saved in the foregoing period. Young capitalists receive an inheritance
at the beginning of the period. The amount of this inheritance is decided by the
pensioned capitalists. For simplicity the rate of interest is assumed to be equal to the
profit rate (no entrepreneurial reward). Further, employment is assumed to be given
by the number of young workers. Capital stock is determined by savings in the past.
Choosing capital stock equal to unity we obtain:
Y = W + r





The consumption rates cw'c, and Czare determined by the intertemporal optimum for
each group. The optimization procedure is well-known in literature (cf. Baranzini
1982) and does not need to be repeated here.
Let us first consider the short-term solution for aggregate consumption C
After substitution for W, Zco and Zcy we get
where Cc= c,( l-cz)+cz is the average consumption rate of the capitalist class (young
and old). Since Zwois predetermined, the effect of a shift in income distribution in
favour of profits (r) is given by
where the first two terms on the right hand side represent the distribution effect of
a change in r, and X; measures the intertemporal substitution effect (the effect on Cw
and cc). Note that the distribution effect is negative, i.e. a normal Cambridge effect
of profits on savings, if, and only if
The overall effect depends on both the distribution effect and the substitution effect
(Xr), the outcome of which is not certain a priori. It is evident that this condition is
more likely to be fulfilled if the share of workers in total wealth is smaller, and thus
the income of pensioned workers is less relative to the income of capitalists. In the
extreme case with Zwo=Othis condition reduces to the familiar Cambridge condition
C?Cc. However, for the other extreme, i.e. a single class model without capitalists
(therefore Zwc/(l+n)=l), the distribution effect is certainly negative, entailing a
reverse Cambridge effect, for any cw<l. Hence we can conclude that for a normal
Cambridge effect workers should own not too large a share of total wealth.
Now consider the long run. In steady state equilibrium with constant n, rand W
the amount of wealth per person must be constant as well, hence
and
Substitution in the budget constraints for workers and capitalists yields
Zwo= (l-cw)W
hr = (hn)/(l-cc)
This latter result is remarkable as it implies that this model is also subject to the
Pasinetti paradox; that is, the profit rate depends exclusively on the growth rate and
the savings propensity of capitalists. Again, this conclusion is of course valid only for
Zco>O;if Zco=Othis model yields an anti-Pasinetti dual, just as in the more traditional
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Pasinetti models.
If these results are substituted in dCjdr above we obtain
and hence a normal Cambridge distribution effect (dCjdr<O) if
n >(l-cw}Y - Cw
The rate of growth (and thus the rate of investment) should thus be sufficiently large
in relation to the savings of workers. This condition is not surprising as the share of
workers in total wealth is less as they provide less of the savings necessary for
investment.
Appendix 2.B Dynamics of the Pasinetti variant of the model with government.
This appendix determines the conditions for local stability of the Pasinetti-variant of
the model with a government sector in section 2.7.
Solution I
Linearization of (2.14) and (2.15) gives
[
Da] = H.[ a-as]
Db b-bs




hzz = (l-sz)ijsz + (l-T}barj8b
and the Routh-Hurwitz conditions
RH(I): -sz(I-T)(l-a)8rj8a + (l-sz)i!sz + (I-T)barj8b < 0
RH(2): -(I-sz)(l-T)(I-a)8rj8a> 0
After substitution for a and 8rj8a the second condition yields
{(1-sZ)x - (I-s,)(g-ry)}/x > 0
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where x = i+g-ry-s,(l-r)y.
Now consider RH(l). After substitution for a, b, 8rj8a and 8rj8b we find
i (l-s2)x - (l-s1)(g-ry)
1 - - > 0
s2 x
Now define II = g-ry and I-' = i-s,(l-r)y which implies x = 11+1-'. It can then be assessed
that these conditions together require
Solution II
For the second solution where a=1 we find h12=0 which reduces the Routh-Hurwitz
conditions to hll>O and h22>0. After substitution for rand 8rj8b these conditions
yield
i » 0 and
(l-S2)X - (l-s1)(l-r)y
x - (l-s1)(g-ry) >0
which is satisfied if in terms of II and I-' defined above
I-s2
i > 0 and (s111+I-')(1I - -- 1-') < 0
s2-s1
These results are presented in table 2.1 in the text.
CHAPTER 3
FINANCE, RISK AND THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the distinctive features of post-Keynesian theory is the proposition that the
profit rate is determined by the growth rate rather than vice versa (cf. Kaldor 1966,
Asimakopoulos 1986). This theorem is based on the differential savings equation and
the Keynesian notion that, in the aggregate, savings are determined by investment. In
criticizing this theorem Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) pointed out that the alleged
growth rate - profit rate relation is merely an equilibrium condition which must be
satisfied in every model of growth, and is thus by no means exclusive to post-
Keynesian theory. A similar view was put forward by Brems (1979) who argues that,
formally, in any theory the growth rate. and the profit rate are determined
simultaneously. The difference between post-Keynesian and other theories should
therefore be motivated in terms of the relative independence of investment from
savings and the responsiveness of income distribution to discrepancies between ex ante
savings and investment.
Post-Keynesian authors have, however, proved very reluctant to give an
appropriate account of these relationships. This is especially true for the explanation
of investment. It is striking that for this variable, which is assigned such a central
place in the explanation of growth and distribution, hardly even the outlines of a
coherent theory among post-Keynesian authors can be distinguished. Joan Robinson
(1956, p.244) even explicitly refuses to develop a theory of investment: "there is no
way of reducing the complexities of the inducement to invest to a simple formula.
We must be content with the conclusion that, over the long run, the rate of
accumulation is likely to be whatever it is likely to be". In a similar vein
Asimakopoulos (1986,p.89) argues: "The possible relations between finance, investment
and saving in the post-Keynesian approach are thus complex [... ]. No general
statement about their relationship which does not recognize (the particular historical)
circumstances can adequately represent the post-Keynesian position." This opinion,
although understandable, is unsatisfactory as it frustrates the further development of
post-Keynesian theory.'
1 Robinson (1962, p.S7) seems aware of this problem herself as in her 'model DC accumulation' she proposes
to express the 'animal spirita' as a function of expected profits.
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This chapter develops a coherent microeconomic framework for the long-
term explanation of investment. Our starting point is the growth strategy of a
representative, permanently growing firm. The central question of the present analysis
is what growth rate a firm will choose when it takes full account of the consequences
of sustaining this growth rate for its financial position and its risk posture in the long
run. This setting of the problem is basically similar to that of the so-called
'managerial' theories of growth of the firm (cf. Williamson 1966, Uzawa 1969, Marris
1971, Solow 1971, Odagiri 1981). The managerial approach is especially interesting
because it takes account of the conflict of interests between the managers and the
owners of the firm (shareholders). However, these theories concentrate on the
organizational and product market constraints on the firm's growth and tend to neglect
the financial limitations.
This chapter is organized as follows. After a concise overview of post-Keynesian
and 'managerial' theories of investment (section 3.2) and a brief discussion of the
financial limitations to growth (section 3.3), we shall in section 3.4 develop a basic
model for a small (corporate) firm without access to the equity market. It will be
shown that this firm faces a trade-off between the rate of growth and its risk posture
(section 3.5). Section 3.6 establishes the optimum growth rate on the basis of this
growth-risk frontier and the managerial preferences towards growth, risk and
profitability. Finally, section 3.7 considers the determination of the pay-out of profits
to shareholders. In the next chapter this basic model will be extended by the
introduction of the equity market and the costs of growth. Attention will then also be
paid to the adjustment process.
3.2 POST-KEYNESIAN THEORIES OF INVESTMENT
Although a well-developed post-Keynesian theory of investment does not exist, it is
possible to distinguish three basic approaches:
a. the 'internal savings' approach, which links investment to the flow of retained
profits;
b. the 'investment opportunities' approach, which concentrates on the limited
availability of profitable investment projects;
c. the 'managerial' approach, which explains the restraint on investment from the
organizational and marketing efforts necessary to sustain a certain rate of growth.
a. Internal savings
The first approach builds on the classical and Marxian 'surplus' theories of saving and
investment, according to which accumulation takes place primarily through
reinvestment of current profits. This idea was taken up by Kalecki (1937,1943) and
later elaborated by Wood (1975) and Eichner (1976). A very strict variant is found in
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Pasinetti (1981) who assumes that growth in each sector is financed purely by internal
savings. Kalecki (1937,1943) allows for the possibility of debt financing in addition
to internal savings. However, by assuming that firms aim at a constant rate of
indebtedness, Kalecki also finds a fixed relation between investment and internal
savings. If investment is raised above this target rate, more external funds are needed.
As a result the rate of indebtedness rises, and thus the risk increases. On the basis of
this 'principle 0/ increasing risk' Kalecki (1937, p.447) proposed the following
expression for investment:
1=(I-d)S+V
where I = investment, S = internal savings, d = ratio of debt to net worth and V
measures the effect of a shift in the marginal rate of return schedule.
A more sophisticated model is given by Wood (1975), who establishes a 'finance
frontier' for corporate firms, representing the maximum rate of investment given the
net returns of the firm and its targets for the pay-out of net returns (6)and the degree
of external financing (f), thus2
1-6
I ~ I-f (?I'-a.r)K
where lI' = profit rate, r = interest rate, a = ratio of debt to capital stock, t = fraction
of investment financed externally. and K = capital stock. The main weakness of this
model, and of Kalecki's, is that the target variables 6 and e, are assumed to be fixed.
Although Wood is right that in the short term firms tend to rely on given norms for
their financial policy, it seems unwarranted to consider these norms as exogenous in
the long run too. In our view a long-term analysis should explain why a firm chooses
a particular level for its targets. Therefore Wood's analysis appears to be suited more
to the short or medium term than for the long term.
b. Investment opportunities
The second approach takes just the opposite point of departure and concentrates on
investment-opportunities rather than finance as the limiting factor of the firm's
growth. Following Keynes it is assumed that the evolution of a well-developed
financial system has separated the investment decision from the ex ante saving and
finance decisions. As is well-known, this 'separability' theorem was later formulated
rigorously by Modigliani and Miller (1958). who showed that the method of finance
is irrelevant to the cost of capital and therefore to the investment decision as well.
The focus in (post- )Keynesian theories of investment thus shifted to investment
2 For expoaitory reason. we have neglected depreciation.
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opportunities as the basic limiting factor. Financial aspects received little attention,
being reduced to a given (exogenous) cost of capital (cf. Harrod 1948), treated as a
fixed side condition (cf. Kaldor 1961, Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962), or neglected
altogether (cf. Robinson 1956, 1962).3 Instead, investment is related - in an ad-hoc
manner - to demand (Harrod 1948), prospective profits (Robinson 1963, Kaldor and
Mirrlees 1962) or a combination of both (Kaldor 1957,1961).4
c. Managerial theories 0/ growth
Managerial, or 'corporate,' theories of growth5 concentrate on the dynamic constraints
on the growth of individual (corporate) firms due to the managerial and marketing
efforts necessary to keep up a certain growth rate. In contrast with the foregoing
approaches this theory is thus essentially microeconomic. The core of the theory of
corporate growth is a concave 'growth-valuation' frontier representing the trade-off
between the valuation of the firm (q) and its growth rate (i) (figure 3.1). Because
shareholders desire maximization of the market value of their shares they would
prefer growth rate (i*) in the figure which corresponds to the highest possible
valuation (q"), However, as managers are more interested in the expansion of the firm,
they will generally select a higher growth rate (i>i*). Given the concavity of the q-i
frontier the actual growth rate will depend on the preferences of the management and
on their discretionary power vis-a-vis the shareholders.
3 According to Robinson (1956, p.51) internal finance may hold back investment at best temporarily: "It
is a large and rapid rise in the rate of investment, not a high rate of investment which the finance limit
prevents."
4 In his early growth modele Kaldor (1957,1961) divides investment into a demand related ('acceleration')
component and a profit related component. Kaldor motivates the latter component with reference to
Kalecki's principle of increasing risk. He does not elaborate this financial aspect further. In hie 'new' model
(Kaldor and Mirrleee 1962) Kaldor introduces his well-known 'pay-back period' criterion for investment;
this 'rule of the thumb' implies that investment ie related to the (undiscounted) prospective returns within
a certain time-horillon. Recently Blatt (1983) has shown that in the presence of 'Knightian' uncertainty this
criterion may be warranted in the short term when firms rely on given norms and targets. However, in the
long run the length of the pay-back period should be considered as variable and should be explained in
terms of the risks and the costs of failure of investment projects. Hence even in this approach one cannot
explain long term investment behaviour without an assessment of the financial position and risk posture of
the firm (see also footnote 18 below).
5 Seminal contributions to the managerial theory of growth have been made by Baumol (1959), Penrose
(1959), Marris (1964) and Williamson (1966). Although these contributions are certainly non-neoclassical,
they are not usually labelled as pos1;-Keynesian. Nevertheless we have included them in our survey of post-
Keynesian investment theory bec.alolsethis approach has much in common with the post-Keynesian
approach, especially the emphaei ....oo institutional and behavioural factors. Furthermore several post-
Keynesian authors have adopted this approach in order provide a microeconomic foundation for the
traditionally macroeconomic oriented post-Keynesian theory (cf. Eatwelll971, Wood 1971, 1975, Eichner
1975, 1988).
46 CHAPTER 3




For the motivation of the q-i frontier two approaches can be distinguished, one
emphasizing the internal, managerial costs of growth, and the other concentrating on
the external, marketing costs of growth.
I. According to the internal approach the growth of firms is constrained by the
limited capacity of the management and the time and effort necessary to find,
train and absorb new managers. Sometimes this constraint is conceived as an
absolute limit on the capacity to grow (cf. Penrose 1959, Slater 1980, Moss 1984),
while other authors assume managerial costs to rise or the efficiency to fall as the
firm expands faster (cf. Williamson 1966, Uzawa 1969, Baker 1978, Odagiri 1981).
2. The external approach explains the negative growth-profitability relation by the
costs for advertisement and R&D necessary to shift the demand curve for the
firm's products. This idea, which was put forward by Marris (1964), has been
elaborated by Solow (1971), Auberada (1979) and Seoka (1985). These authors
include the 'stock of goodwill' in the demand function for the firm's products and
explain the growth of goodwill from the amount of marketing effort. Lintner
(1971) extended Marris' model to an uncertain environment, and also showed that
a positive association between growth and the variability of profits may be
.sufficient to impose an effective constraint to the firm's growth rate.
These models of corporate growth provide an interesting microeconomic foundation
of investment behaviour. However, as in the 'investment opportunities' approach
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discussed above, they concentrate on the real costs of growth and pay little attention
to the financial aspects. Managerial theories appear to follow the separability approach
of finance and investment too. This is unsatisfactory, particularly for a theory which
stresses market imperfections and conflicting interests between shareholders and
managers.P
3.3 FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS TO GROWTH
In contrast to the 1960's and 1970's during which the Modigliani-Miller 'irrelevance
of finance' view reigned, it is nowadays widely recognized that the financing decision
is an essential element of the firm's development strategy as a whole. In this
connection it may be noticed that the focus of financial theory has shifted from
market equilibrium to the finance decisions of individual firms'? It is explicitly
recognized now that the firm is the typical legal and organizational entity for
production and investment; investment projects do not exist on their own, they exist
only when embedded in an organizational entity.8
As a corollary the risk of financing investment projects is not attached to these
projects as such but to the firm which carries them out. It is thus natural for capital
market investors and financial intermediaries to base their lending decisions on the
creditworthiness of the firm rather than on the direct merits of the investment plan.
Only in a perfect Modigliani-Miller world without liquidity constraints,
irreversibilities, information costs, (re)organization costs and costs of bankruptcy.
would it be permissible to abstract from the organizational and legal structure.
However, in such a world firms would not exist either and every investor would run
his/her own project.
One important aspect of the imperfection of financial markets is that the
opportunities for risk sharing are limited. Due to informational imperfections (most
of them related to the intrinsically asymmetrical nature of information about firms)
6 It may even be questioned if the separability theorem is not inconsistent with the idea of conflicting
interests between managers and shareholders. Aa is known, this separability theorem is valid only in a
Modigliani-Miller world with perfect capital markets and in the absence of bankruptcy costa and tax
subsidies. It is, however, difficult to see how with perfect capital markets the firm's strategy can ever diverge
from the interests of shareholders; any discrepancy between the actual and the potential maximum would
immediately lead to intervention by the shareholders. Since Jensen and Meckling'. (1976) .eminal
contribution on agency theory it ia now widely accepted that once the BI.umption of 100%control by the
shareholders is relaxed, one must also take account of the consequences of the finance decision for the
'ownership structure' of the firm and hence for the cost of controlling the management ('agency coat.').
7 In their introduction to a recent special issue on corporate finance of the Journal of Financial Economic.,
Jensen and Warner (1988, p.19) report "the expansion of financial economists' intereats from financial
marketa to research on behavior within corporations."
8 With respect to the modern theory of finance some authors make a di8tinction between agency theory,
and transaction cost theory; agency theory conceives the firm 88 a nexus of contracts, whereae the
transaction cost approach concentrates on the governance of production and finance (cf. Williamson 1988).
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the equity market is far from perfect; some authors even consider equity typically to
be rationed (cf. Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988a, 1988b). Consequentially, if firms have
only limited recourse to issues of new shares, they must manage risks on their own.
This implies that when deciding on production and investment they should take good
account of the consequences of these decisions for the financial position and risk
posture of the firm.
Further, the recognition of firms as distinct organizational entities raises the issue
of diverging interests between those who control the firm (the managers) and those
who supply the finance to it (shareholders, bondholders, credit institutions). In their
pioneering article on the agency theory of the corporate firm Jensen and Meckling
(1976), showed that the divergence of interests between the 'inside owners' of the firm
(the managers), and the 'outside owners' (the investors without a direct role in the
management) generates agency costs. These costs consist of the efforts of bonding and
monitoring and the residual loss to the investors (the 'principals') because the
managers (the 'agents') pursue different interests from theirs. According to Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p.312) managers are more interested in non-pecuniary benefits, such
as "the physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the secretarial staff,
a larger than optimal computer to play with, ... etc," than in the pecuniary benefits
which are reflected in the present value of the firm alone. As a result inside owners
(the managers) aim at a lower efficiency, and thus a lower valuation than outside
shareholders.
With respect to finance the critical distinction in Jensen and Meckling's theory is
thus not between the types of finance - debt or equity - , but between the sources of
finance: inside finance (from the personal wealth of those who control the firm) or
outside finance (from investors without any actual controlj.? A basic proposition of
their analysis is that as the volume of outside finance increases relative to inside
finance the divergence in interests will grow, thus leading to higher agency costs.
This applies to debt as well as to equity finance.
It is obvious that these theories on imperfect financial markets give new support to
the 'internal finance' approach of investment. In the presence of external financial
constraints the amount of inside finance, i.e. the wealth or savings of the inside
owners, is, of course, the essential limiting factor to the expansion of the firm.
In this chapter we shall develop a model of the growth of the firm concentrating
on the financial constraints. From the agency theory we adopt the proposition that the
supply of internal finance is a principal limiting factor to the growth of the firm.
Attention will also be given to the conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders. Wedo not follow Jensen and Meckling, however, in their neglect of risk.
9 In their theory the optimum debt-equity mix of finance is in fact a secondary problem. following from the
structure of agency coat. which are different for debt and equity.
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In this respect we agree with Greenwald and Stiglitz (l988b, p.252) that "every
production decision is a risk decision." Just because of the limited supply of inside
finance it can be shown that there is a crucial relationship between the rate of
expansion and the risk posture of the firm. In essence, this relationship is similar to
Kalecki's principle of increasing risk.
3.4 A BASIC MODEL
In order to concentrate on the financial aspects we shall consider the following
elementary model of a (small) corporate firm. The firm is a price-taker on both the
input and the output markets. Its production is subject to constant returns to scale and
diminishing marginal productivities of capital and labour. Production factors can be
adjusted instantaneously and without cost. As far as the firm holds positive stocks
of financial assets (including bank deposits) these yield the same interest rate as the
firm's debt. As we wish to concentrate on the internal constraints on growth, the
supply of loans is assumed to be perfectly elastic at the given interest rate; there exist
no liquidity constraints and no credit rationing. Finally, it is, as a first step, assumed
that the firm has no access to the equity market at all; it is thus fully equity rationed.
The firm operates in a 'steady state' environment: Technical change is purely labour
augmenting and (real) wage growth is equal to productivity growth, so that the profit
rate and relative prices are constant. The interest rate, time preference etc. are
constant as well.
The model uses the following variables (all stock and flow variables are in real terms
and expressed as ratios to capital stock):
a = debt, net of holdings of financial assets
= net investment (= growth rate of capital stock)
= labour employed (in efficiency units)
p = rate of inflation
P = output price
r = real interest rate (net of taxes)
R = nominal interest rate (= r+p)
W= real wage rate (per efficiency unit)
y = production (value added)
{) = pay-out of profits to shareholders (dividends)
7r = profit rate (net of taxes)
T'F = tax rate on profits
Tr = tax rate on nominal interest payments
T p = tax rate on inflationary change in nominal debt
¢ = depreciation rate
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The relevant relations for the firm may be then modelled as
Da = -y + WI + Ra + 6 + (i+t/I) + riy-Wi-t/l) - (TrR-Tpp)a - a(i+p)
11"= (I-T.,)(y-Wi-tp)






Equation 3.1 represents the budget constraint which states that the change in debt Da
is equal to the payments of wages Wi, interest Ra, pay-out of profits to shareholders
6, gross investment (i+t/I) and taxes on profits and interest payments less income from
production y and less the impact of nominal growth on the debt ratio, a(i+p). The
second and third equations define the profit rate 11"(after taxes) and the real interest
rate r (after taxes). Equation (3.4) represents the linear homogeneous production
function with the usual assumptions on differentiability.
Then, after substitution of equations (3.2) and (3.3) the budget constraint (3.1)
becomes
Da= -(11"-6) + ra + (I -ali (3.5)
This equation implies that in the steady state (Da=O) the debt ratio is determined by




Confining our argument for the moment to the case where retained profits exceed the





0< a < I
a > I
if (11"-5) > i > r
if i > (11"-6) > r
if i > r > (11"-6)
These results are obvious: if retained profits persistently exceed investment the firm
becomes a net creditor in the long run. If retained profits are less than needed for
investment the firm must continuously raise external funds and will thus become a net
10 As we will see the optimum growth rate will always exceed the interest rate (i>r) if (1r-6»r. In order
to ease our argument the explanation of the model is confined to this situation. The analysis is, however,
also valid for the case with (1r-6)<r. When discussing the optimum growth rate in section 3.6 we shall
return to this case.
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debtor. If moreover, the rate of interest exceeds the retained profits (r>(1r-6» the rate
of indebtedness will rise above unity, leading to insolvency of the firm.
Equation (3.6) implies that, if (1r-6»r, a higher growth rate implies a higher debt
ratio. At a given pay-out rate a higher indebtedness is thus the price that has to be
paid for a higher growth rate in the long term. This relation between growth and debt
is illustrated in figure 3.2. Notice that limi..a>a = 1, which means that there exists no
absolute financial limit on the growth rate." Further, this figure brings out that
a-+-oo if i approximates to r.
The profit rate has, of course, a negative effect on the debt ratio: if lr is higher,
less external finance is needed entailing a smaller debt ratio in the long run. The
influence of the interest rate is ambiguous: if the firm is a net debtor a higher interest
rate implies a higher steady state debt ratio; but, if the firm is a net creditor a higher
interest rate raises income of the firm and thus leads to a lower debt ratio (in casu a
larger credit position) in the long term. This is illustrated by the shift in the curve in
figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Growth and debt
-------------1
o 2%
Explanation: this figure is based on the following numerical values: 1r=0.10; 6=0.05;
and r=0.02 or 0.04 (in both cases (lr-6»r).
11 This result shows that Williamaon (1966) is wrong when arguing that there exists an absolute limit on
the growth rate due to the requirement that the growth rate should not exceed the retention rate. If one
allows for external debt, the requirement of positive net returns implies i < {(r-6)-ra}/(1-a) which is not
limiting at all if a ia free.
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3.S GROWTH-RISK FRONTIER
This simple relation between the rate of indebtness and growth offers a good point of
departure for the analysis of the long-term strategy of the firm. In the presence of
equity rationing it is evident that there exists a positive association between the rate
of indebtness and the financial risk of a firm.12 As we do not pursue a fully-fledged
assessment of the risk-posture of a firm, we shall adopt a simple device to introduce
financial risk in the present model. As mentioned above, we concentrate on borrowers'
risk; it is assumed that lenders are willing to supply funds unlimitedly at a given rate
of interest. Further, we adopt the conventional proposition that risk is adequately
measured by the second moment of the probability distribution (the variance).13
Now let the profit rate and interest rate be stochastic variables with known mean
1r and r and variances var(1r)and var(r).14Given the budget constraint, shocks in these
variables must be reflected either in distributed profits 6 or in net investment i, or in
the growth of debt Da. As it is well-established empirically that corporate dividends
are sticky 15we shall treat this variable as a constant in the short term. Further, we
shall follow Kalecki (1937) and Wood (1975) and assume that firms hold on to a given
12 The reasons for a p08itive relation between risk and the debt ratio are obvious: a large indebtedness
implies that a large part of net earnings has to be spent on fixed debt service, 80 that the remaining flow
of earnings becomes more sensitive to the volatility of the profit and the interest rate. Further, high debts
may worsen the creditworthine8s of the firm and thereby reduce ita capacity to raise external funds. Finally,
a high indebtedness enhances the risk of illiquidity and thus, in the event, the risk of bankruptcy as well.
13 A more sophisticated assessment of risk is given by Blatt (1983). He stresses that in an environment
eharaeterieed by 'Knightian' uncertainty firma will in the first instance attempt to avoid a disaster, i.e. such
as failure of the investment project that would lead to bankruptcy of the firm. As a corollary the downward
risk, i.e. the area under the lower tail of the probability distribution, is much more important than the first
two momenta of the probability distribution. Blatt shows that a modified pay-back period may in sueh
circumatances - in the short term - offer a better criterion for investment than the usual present value
method. In the long term the length of this pay-back period should be derived subject to the probability
distribution of costs and returns. Because of the complexity of thi8 problem his analysis remains rather
sketchy on this point. Therefore we shall follow a different approach with a simple conception of risk which
allows for an explicit analYlis.
14 The variance of the interest rate is determined by the simultaneous distribution of the nominal interest
rate (r+p) and the rate of inflation p, thus
var(r)=var(r+p)+var(p)-2covar(r+p,r).
The variance of the profit rate depends on the probability distribution of the wage rate, technical change
and the prices of input and output (P). If the technique of production and the rate of depreciation are
constant, the variance of" i. given by
var( lr)=y~ar(P)+/2var(W)-2ylcovar(P, W).
This expression shows that the variance of lr is not independent of the choice of technique. As a corollary,
the optimum technique of production will be dependent on the probability distribution of P and W.
Although a further analysis of this effect of uncertainty on the choice of technique is certainly interesting,
it would, however, make the present analysis unnecessarily complex and distract us from our main concern.
Therefore it will be neglected subsequently, so that var(lr) can be treated as a given and independent
parameter.
16 The classical contribution in this field of research is, of course, Lintner (1966).
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target for the rate of indebtedness in the short term, thus Da=O.This is motivated by
the observation that firms only periodically reconsider their financial strategies.l''
Consequently, if a and 6 are constant there is only one variable left which must absorb
all shocks, namely the growth rate 17; thus according to equation (3.5)
i - (i - 6 - fa)I-a (3.7)
where the tilde C) denotes the stochastic variables.18 As the variance of net returns
is thus fully transmitted into the variance of i,we may conceive var(i) as an indicator
of the risk posture of the firm. From (3.7) we find
1
var(i) = -- {(var(7r)+a2.var(r)-2a.covar(7r,r)}
(l-a)2
(3.8)
As the debt ratio depends on the growth rate (eq. 3.6) this result implies that there
exists a unique relation between the growth rate and the risk posture of the firm,
measured by its variability. This relation will be called the growth-risk frontier. As
figure 3.3 brings out this growth-risk frontier generally has a positive slope, reflecting
the fact that the risk increases as the growth rate is pushed up.
This general result, however, is not valid when the growth rate approximates to
the real interest rate. In this region risk is negatively associated with the growth rate.
This is because the firm is then a creditor, which has invested its wealth for the larger
part in financial assets rather than in capital goods (note that a-+-oo if i!r, see also
figure 3.3). As a result of this one-sided composition of the portfolio the benefits of
diversification decline and the risk rises again when i tends to r. This region with a
negatively sloping growth-risk frontier is, however, not very interesting as it will
prove to be non-eligible for any risk-averse firm.
It may be noted that the positive association between var(i) and i is also an
16 Apart from this theoretical motivation for a rigid debt ratio, this assumption also has a considerable
technical advantage because a varying debt ratio would create complicated autoregressive processes which,
unfortunately, cannot be reduced to a manageable ('Markov process') form on the analytical level.
17 Fauari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that this is especially true for firms with high retention and
low dividends. For mature, high dividend firms the relation between the variance in investment and net
returns may be looser, as dividends may absorb part of the variability. Their empirical analysis indicates
that variations in net return can explain a significant part of variations in the investment/capital ratio.
18 This result is similar to Lintner (1971) who also assumes a positive association between variations in
profits and investment, but different from e.g. Baker (1978) who assumes that dividends absorb the shocks
in the firm's earnings. For empirical support of the short-term relation between profits and investment on
the microeconomic level of the firm lee e.g. Eatwell (1971) and FaZllari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
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essential element in the analysis of Lintner (1971). He does not, however, motivate
this relation on the basis of theoretical considerations, but on the basis of an observed
relation between these variables in practice: "Empirically there is evidence that larger
retention undertaken to raise expected or average growth also leads to greater
















Explanation: this figure is based on: 11"=0.10;0=0.05; var(?r)=0.006; var(r)=0.005;
covar(?r,r)=0.002; r=0.02 and 0.04.
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3.6 OPTIMUM GROWTH
In managerial theories of growth it is assumed that managers aim at maximum growth
or size of the firm in contrast with shareholders who desire maximum market value.19
This is often motivated by the well-documented empirical observation that managerial
rewards (including the non-pecuniary rewards such as status and perquisites) are
related to the size of the firm rather than to its profitability (cf. Odagiri 1981). In the
present analysis we shall follow this approach and, more precisely, assume that
managers maximize the discounted sum of future sizes of the firm.20 How the size
must be measured is, however, not precisely clear. Weshall consider two alternatives:
the volume of production (Y) and the magnitude of capital stock (K). For the moment
we concentrate on the latter. Then the optimization problem is:
00 t
Maximize PV(K) = fK(t)exp{ -ofp(r)dr}dt
i,l,o 0
(3.9a)
subject to DK(t)=i(t).K(t); I(t) z. 0; K(t) z. 0
where p = rate of discount. The growth rate i, labour intensity I and pay-out 0 are
control variables; capital stock and the debt ratio are state variables. Since there are
no adjustment costs with respect to capital and debt the firm can freely choose its
initial capital stock subject to
1
K(O) = l-a(O) V0 (3.10)
where V0 is the given initial amount of net worth. As the initial value and the ultimate
value of the state variables are free it can be shown that this problem is similar to the
problem of choosing a once and for all constant growth rate i that maximizes21
19 Note that this representation of managerial preferences is different from that found in Jensen and
Meckling (1976), who explain the divergence in interesta between managers (in.ide owners) and shareholders
(outside owners) by the desire of managers for non-pecuniary reward. (perquisites) at the expense of the
current profits of the firm.
20 See Williamson (1966), Auberada (1979), Seoka (1986) for a .imilar as.umption. A. an alternative
hypothesis it i•• ometimes assumed that managers aim at maximum (.teady state) growth. A. growth it
generally easier as the initial lize i. smaller, thil hypothesis, however, tend. to give rise to unfortunate
resulta. Solow (1971) and Auberada (1979) showed that the growth maximizing firm yield. either the same
growth rate as the .ize maximiEing firm (if initial size is given), or give. rise to an infinite.imal emall
optimum initial .ize (if initial .ize is free).







subject to K(O) = Vc/(1-a) ; K(O)~ 0
a = (i-(,..-c5}}/(i-r)
where v (= PV(K)/V 0) is the valuation ratio of managers, i.e. the ratio of the
discounted size of capital stock and the given initial net worth V0 (>0). The last
constraint restates the steady state budget constraint (eq, 3.6).
The important question to be answered now is what holds back managers in their
desire to maximize the size of the firm ad infinitum. Given the budget constraint it
is obvious that a higher growth rate implies either a higher debt ratio, or a lower pay-
out to shareholders. A higher debt ratio is not attractive to managers as it raises the
financial risk for the firm, and thus the risk for the management as well. But it is
evident that the alternative of cutting the pay-out to shareholders may also affect
the position of the management. If shareholders become discontent with the firm's
policy, they have the ability to intervene and even to dismiss managers. Therefore,
managers must take account of the interests of shareholders too.
This chapter will concentrate on the first constraint, i.e. the increasing financial
risk as growth is higher. The other constraint, the necessity to keep shareholders
satisfied is considered in the next chapter. For simplicity the representative firm in
the present chapter is assumed to be a relatively small firm, which is owned by a
small, steady group of shareholders (for example a family). The pay-out of profits is
for the moment taken to be a fixed proportion of total profits.
Financial risk
For the incorporation of risk we follow - with slight modifications - the 'certainty
equivalent' method of Lintner (1971). Starting from an exponential utility function
U(x)= _XCI this author has shown that the certainty equivalent i* of a stochastic,
normally distributed, growth rate i is given by
i* = E(i)- !n var(i) (3.11)
Assuming a constant E(i)=i and a constant var(i) the present value PV of a variable
x(t) is given by
PV(x(t»= x(O).exp{(i- !cr var(i)-'7)t} (3.12)
where '7 indicates the rate of time preference. This expression can be reduced by
taking time preference '7 and risk premium !crvar(i) together in the risk adjusted
discount rate p, thus
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p = '1 + fa var(i) (3.13)
Now our model is complete and can be solved. After substitution for K(O) and











where var(i) is a function of the debt ratio (eq. 3.8) and y is given by the production
function y(/) (eq. 3.4). The rate of investment i and employment I are control
variables; the wage rate W, the pay-out rate 8 and the interest rate r are given.
Note that this procedure is only valid if i<p for all i. If there exists some i ~ p the
optimization problem (3.9b) becomes subject to the growth-stock paradox; that is, if
the integral does not converge v becomes infinite for a range of instrument settings,
so that no unique optimum can be determined.22 As in the present model the risk
premium var(i), and thus p, rises faster than i when i-+oo, so that
lim (i-p)= - 00
1-+00
it can be assessed that this model may produce a finite optimum without the growth
stock paradox.23
The basic considerations regarding the optimum growth rate can be discussed with
reference to the scheme of the causal relationships below. A higher growth rate has
a positive effect on v through its effect on the future scale of the firm, and on the
initial scale as well (as a result of the higher debt ratio). On the other hand, however,
a greater indebtedness also affects the risk posture of the firm, thus raising the
discount rate. For low growth rates the positive effects outweigh this latter negative
22 As Lintner (1971) haa shown, this paradox hinges on the assumption of a constant rate of discount over
time. Lintner rightly argues that this il unrealistic because in reality uncertainty increases aa the future
becomes more distant. As an alternative he shows that if i behaves as a random walk, 80 that its variance
increases linearly with time, the growth-stock paradox is excluded for any i. Although his solution is
elegant, it is too complex to handle in more elaborate models. Moreover, Lintner seems unaware that if p
increases with time, the constant growth path no longer corresponds to the dynamic optimum. Therefore
a more general formulation of the optimization problem is necessary. Because of these complexities we shall
follow common practice, and assume that the parameters of the p-i relation are such that p-i>O for all {i,l}.
23 This is obtained from equations (S.6, S.8 and S.lS).
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effect, but beyond some point the negative effect of i on the risk will become
dominant. This is corroborated by the v-i frontier in figure 3.4 which is based on a
numerical simulation of equation (3.14). Just as the growth-valuation frontier in
conventional corporate models, so this i-v frontier is concave for any i>r.24However,
in our model this concavity is caused by increasing risk whereas in corporate theories













Explanation: this figure is based on the numerical values given in figure 3.3 and Q=IO;
77=0.15and r=0.02 and 0.04.
24 This i-v frontier should not be confused with the growth-valuation frontier in most other managerial
theories of growth, where valuation refers to the valuation of shareholders.
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Optimum growth rate
The first order conditions for an optimum (written in a convenient fashion) are
av av a1f
ar a1( st =0 (3.15)
av I 8r
ai v{-. - - --.- (8i -In = 0 (3.16)l-r 1(-1
The first condition yields the familiar marginal productivity rule for instant profit
maximization ar/aI=O, which implies
y' - W = 0 (3.17)
The second condition can after some manipulation be reduced to the following
expression for the optimum growth rate i* 25
i* =
var(r) + 2(T/-r)/a
r + {(r-6)-r){ }'"var(1f)+ var(r)-2 covaror.r) (3.18)
This result implies that i*>r whenever (1f-6»r, and i*<r otherwise. Further, the
characteristics of this optimum can be found from the partial derivatives of i*
ai* /a1f > 0
ai*/ar> 0
ai*/aa < 0 ; ai* /8T/ > 0
if a > -(I-a)2{(1f-6)-r)
if a > 0 and (1f-6)-r > 0
if a > 0 and (1f-6)-r > 0ai* /acovar(1f,r) > 0; ai* /avar(1f) < 0
ai* /avar(r) < 0 if a > 0 and (1f-6)-r > 0
Most results conform intuition. The optimum growth rate is positively associated with
the rate of retained profits and the time preference.26 The sign of the interest rate is
25 Equation 3.16 actually gives two solutions for i, but the lower solution corresponds 1:0 a minimum. Itmay
be noted that the solution (S.18) is also valid for the case with (1r-6)<r. In this case the growth-risk frontier
is characterized by var(i)- if i-+-'" and var(i)-+var(r) if i-+r. As risk is still a concave function of i, the
model will also in thi8 case generally yield an interior solution for i. In thi8 ease the optimum for i will be
less than the real interest rate, i· <r.
26 Note that equation (S.18) implies that the optimum debt ratio i8 independent of 1r and 6,
a* = 1 - {var(1r) + yarer) - 2covar(1r,r)}ls!{var(r) + 2(17-r)!<>}
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ambiguous. When the firm has a net creditor position27 and the rate of retained profits
is close to the interest rate a rise in the interest rate may lead to a higher growth rate.
Elsewhere the effect of r is negative as usual. As profits become more volatile (var(",)
higher) the firm will choose a lower growth rate. The same happens when the
volatility of the interest rate goes up, except when the firm is a net creditor; in the
latter case the firm will reduce its risk by reducing its net creditor position and thus
by choosing a higher growth rate. An increase in the covariance between '" and r,
which lowers the risk, always leads to an increase in the growth rate. Finally, as
managers have a stronger time preference (" greater) or a smaller risk aversion (a
lower) they will choose a higher growth rate.
All these effects have been discussed for the normal case in which net retained
profits exceed the interest rate. If (lI"-o)<r a higher growth rate is, as we have seen,
associated with a lower steady state debt ratio. It is obvious that many of the above
effects may then change direction (see eq. 3.18).
Production maximizer
If managers measure the firm's size by its production rather than by its capital stock
the results will be slightly different. The production maximizing firm (YMF)
maximizes the size of discounted future production in relation to initial net worth,





The first order condition with respect to i is identical to the condition for the capital
maximizing firm (KMF) (eq. 3.16 above), and thus yields the same result for the
optimum growth rate as above (eq. 3.18). However, the condition with respect to the
choice of technique is different and becomes
v av all"
y y' + a", al = 0
Since (v/y)y'>O and av/a1r>O this condition can be seen to require a1l"/81<0; this means
that the production maximizing firm always chooses a more labour-intensive technique
than the KMF. As a corollary the marginal productivity of labour will be less than the
wage rate (y'-W<O), and the optimum profit rate lower than the maximum profit rate.
It varies positively with time preference 1'/ and the covariance between 11' and r and negatively with the
interest rate and the variance of 11'.
27 The finn is a net creditor (a>O) if r > 1'/ - ia{var(1I')-2covar(1I',r)}.
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Moreover, since the growth rate varies with the profit rate (eq. 3.18) it can be
concluded that the YMF also chooses a lower growth rate than the KMF. Thus in
summary:
Aside, it may be noticed that the choice of technique has become interdependent with
the growth strategy of the production maximizing firm; all factors affecting the
growth-risk trade-off thus influence the choice of technique as well.
In order to get an impression of the differences between the YMF and the KMF,
table 3.1 presents some numerical results for the optimum values i*, 1* and ?r* for
different wage rates and interest rates, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function
y=IIJ. These results confirm our theoretical findings for the KMF and the YMF.
Although the differences are quite small, it can be seen that the YMF chooses a higher
n and a lower "",and consequentially a lower i than the KMF. These results also show
that the technique of production of the YMF is dependent on the interest rate, while
it is independent for the KMF. Further, these numerical results indicate that the
labour intensity, the profit rate and the growth rate fall as the wage rate rises. As in
our theoretical analysis above, the impact of the interest rate on the growth rate does
indeed depend on the financial position of the firm. If the firm is a net debtor a
higher interest rate reduces the growth rate, but when it has a net creditor position
and the profit rate is low relative to the interest rate it may induce a higher growth
rate.
Table 3.1 Numerical results for the KMF and the YMF (between brackets)
for r=4% and r=10%
W r(%) ?r*(%) 1* i*(%)
KMF(YMF) KMF (YMF) KMF (YMF)
0.8 4 22.0 (22.0) 0.64 (0.68) 14.9 (14.9)
10 22.0 (21.8) 0.64 (0.72) 10.8 (l0.8)
1.2 4 8.5 (8.2) 0.17 (0.23) 4.4 (4.1 )
10 8.5 (8.1 ) 0.17 (0.24) 5.2 (5.0)
1.6 4 4.4 (4.2) 0.06 (0.09) 1.2 (l.0)
10 4.4 (4.2) 0.06 (0.09) 3.4 (3.3)
2.0 4 2.6 (2.5) 0.03 (0.04) -0.2 (-0.3)
10 2.6 (2.5) 0.03 (0.04) 2.6 (2.6)
Explanation: /3=0.7 and all other numerical values as in figure 3.3. At these parameters
the debt ratio is 0.36 (if r=4%) and -0.18 (if r=10%).
62 CHAPTER 3
3.7 MONITORING AND THE PAY-OUT OF PROFITS
From the point of view of the shareholders the firm's strategy is optimal if the present
value of paid out profits is maximized in relation to initial net worth, thus
I 00
Maximize q - r 6K(O)exp{(i-ps)t}dt
Yo b
(3.9c)
subject to K(O) = Vc/(l-a) ; K(O)~ 0
where Ps stands for the risk adjusted discount rate of shareholders (ps = 11s+
tas' var(i». Since for any given 6 the pay-out of profits is proportional to capital stock,
this q ratio is maximized if the present value of future capital stocks is maximized.
If shareholders have the same time preference and risk aversion as managers (11s=11;
as=a) this optimization problem therefore yields the same technique of production and
growth rate as for the KMF (eqs. 3.17, 3.18). However, if shareholders are more risk
averse or have a smaller time preference they would prefer a lower debt ratio and thus
a lower growth rate than managers.
There is, however, a more fundamental conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders; this concerns the determination of the pay-out of profits 6. It can be
established that the present model yields no interior solution for the optimum 6 for
shareholders. Solving equation (3.9c) for a constant growth rate and rewriting q as a
function of 6 and a, we find
q 6 + (l-a)ps - (r-ar) (3.19)
Since Ps is a function of a and independent of PS' maximization of this function with
respect to 6 gives either an infinite or an undetermined pay-out rate. Whenever the
discount rate exceeds the rate of return on net worth (ps>(1r-ar)/(l-a» the q ratio
tends to a maximum <<tmax=l)if 6-+00, i.e, if shareholders completely withdraw their
investments from the firm. On the other hand if Ps«1r-ar )/(l-a) the optimization
problem is subject to the growth-stock paradox28, so that no unique optimum can be
established.
Figure 3.5 shows the valuation ratios v and q as a function of the pay-out rate 6
for the case with ps>(lr-ar)/(l-a). The conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders is evident from this figure. It is obvious that managers prefer 6 to be as
28 ~ the budget constraint (eq. 3.6) implies i=( ...-6-ar)/(1-a) it can be seen that when ps« ...-ar)/(l-a)
there must exist aome i>ps for 6>0 so that p='" (see eq. 3.9c).
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Figure 3.5 Valuation ratios of managers and shareholders
v,q
q
low as possible, while shareholders prefer the highest possible pay-out rate. What pay-
out of profits is actually realized depends on the discretionary power of managers vis-
a-vis shareholders. This depends on a variety of factors, such as the ownership share
of managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), competition on the labour market for
managers (Fama, 1980), the legal and organizational structure of the firm, the role of
credit institutions, information costs, etc.
By way of tentative analysis we shall consider a simple, and obvious, relationship
between the monitoring effort of shareholders and the discretionary power of
managers. Under the plausible assumption that monitoring efforts are subject to
decreasing marginal returns it can be shown that the optimum is reached where the
marginal returns of monitoring in terms of a higher q are equal to the marginal cost
of monitoring. For example, assume the following relation between the cost of
monitoring as a fraction of capital stock (It) and the deviation of the managerial
valuation ratio v from its maximum
1t'>0; 1t">0; It( 1)=0 (3.20)
This function states that in the absence of monitoring (1t=0) the managers will choose
the strategy that maximizes v, hence (vmaxlv)=l. In order to force the management to
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choose a strategy yielding a lower v (vma/v >1) a positive monitoring effort by
shareholders will be necessary. Since v is maximal if 6=0 the ratio between v and vmax
can, after substitution, for i be written as a function of 6
vmax x+6
v x where x = (l-a)p-('lr-ar) (3.21 )
From the point of view of shareholders the cost of monitoring should be subtracted
from the pay-out of profits. Hence the q ratio (eq, 3.19) becomes
6-1C
q=--
xs + 6 (3.22)




This result shows that there will always exist an interior solution if IC',IC">O and
8q/86>O at 6=0. This latter condition states that the marginal cost of monitoring at 0=0
should not exceed its marginal return in terms of pay-out (IC'(O)<X). Otherwise, there
would be no monitoring at all (hence 6=0). Equation (3.23) implies that the optimum
pay-out is higher as the marginal cost of monitoring is less, and the potential benefits
are greater, i.e. if the difference between the discount rate and the rate of return on
net worth is larger (xs or x higher).
In this deterministic approach shareholders are assumed to have full insight into the
strategy of managers and the costs and benefits of monitoring. The pay-out is then
determined simultaneously with the growth strategy of the firm. Such an optimization
procedure is, however, difficult to imagine in practice, where shareholders have only
limited knowledge and monitoring is a complex process with many different actors.
Moreover, shareholders are not a homogeneous group, but have different amounts
of shares, different time preference and risk aversion, and different ideas about the
costs and returns of monitoring activities. All these factors make the organization of
29 If shareholders have the lame discount rate u managers there is, u we have seen, no divergence of
interest! with relpect to the optimum debt ratio (hence 8q/8a=O whenever 8v/8a=O). ~ in thil cue the
solution for a is independent of 6 (.ee footnote 26 above), the optimization problem can be solved in two
separate &tepl. u we have done in this chapter. If psi-pthe monitoring effort will, however, also be directed
at the debt ratio of the firm. In that cue the optimum debt ratio is no longer independent of the payout
rate. and needs to be determined .imultaneously with the condition for the optimum payout rate. For
brevity, however, this is neglected in the present tentative analysis.
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monitoring more complex. This may provide an ex post rationale for the assumption
of a given pay-out rate used in the foregoing analysis. If monitoring is difficult to
organize it seems reasonable to assume that shareholders agree on a fixed pay-out rate
which is maintained as long as their confidence in the management is not shaken.
3.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter starting from a basic model of a permanently growing, equity rationed
firm, a unique relation has been established between the growth and the financial risk
of the firm. On the basis of this growth-risk frontier we have established the optimum
growth rate as a function of retained profits, the interest rate and the risk ensuing
from the variability of profits and the interest rate, given the time preference and risk
aversion of the managers.
Unlike most conventional models of corporate growth the present model does not
require a negatively sloped growth-profitability frontier. In stressing increasing risk
rather than the declining rate of return our analysis builds on Kalecki's principle of
increasing risk rather than on Keynes' proposition of a falling marginal efficiency of
investment. This does not mean, however, that the growth-profitability relation is
inconsistent with the present approach. On the contrary, this frontier and the growth-
risk frontier are natural counterparts in the determination of the growth of firms.
Therefore in the next chapter the consequences of incorporating the growth-
profitability frontier in the present model will be investigated.
The model considered in this chapter was also restrictive in two other important
respects: in the first place it neglected the possibility of raising funds by floating
shares; secondly, the analysis was limited to the steady state, and it neglected the
adjustment process. The next chapter will extend the analysis to these points as well.
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APPENDIX 3.A DYNAMIC OPTIMUM
This appendix shows that the time path obtained under the restriction of a once and
for all constant growth rate corresponds to a true dynamic optimum if the initial value
of a and K are free and if prices and preferences are constant over time. A general
formulation of the optimization problem is
00 00
Max v = !K(t).exp{ - ! p(r)dr}dt
o 0
(A.l)
Since K(t) = V(t)/(l-a(t»
and DV(t)= V(t){(?r-c5)-a(t)r}/(I-a(t)}
(where D is the differential operator, and 1r,c5and r are constant over time) equation








z(O)=1 and Dz(t) = (I-a(t) - p(t)}z(t) (A.3)
where z is a state variable and a the control variable. Suppressing the time subscripts
the Hamiltonian system is
v0 (1r-c5)-ra
H = I-a z+ ~{I-a - p}Dz subject to z ~ 0; z(O)=I; a-cl (A.4)





~{--- - Pa}z = 0
I-a
dH V0 ('lr-c5)-r
dz = (I-a) +~{ I-a - p} = -D~
where Pa represents the first derivative of p with respect to a. These conditions yield
the following result for the debt ratio:
(A.S)
2(I-a)p -(I-a)2pa aa
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Now consider optimization of v subject to the steady state assumption of a constant
growth rate, or in terms of the present model, of a constant debt ratio (Da=O). From
equation A.2 we then obtain:
v (,,"-6)-rao _,
v = J -a {1-a - p}
The first-order condition dv/da=O is satisfied if
(J-a)Pa - P + r = 0
Comparing this result with equation (A.5) proves that this solution derived from the
steady state proposition indeed satisfies the condition for a true dynamic optimum.
Q.E.D.
CHAPTER 4
GROWTH OF THE FIRM: SOME EXTENSIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic model described in the foregoing chapter will now be elaborated with
respect to three important points. First, we shall relax the assumption of full equity
rationing and introduce the possibility of issuing new shares (section 4.2). Secondly,
we analyse the consequences of positive costs of growth for corporate strategy and the
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders (section 4.3). Finally, in
section 4.4 we shall drop the assumption of a free initial capital stock and examine the
adjustment process starting from a given initial size of the firm.
4.2 MARKET VALUATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
So far we have concentrated on a relatively small firm which has no access to the
equity market at all. Introduction of the equity market adds two important dimensions
to our analysis. First, the possibility of issuing new equity introduces an additional
source of finance to the firm besides internal saving and external debt. Secondly, the
market valuation of shares becomes an important signal to managers as an indicator
of the risk of intervention by the shareholders or take-over by new owners.
This second aspect is probably more important than the role of the equity market
as an additional source of finance. In practice funds raised by floating shares make
up only a very minor part of total funds. In the post-war period non-financial firms
in the United States raised some 60 to 70 per cent of their funds internally, 30 to 40
per cent by external debt and only I to 6 per cent by new equity (Taggart 1986, p.
19). Looking at the net financing of firms, i.e. gross financing less accumulation of
financial assets, the figures are even more revealing. In a recent survey Mayer (1988)
reports that the average contribution of shares in the period 1970-1985 ranges from
-4 per cent in the UK to 5 per cent in France. Retentions are by far the most
important source of finance ranging from some 60 per cent in France and Japan to
more than 100 per cent in the UK (see table 4.1).
These figures suggest that selling new shares is not a normal way of funding
investment. Mayer (1988, p.1189) accordingly concludes that "the issuance of stocks
is much more related to the problem of power in the firm and, in this respect, is
restricted to very special moments in the life of the firm."
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Table 4.1 Net financing of private physical investment 1970-1985 (percentage of
total finance)
retentions debt shares
France 62 32 5
Germany 73 26 1
Japan 65 31 4
UK 107 -3 -4
USA 90 13 -3
Source: Mayer (1988, p. 1174)
Nevertheless the equity market plays an important role in corporate strategy, not so
much as a source of finance, but rather because of the impact of market valuation on
the discretionary power of managers. If the managerial strategy presses the market
valuation too far down this may provoke a reaction by shareholders to reduce the
power of the present management, or even to dismiss them. In addition, a low
valuation makes the firm more susceptible to take-overs, as outsiders can make a
capital gain by taking over control of the firm. •
In this section we shall investigate the influence of market valuation on the
strategy of a large corporate firm which has access to a well-developed equity market.
Nevertheless the equity market is imperfect in the sense that there is only a limited
demand for the firm's shares.' This imperfection manifests itself in a falling demand
curve for the firm's shares. This is in accordance with the empirical observation that
share prices fall as more new equity is issued,2 which is usually explained by the
greater reliance on more pessimistic and risk averse agents when the floatation of
equity is increased (cf. Nickell 1978, p. 184).3
Market valuation
The falling demand curve for shares can be represented by a rising rate of discount
as the amount of equity issued increases. For simplicity, it is assumed that
shareholders are fully aware of the mutual relationship between new equity raised and
dividends paid out. Neglecting liquidity constraints and distorting taxation, the net
amount of dividends and new equity raised can then be considered as a homogeneous
1ABmentioned in chapter 3 (note 7) the proposition of a perfect equity market is inconsistent with the
managerial approach which .tresses the relevance of the ownership structure of the firm.
2 For recent evidence on the falling demand curve of shares see e.g. Shleifer (1986)
3 Another explanation can be derived from agency theory. ABmonitoring and bonding costs increase
when more new shares are issued, the market valuation, which is based on returns net of these costs, will
fall.
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variable.4 This difference between the gross pay-out of profits and new equity raised
will in the following discussion be represented by the pay-out rate S, which is now
conceived as a net rate.
The functional relationship between the market rate of discount Ps and the net
pay-out rate S may - modifying equation (3.13) of the foregoing chapter - be written
ass
(4.1)
where the suffix s refers to shareholders. As in our basic model var(i) is again
determined by the debt ratio and the probability distribution of '" and r (eq, 3.8).
Given this discount rate and a constant growth rate i the market valuation ratio q is
q
00
f SK(O) exp{(i-ps)t} dt
o
(4.2)
where Va is the initial net worth. The convexity of the relation between the rate of
discount and the net pay-out rate ensures that an interior solution can exist for the
maximization of q, that is, the optimum strategy from the point of view of
shareholders (for a proof, see Appendix 4.A).
Managerial strategy
As we have mentioned the valuation of shares on the equity market imposes a
significant restraint on the discretionary power of managers. The precise modelling
of this restraint is not generally agreed on, but it is widely accepted that it arises from
fear of dismissal by dissatisfied shareholders or take-over by new owners when the
4 This can be shown as follow8. Defining J=number of shares, P .=price of shares, d=dividend ratio
and j=DJ/J, then the market valuation of all outstanding shares is given by the present value of dividends
on these shares:
P eJ = or' dK(O).exp{(i-j-p)t}dt
Under the usual assumptions this can be solved into
PeJ = dK(O)/(p+j-i)
Since we have defined pay-out of profits net of equity raised (6K = dK-jP eJ), we find for the total value
of shares P eJ = 6K(O)/(p-i). This latter result shows that the market valuation P J depends on net payout
only, and is thus independent of the division of net returns 6K(O) in dividends dKfo) and new equity raised
jP eJ.
5 For simplicity we neglect the relation between the risk premium and the probability distribution of
the market rate of return. According to the CAPM model only the non-divenifiable part of the variance
of i is relevant to the risk premium. Incorporation of this relation would, however, not essentially change
the subsequent analysis. For an appropriate account of this relation in the context of a similar model, see
Lintner (1971).
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market value of shares is pressed too far down. Some authors postulate an absolute
minimum for the market value (cf. Marris 1971, Uzawa 1969, Solow 1971, Slater
1980), while others define a minimum for the ratio between the market value and the
potential maximum value (Williamson 1971).
A more sophisticated approach is given by Odagiri (1981), who shows that in an
uncertain environment the probability of take-over should be related to its expected
costs and benefits. As the costs will be fairly constant over time and the benefits vary
directly with the divergence between the actual market value and the potential value,
he argues that this divergence is the most important determinant of the risk of take-
over.
In the following analysis we shall introduce this risk for managers by a hazard rate
(J reflecting the chance of being dismissed. Following Odagiri this hazard rate is
assumed to depend on the market valuation q and the potential maximum valuation
qmax'As the utility of managers after they have been dismissed is zero, the 'effective'
future size of the firm for the present management should be discounted by this
hazard rate in addition to time preference and risk premium, thus
P = T/ + ta.var(i) + o(qmax,q) (Jq'<0; o(q=O)= 00
0(q=qmax)= 0
(4.3)
where qmaxfollows from the maximization of equation (4.2) above.
The discount rate of managers now incorporates two kinds of risk: the financial
risk (var(i» which is related to the firm as a whole, and the managerial risk (0') which
is specifically attached to the position of the managers. The (J function reflects the
ownership structure of the firm. If shareholders have full power over the firm O'q'
would be infinite at q=qmax;that is, all managers will immediately be dismissed at the
slightest discrepancy between q and its maximum. If shareholders have no influence
at all, «; would of course be zero for all (qmax,q}.6
Given this relation for p the optimization problem for the managers is to select a




- f K(O) exp{(i-p)t} dt
Yo 0
(4.4)
6 This representation of the conClict between managers and shareholders focusses on the behaviour of
managers, in contrast with the tentative 'monitoring cost' approach of section 3.7 in the foregoing chapter,
which concentrated on the costa and benefits of shareholders.
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The basic considerations with respect to the choice of i and 5 can be explained with
reference to the scheme above:7 Starting from a low growth rate close to r (where a
= -00) it can be assessed that an increase in i initially has a beneficial influence on v
because of its positive effect on the initial and future scale of the firm. Also the
market valuation q rises at first, thereby diminishing the managerial risk (0) and
pushing v up even more.8 However, as i and thus the debt ratio are raised further, the
negative effects of the increasing financial risk on the discount rates p and Ps become
stronger, and will sooner or later outweigh the positive effects on the firm's size.
Thereafter, further raising of i goes together with a fall in v. In the limit, if i-+oo and
a-+l the discount rates of shareholders and managers tend to infinity, so that v and
q fall to zero:
The resulting growth-valuation frontiers for v and q are shown in Figure 4.1.
7 For expository reasons the explanation again concentrate8 on the case with (:r-6»r and i>r. AI. in
the foregoing chapter the results are, however, also valid for (:r-6)<r and i<r.
81f (:r-6»r the relevant region for i start8 at i=r. At i!r the debt ratio tends to _e 80 that the variance
becomes equal to var(r). Provided that covar(:r,r)<var(r) the rise in i also contributes to a higher q and v
because of the declining financial risk var(i} as i the debt ratio i. raised.
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Explanation: This figure is based on a numerical example with u
Al
= v.exp( -w6); U =
O[ exp{~(q(max)-q)/q} - I]; 6=0.05; 11"=0.10; r=0.02; 1/=0.025; 1/ =u.02; 11:=0.01;~=20;
0=15; v=O.I; Q=Qs=IO; var(1I")=0.006; var(r)=0.005; covar(1I",r)=l>.002. The Us and o
functions will be discussed below with reference to table 4.3.
With regard to the net pay-out rate we find the q ratio starts at zero at 6=0. As the
risk of dismissal is then infinitely large, the valuation ratio of managers (v) starts at
zero as well, thus
q16=O = 0; v16=O = 0
As 6 is raised above zero the q ratio starts to rise, and thanks to the falling risk of
dismissal v rises as well. Beyond some point, however, the negative effects of 6 on the
debt ratio, and thus on var(i) become dominating, so that q and v begin to fall again.
Eventually, when 6 approximates 60 = (1I"-r)where the debt ratio becomes equal to
unity, the financial risk (vartij) becomes infinitely large so that q and v fall to zero
again (see figure 4.2), thus
lim q = 0;
6-+60
lim v = 0
6-+60
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The convexity of these functions ensures that an interior solution exists to the
maximization of v. Provided that the growth-stock paradox does not occur and that
a finite maximum exists for qmax'the first-order conditions for v are
8v 8v 81f
81 =a1(a-1 = 0 (4.5)
av ap
aa = v
2{p-r-(1-a) aa } 0 (4.6)
av ap
a6 = -v
2{(1-a) a6 + I} = 0 (4.7)
For convenience the conditions have now been written with respect to I, 6 and a. The
growth rate is, of course, implied in the solution of these variables. The first condition
determines the optimum technique of production (where y'=W). Both the other
conditions determine the simultaneous solution for a and 6. As vlq=o=00and vla=1=00,
the conditions (4.6) and (4.7) ensure that the managers always select a policy with
positive net payout (6)0) and a debt ratio less than unity (a-cl), and thus a strategy
with finite growth rate (i). Note that if the demand curve for the firm's shares does
not fall (hence 8p/a6 = 0) the last condition (4.7) cannot be satisfied for any v>O.The
assumption of a limited supply of new equity is thus a necessary condition for an
interior solution of the firm's strategy to exist in this model.




o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Explanation: i=0.06; all other variables as in figure 4.1
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Conflicting strategies
The differences between managerial strategy and the strategy desired by shareholders
can be established by evaluating the first-order conditions for v in the optimum for
q. If the conditions for v prove to be satisfied in the shareholders' optimum
{l,a,Slq=qmax}'this will of course represent an optimum for the managers too. If the
conditions for v are not satisfied at q=qmax'the managers will select a different










The first equation shows that managers select the same technique of production as
shareholders.l? Both the other first-order conditions are, however, generally not
satisfied. This means that managers will pursue a different strategy towards growth,
debt and pay-out. Equation (4.10) implies that the partial derivative with respect to
S is always negative (avj8S<0) irrespective of the debt ratio a. For maximization of v
managers will therefore always choose a lower pay-out than shareholders.
With regard to die debt ratio the outcome is less clear-cut. Equation (4.9) implies
that managers select a higher debt ratio (8vj8a>0) if they have a higher discount rate
than shareholders (P>Ps)' or if they are more risk averse (a>as)' However, if managers
have a lower time preference and are more risk averse than shareholders, they will
prefer a lower debt ratio than shareholders.
As the growth rate depends on both the debt ratio and the pay-out rate it cannot
be unambiguously determined whether managers do desire a higher growth rate than
shareholders. The positive effect of the lower pay-out rate may in principle be offset
by a reduction in the debt ratio. However, as we have seen this is only possible in the
case of a very conservative management, that is, if managers are more risk averse or
have a lower discount rate than shareholders. Given the enterprising nature of
managers this possibility seems hardly likely. Therefore, it can be concluded with
reasonable confidence that the management realizes a higher growth rate than that
9 See Appendix 4.8 for the derivation of these results.
10 This conclusion is only valid if managers measure the size of the firm by ita capitalatock. If, however,
managers maximize production rather than capital stock it is obvious that they will choose a more labour
intensive technique, with a higher production per unit of capital (see also section 3.6)
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Table 4.2 Corporate strategy
normal management
(p z. Ps' Q ~ as)
conservative management
(p < Ps' a > as)
choice of technique Ivmex ICJII8x Ivrnax = ICJII8x
pay-out of profits
debt ratio aqnax >< aqnax
growth rate
vmax = corporate strategy; qmax = optimum strategy for shareholders
preferred by shareholders.
The differences between the corporate strategy (maximizing v) and the optimum
strategy for shareholders (maximizing q) are summarized in Table 4.2. The size of the
divergence depends largely on the ownership structure of the firm reflected by the 0
function. Differences in strategy will be smaller if the chance of dismissal when q <
q(max) is greater. This is corroborated by the numerical results of table 4.3. This table
is based on the following explicit functions for Os and 0:
-w6
Os = lI.e
o = 9(-I+e !p(q(max)-q)jq)
(4.11)
(4.12)
These functions satisfy the theoretical requirements of the implicit functions given
above (eqs. 4.1 and 4.3). In the second equation the chance of dismissal varies with tp.
If tp=oo, the risk of dismissal is infinite for any q < qmax'In this case shareholders
effectively have full control over the firm and will thus enforce a strategy that
maximizes q. In the numerical example presented in the table this entails a choice of
i=-0.4% and 6=1.01 yielding a maximum q of 1.40. If tp becomes smaller, the influence
of shareholders weakens which is reflected in a lower pay-out rate, higher growth rate
and higher debt ratio. In the extreme if tp=O the risk of dismissal is nil (0=0) for any
q. In this hypothetical case the management can freely lower the pay-out and raise the
floatation of equity without worrying about the market valuation and the continuity
of their jobs. In this case, however, no interior solution for 6 and the growth rate can
be found, as managers can always find a policy where i>p, so that the optimization is
inevitably subject to the growth-stock paradox.
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Table 4.3 Some numerical results for the corporate firm
I{> v q i(%) 0 a
00 5.70 1.40 -0.4 0.10 0.12
50 6.70 1.38 2.1 0.08 0.26
20 7.49 1.33 3.9 0.07 0.32
10 8.42 1.26 5.9 0.06 0.37
Explanation: 'Jr=0.10;r=0.02; '7=0.025: '7s=0.02; 9=0.01; 1{>=20;v=O.I; w=15; Q=Qs=IO;
var('Jr)=0.006;var(r)=0.005; covar(1r,r)=0.002.
4.3 COSTS OF GROWTH
Managerial theories of growth traditionally explain the restraint on the firm's growth
by declining profitability rather than by increasing financial risk. In this section we
shall investigate the consequences for the determination of growth and finance when
a negative growth-profitability relation is incorporated in our basic model. As
mentioned in section 3.2 the growth-profitability frontier has been motivated in
basically two ways: the internal approach, inspired by Penrose (1959), which
emphasizes the organizational costs related to the expansion of the firm, and the
external approach which follows Marris (1964) and concentrates on the product-
market constraints and the 'demand shifting' effort necessary to maintain a certain
growth of sales.
Annex 4.1 to this chapter analyses both aspects on the basis of an integrated model
of production, marketing and growth. This model takes account of the labour
necessary for production as well as managerial labour and marketing effort. One of
the interesting aspects of this analysis concerns the simultaneity of decisions
concerning technique of production, marketing effort and the rate of investment. With
regard to the present analysis we shall, however, skip the modelling of underlying
marketing-, organization- and production-decisions and start directly from the
growth-profitability frontier which emerges from this analysis. As is shown in the
annex, the profit rate of the firm is related negatively to the rate of growth (i), the
wage rate (W), the depreciation rate (IjJ) and the tax rate on profits (1"7) and positively
to the volume of market demand (Z) and market demand growth (Z), thus
(4.13)
where Z = DZ/Z. The negative impact of i on 'lr is due to the marketing and
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organizational effort attached to growth". The effects of W, I/J and T. are evident.
Market demand and its growth have a positive impact because ample markets make
sales more easy, and thus reduce marketing costs. The consequences of this function
for the firm's strategy and the conflict between managers and shareholders will be
discussed with respect to the basic model described in the foregoing chapter.
Optimum growth rate
First, it can be noticed that at a given level of the profit rate the negative 1I"-irelation
leads to a lower optimum growth rate. In comparison with the 'old' first derivative
with respect to i (eq. 3.16), the first order condition for optimum growth rate is now:
dv dv Bv
di = ill (old) + 81r .1I"j= 0 (4.14)
Since BvjB1r>O and 1I"j<0the marginal effect of the growth rate on v is always negative
at the old optimum, where of course dvjdi(old)=O. Therefore, it can be concluded that
in the presence of costs of growth the model still yields a finite optimum for the
growth rate, which is lower as the slope of the 1I"-ifrontier is steeper.
Conflicting strategies
Now let us consider the difference in desired growth rate between managers and
shareholders. In chapter 3 it was established that if managers maximize the capital
stock there was no essential conflict between managers and shareholders regarding the
investment-risk trade-off, except due to differences in time preference or risk
aversion. The introduction of a growth-profitability frontier gives rise, however, to
a more fundamental conflict of interests. Since in the steady state v = qj6 (eqs. 4.2 and
4.4), the first order condition for v can be written as
dv 1 dq
di= ;r-(di -v61rj) (4.15)
This expression shows that in the shareholder's optimum q=qmax(where dqjdi=O) the
growth rate still has a positive effect on v (dv/db-O). Therefore managers will choose
a higher growth rate, thus
ivmax > iqnax for any 1I"j< 0
11 As rapid shrinkage of the firm requires great organisational effon, jUlt u fut expansion, it leerna
likely that the growth-profitability relation i, positive for i«O. For the moment, however, we shall neglect
this poslibility, and concentrate on the downward sloping segment of the lr-i frontier.
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and hence for any given 6
avrnax> aCJll8x; K(O)vmax> K(O)CJII8x; 1I"vrnax< 1I"CJII8X
4.4 THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
So far we have concentrated on the optimum growth path under the restriction of a
once and for all constant growth rate. This steady growth approach was warranted in
the simple model where the capital stock could be varied instantaneously and without
any cost. However, after the incorporation of the Penrose- and Marris-effects this
approach is no longer warranted. One cannot on the one hand assume that growth of
capital and production requires organizational and marketing costs, and at the same
time let the initial stock of capital be varied freely. Note that this is not always
recognized properly in models of corporate growth (e.g. Marris 1971, Slater 1980,
Odagiri 1981).
For this reason we shall in this section drop the assumptions of a once and for all
constant growth rate and a free initial stock of capital, and return to the general
formulation of the optimization problem for the fully equity rationed firm (eq. 3.9a
in the foregoing chapter). After substitution for q this can, for a given pay-out rate,
be written as
loot
Maximize v = - f K(O) exp[ f {i.,.-lavar(i).,.-TJ}dr] dt
1 Yo 0 0
(4.16)
Unfortunately the mathematical form of this equation is too complex to handle on the
analytical level. However, in order to be able to get an impression of the adjustment
process we shall analyse the following simplified variant which is more familiar in
control theory.
00




"" = ""0 - x(i-io)2 (4.18)
where var(i) is given by the known function of the debt ratio a (eq, 3.8) and the
change of a follows from the budget constraint (3.5). According to (4.17) managers
maximize the certainty equivalent of the growth of the firm, rather than the
discounted size. Since the initial size of the firm is given this alternative
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representation is not fundamentally different from the original model. The basic
considerations regarding the time path of i are similar; the trade-off between growth
and (future) risk is still the central relationship.12 As will be argued below, most of
the conclusions based on the simplified version are valid for the original model as
well. However, as the timing of the growth-risk trade-off is different, the precise
shape of the adjustment trajectory will be different.
Equation (4.18) represents a simple version of the growth-profitability frontier.
All determinants of ,.. other than i are included in the autonomous factor 11"0. The
quadratic shape of this function can be motivated by the observation that not only the
rapid growth but also the rapid shrinkage of the firm requires large organizational
costs.13 According to equation (4.18) the costs of growth decline when i<io and rise
when i>io. The costs of growth are thus minimal at i = io; that is if the firm shrinks
at the rate io (we assume io~ 0).
On the basis of these functions the optimum time path can be established from the
(adjusted) Hamiltonian system (suppressing the time subscripts)
H· = i-fa var(i) - ).[{"'0-6-X(i-io)2}- ra - (l-a)i]
a(O) = ao
lim e-'It ).(t).a(t) = 0
t-oo
(4.19)
The first order conditions are
dH· dH·
di = 0; da = '1). - D)'
dH·
and cv:- = Da (4.20)
which implies
I + )'{(l-a) + 2x(l-6')(i-io)} = 0
(4.21)
dvar(i)
fa da + ).(i-r) = D)' - '1).
where 6' (=86/8,..) stands for effect of total profits on the pay-out. These conditions
12 Under the reltriction of a given initial size and constant growth rate, both formulations a110yield
the lame solution, namely the growth rate that maximizes the risk-discounted growth rate, {i-ia var(i)}.
13 See also footnote 11 above.
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can be resolved into the following differential equation for i
81
I
Di= 2X(I-S) [r - '7(l-a) - {1ro-S-X(i-io)2} - 2x(l-S')(i-io)(i+'7-r) + Q«(l-a) +
+ 2X(I-S')(i-io)}2.{var(1r)+a.var(r)-(l+a)covar(1r,r)}(I-ar3] (4.22)
Together with the budget constraint (3.5) this equation determines the dynamics of
i and a.
Debtor firm
Although this differential system cannot be solved explicitly it can be analysed
qualitatively by means of the phase diagram (figure 4.3) which shows the Di=O and
Da=O curves in the {i,a} plane. Because of the quadratic shape of the i-1r frontier more
than one solution may exist, but there is only one optimum solution A (i=4.9%, a=0.29)
characterized by the familiar saddle-point configuration. The dashed line shows the
hypothetical adjustment trajectory towards this optimum.
















.6 -.1-. .8 .9 a
Explanation: 7ro=0.10; X=I; io=-0.04; 1)=0.02 and all other parameters as in table 4.3.
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The same figure also shows the Di=Oand Da=Ocurves for a higher interest rate
(8% instead of 4%) yielding a new optimum A' at a lower growth rate and a smaller
debt ratio (i=4.2%, a=O.12). It can be seen from the figure that the impact effect of
the increase in r is greater than its ultimate effect. After the rise in r, the growth rate
falls to a point B on the lower adjustment trajectory, whereafter it gradually increases
again as the debt ratio tends to its new, lower steady state optimum.
The difference between the impact effect and the ultimate effect depends on the
slope of the 1I"-ifrontier. If 11" is very sensitive to changes in i (X large) it is very
'expensive' to vary i much along the adjustment trajectory. Thus the optimum
trajectory will be flat. As a corollary the adjustment process will also take longer. As
X becomes smaller the initial drop in i becomes sharper, and the adjustment time
shorter. If xLO the speed of adjustment becomes infinitely large.
Creditor firm
In the above case both the impact effect and the ultimate effect of a higher interest
rate on the growth rate are negative. As we have seen in chapter 3 this is not









-- - - Da=O(r=8%)
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Explanation: see figure 4.3
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fig.a debtor firm fig.b creditor firm
necessarily so. When the firm is a net creditor (a<O) and 'If' is low in relation to r, the
steady state effect of the rise in r may be reversed, thus yielding a higher growth rate.
This is illustrated in figure 4.4 showing the adjustment trajectory when the
interest rate rises further from 8% to 12%. The new steady state position at r=12% is
now characterized by a higher growth rate and a lower debt ratio (i=5.3%, a=-O.IO).
This new equilibrium can, however, only be reached by temporarily reducing the
growth rate in order to let the rate of indebtedness decrease. After the discrete
reduction in the growth rate, it will gradually recover again as debt declines over time.
Ultimately i will even rise above its original level. Hence, in this case the higher
interest leads to a lower growth rate in the short term and a higher growth rate in the
long term.
The impact and ultimate effects of the higher interest rate for the debtor and the
creditor firm are summarized in figure 4.5. This figure shows the time paths of the
capital stock, the growth rate and the debt ratio after a permanent rise in the interest
rate at time to' Fig.a refers to the 'normal' case with negative impact and ultimate
effects and fig.b to the 'perverse' case with negative impact effect and positive
ultimate effect.
Fall in profitability
One of the characteristics which clearly emerges from figures 4.3 to 4.5 is the
'overshooting' of the adjustment process. Similar overshooting processes may occur
84 CHAPTER 4
after exogenous changes in the profitability of investment (11"0) or the variability of the
profit rate var(1I")or the interest rate var(r). As a final example we shall therefore
consider a shift in profitability. Figure 4.6 shows that a fall in 11"0from 10% to 6%
eventually leads - after a similar overshooting process -to a lower steady state debt
ratio (a=0.23) and a lower growth rate (i=2.4%).
In addition this figure shows the trajectory when the fall in profitability is
foreseen by entrepreneurs at an earlier moment. This may happen, for instance, if it
is announced at time t, that wages, or taxes, are to be raised at t2 (>t,). In this case the
firm will already reduce its growth at the moment of the announcement (t,). This is
shown in the figure by the discrete fall to point C; then the growth rate gradually falls
further until the actual fall in profit rate at t2. From that moment onwards the growth
rate starts rising again along the trajectory B-A'. Thus, as soon as the future fall in
profits becomes known, the growth is reduced immediately in order to achieve a
better point of departure, i.e. a lower debt ratio, before profits actually fall. This is
illustrated in figure 4.7.
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Explanation See figure 4.3
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These conclusions based on the simplified model will not really be different from
the conclusions which can be drawn on the basis of the original version of the
optimization problem. The ultimate effects on the growth rate found above correspond
to the conclusions from the steady state analysis in the foregoing chapter, for the
debtor firm as well as for the creditor firm. As to the impact effects it can be seen
that their direction must be the same for the original model as well14; an ultimate
decrease in the debt ratio will always require a (temporary) reduction of the growth
rate, and an ultimate rise in debt an increase in i.
The dynamics considered above emerge from the fact that the firm's debt ratio can
only be adjusted slowly. This follows from the assumptions of a given initial stock of
capital and given initial net worth of the firm. In the above model the firm has been
assumed to have no access to the equity market at all. This is, of course, relevant for
many firms in reality. The analysis may, however, be generalized for the case of a big
corporation which can raise funds by floating equity as well. It is evident that if the
14 This follows from the fad that the optimum must be characterized by a saddle-point configuration
and that the Da function ie, of course, identical in both the Cormulations of the optimization problem. JoB
can be seen Cromthe phase diagrams above the adjustment trajectory must thereCore always lie under the
Da=O curve in the ease of a reduction in a and above this curve in case of a rise in a.
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firm can raise equity freely without any limitation, there no need for a delayed
adjustment to the desired debt ratio. If, however, as we have argued in section 4.2,
there is only a limited demand for the firm's shares, so that equity can only be raised
at increasing costs, these costs may impose an effective constraint on the adjustment
of the firm's financial position.15 Then, the adjustment process will not be essentially
different for a big corporation with access to the equity market than for a small firm
without access as was considered above.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have elaborated the basic model of finance and growth with respect
to three points: the introduction of the equity market, the incorporation of costs of
growth, and the analysis of the adjustment process.
By the introduction of the equity market together with a hazard function for the
risk of dismissal for managers we could establish the simultaneous equilibrium for the
growth and pay-out policy of a big corporation. The analysis corroborates the basic
conclusion of the foregoing chapter that when the supply of equity capital is limited
(i.e. absent as in chapter 3, or subject to rising costs as in section 4.2), the principle
of increasing risk provides an effective restraint on the firm's growth.
Introduction of the costs of growth did not significantly change the conclusions
of the basic model. It sharpens, however, the conflict between management and
shareholders, as the pursuit of rapid growth now directly affects the profit rate.
One of the central elements of our modelling of the growth of the firm has been
the conflict of interests between shareholders and the management. The main
differences in strategy between a firm that maximizes market valuation (q) and a firm
that maximizes the discounted size (v) are summarized in the scheme below. By way
of reference the results of Williamson (1966) and Seoka (1985) are also given. These
results show that managers generally aim at a higher growth rate and lower pay-out
rate than shareholders. Only if managers are significantly more risk averse and have
a higher discount rate than shareholders, is it not certain that they would choose a
higher growth rate. In these circumstances they may prefer a lower debt ratio. In the
case of a falling growth-profitability relation, or if managers maximize production (or
sales) rather than the capital stock, the firm's strategy will deviate from instant profit-
maximizing, which is desired by shareholders.
15 ICthe COlts of rai.ing equity are related to the flow of new ('outside', see section 3.3) equity, these
coats may put a similar re.traint on the adjustment of the firm's net worth, as the adjustment co.te of
investment prevents discrete changes in capital stock. A motivation for the relation between costs and the
floatation of .hares can be found in Jensen and Meckling (1976), who aslume that agency costs rise with
the amount of outside finance.
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Differences between a v-maximizing firm and a q-maximizing firm
(+ indicating a positive difference)
6 a K(O) y 11"
small firm (1I"j=O)
-') 0- capital-maximizing + 0 0 0
- production maximizing + -') 0 0 +
small firm (11" j<O) + + + ?
large firm (11" j=O)
- normal management + + + 0 0
- conservative management ? ? ? 0 0
Williamson (1966)
Seoka (1985)
? ? + +
+ +
1) These results are valid only if the discount rate of shareholders exceeds the net rate
of return of the firm, so that shareholders desire 6=00 and i=-oo.
Consistent modelling requires that if one allows for costs of growth, one should also
drop the assumption of a free initial size. Analysis of the adjustment process revealed
that changes in profit rates and interest rates may lead to significant changes in
investment, in the short term as well as the long term. In the presence of imperfect
equity markets changes in profits and interest rates affect investment in two ways:
through the availability of internal finance and through the change of the desired
financial structure. The first, 'internal savings,' effect is essentially a short-term
effect, as it implies direct adjustment of investment to the flow of internal finance.'6
The second effect may, however, produce quite persistent changes in investment. This
is because the firm's balance sheet can only be adjusted slowly to the desired new
composition. The combination of both effects means that the adjustment process is
often characterized by overshooting; that is, the impact effect of an exogenous change
proves to be stronger than the ultimate effect. For a creditor firm the impact and
ultimate effects may even have different signs. This corroborates our observation in
chapter 3 that the interest effect on investment may be reversed for a creditor firm.
These dynamic processes may provide an insight into the actual economic
16 The recognition of financing constraints has given new support to the 'internal finance' view of
investment. From their empirical research on U.S. corporate investment Fanari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988,p.186) thus conclude that "financing constraints could account (or a large proportion of the aggregate
variability o( investment."
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developments in the most recent period. This period was characterized by large
aggregate shocks which had a strong impact on the financial structure of firms. It is
well-established - at least for European economies - that the adverse shift in profits
and risk in the 1970's caused a long process of adjustment before the discrepancy
between the actual and the desired financial structure was resolved. As changes in the
investment behaviour of firms have great consequences for macroeconomic aggregates
such as effective demand and employment, which in turn have great consequences for
the strategy of firms, this adjustment process should not be considered in isolation.
In the next chapters we shall therefore return to the macroeconomic level, and analyse
the dynamic interaction between firms, government and workers for the medium
period (chapter 5), the long period (chapter 6) and the open economy (chapter 7).
ANNEX 4.1 A DIGRESSION ON COSTS OF GROWTH
This annex establishes the growth-profitability (x-i) frontier on the basis of an
integrated model of production, sales effort and growth. In this analysis the growth
rate is taken as given; the consequences of the 1r-i frontier for the dynamic optimum
of the firm are discussed in section 4.3 of this chapter.
Unlike most models of corporate growth we shall take explicit account of the
simultaneity of decisions on technique of production, marketing effort and growth
strategy.'7 The model incorporates both the Penrose relation between growth and the
need for managerial services and the Marris relation between growth and 'demand
shifting' effort. As production is measured by value added, the costs of growth should
be expressed in additional labour required or lower productivity of the capital stock.
Adopting the first possibility, the Marris and Penrose effects can be incorporated in
the production model as follows:
y = y(l,) y'e-O; y"<O (Ll)
12 = (1/K).l(G, G, Z) 'ii>0; IG>O; Iz<O; '00<0 (1.2)
13 = 13(i) 1j>Ofor any i>O (1.3)
I = I, + 12 +/3 (104)
yd= (1/K).yd(p, G, Z) yp<O;YG,yz>O (1.5)
y = yd (1.6)
17 In moat previous models the technique of production is assumed to be exogenous [cf. Solow 1971,
Auberada 1979, Seoka 1985) or at least to be independent of the choice of marketing effort and the
managerial costs of growth (Marria 1971, Odagiri 1981). For an interesting attempt to integrate the choice
of technique and the managerial cosh of growth, see Slater (1980).













demand for the firm's products
total real demand on the product market
The lower case symbols 1
"
12, 13 and yd are again expressed as ratios to the firm's
capital stock. The first equation is the familiar production function, now however not
with total employment as argument, but only labour as far as it is involved in the
production process (/1). Equation (1.2)represents the Marris relation and equation (1.3)
the Penrose relation. Following Solow (1971) and Seoka (1985) marketing effort (/~)
is related to the growth of the stock of goodwill (G).'S As it is plausible that It
becomes increasingly difficult to expand the stock of goodwill as it becomes greater
we have also included G in this function (/G>O). Finally, the state variable Z is also
included as it seems plausible that it is easier to increase goodwill as the market is
larger in relation to the present stock of goodwill (hence Iz<O).
The Penrose relation between investment and (labour) costs (eq.I.3) resembles the
well-known 'adjustment cost' function in neoclassical investment theory, but unlike
this function the Penrose relation is not required to be convex in i.19 Equation (1.4)
defines total demand for labour as the sum of production, marketing and organization
labour. Note that in this modelling of demand for labour it is implicitly assumed that
(managerial) labour is freely available and can be absorbed without any cost.20
According to equation (1.5) demand for the firm's products depends on the stock of
goodwill, the price set by the firm and total market demand.21 Equation (1.6) finally
defines equilibrium between production and sales of products.
If the management maximizes the discounted size of the firm's capital stock, it
must at any moment select the technique of production 11, marketing effort 12 and
expansion effort 13 that maximizes the profit rate22
(1.7)
18 Seoka (1985) h811pointed out that it is most appropriate to relate marketing effort to the rate of
change of G.
19 See e.g. Nickell (1978) for a critique on this convexity 8IIsumption.
20 For alternative 8IIBumptions see Slater (1980) and Moss (1984).
21 This latter factor, which determines the locus of the demand curve, is systematically neglected in
most managerial theories. Williamson (1966, pA) motivates this neglect arguing that "virtually unlimited
opportunities for diversification remove any necessity .. to move down existing demand curves".
22 If managers aim at maximum production rather than capital stock the momentary equilibrium will
of course be different. For brevity, we shall not examine this case here.
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Figure 1.1 Optimum technique of production
W Me
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1 I •1 I •1
where K, Z, Z and Ware given. The initial stock of goodwill G is assumed to be a
free variable.23
First notice that transformation of equation (1.5) in growth rates yields the
following condition for the growth of the stock of goodwill.
I DP DZ
G = fG(i - fp P - fZZ fG>O;fp<O;fZ>O (1.8)
where fp = yp.(P/yK) denotes the price-elasticity of demand and fG = YG.(G/yK) its
elasticity with respect to goodwill. As prices cannot be lowered for ever this equation
implies a unique relation between the growth rate of goodwill (G) and the growth rate
of capital stock (i) and market demand rate (DZ/Z).24 After substitution of this
Z3The assumption of free G(0) is necessary for expository reasons, because with a fixed initial state the
steady state path would no longer represent a dynamic optimum. As a motivation for the free G(O) one may
imagine that the firm chooses its initial K(O) as well as G(O) by the take-over of existing firma together with
their stock of goodwill.
Z4 For the steady state to exist for i#=DZ/Z,in bct very special conditions must be satisfied as to the
elasticities in the functions for demand (1.5) and markefing effort (1.2). Time differentiation of these
equations gives respectively
i + Dy/y EpDP/P + EGDG/G + EZDZ/Z
i + D/Z/IZ = "'6" DO/O + "'GDG/G + "'z DZ/Z
whAere"'j stands for the elasticity of 12 with reapect to variable j. Since in the steady state DP, Dy, D/z,
DG=O these equations are inconsistent unless "'G=EGand "'Z=EZ' which means that a change in G should
lead to an equiproportional change in demand (y) and marketing labour (12). It may be noted that
Williamson (1966), Solow (1971), Auberad& (1979), Odagiri (1981) and others introduce this assumption
implicitly by disregarding; the influence of Z altogether (hence EZ="'Z=O)and poatulating' Iinear homogeneity
of equations 1.2 and 1.5 (hence "'G=£G=l). In that case equation 1.8 refluces to the simple equality between
the growth rate of capital stock and the growth rate of goodwill, i=G.
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(1.10)
fp
In both conditions the first term may be considered as the marginal returns (MR) of
labour (I, and 1 ) and the second term, the wage rate W, as the marginal cost (MC).
Provided that tLe price-elasticity of demand fp is less than -I the first condition
yields the optimum for I,. This is shown in figure T.1 by the intersection A of the MC
and the MR schedules.
Now consider an increase in marketing effort Ir Through the larger 12 the firm
can afford a greater initial stock of goodwill at the given rate of growth d, and thanks
to this greater G(O) it can earn a higher price on its sales. Because the marginal return
of production labour is thus increased, the firm will change its technique of
production and employ more production labourers (from 1,* to 1,*'). A greater
marketing effort thus leads to a more labour intensive technique of production,
The optimum for marketing effort 12 can be explained with reference to figure T.2.
The marginal costs are, of course, again given by the wage rate W. The marginal
returns of 12 result from the fact that the firm can maintain a greater initial stock of
goodwill G(O) as I~ is larger, and thus ask a higher price for its products. These
marginal returns will, however, diminish as 12 becomes larger. This implies a falling
MR schedule in figure T.2.







Now consider the effect of additional production labour on the optimum for
marketing effort. At a given stock of goodwill the marginal returns of marketing
labour will be larger as production is larger, and thus goodwill is smaller in relation
to production and sales. Therefore, the increase in production labour (11) causes the
MR schedule of 12 in figure 1.2 to shift upward, thus leading to a larger optimum
marketing effort. Hence
Bringing these results together we can establish the simultaneous optimum of 11 and
12• Figure 1.3 represents this optimum by the intersection of the 11• and 12• curves
showing the mutual relationships between these variables established above.
Growth and profitability
In order to establish the relationship between growth and profitability we shall now
consider the effect of a change in the growth rate i on this simultaneous production
and marketing optimum. As we have seen a higher growth rate requires a greater
marketing effort in order to realize a correspondingly higher growth of goodwill.
Therefore, at a given input of marketing labour 12, the firm can afford only a smaller
initial stock of goodwill. Then, as marginal returns of production labour fall, the I,
schedule in figure 1.1 shifts downward leading to the lower optimum of production
labour. As for the production-marketing optimum represented in figure 1.3, this
manifests itself in a downward shift of the I,· schedule.
The smaller initial stock of goodwill changes the marginal returns of 1 too. At a
given volume of production labour it is evident that a smaller initial stock ot goodwill
implies the marginal returns of 12 to be higher . Therefore the 12• curve in figure 1.3shifts to the right.
As both schedules in figure I.3 shift to the right the overall result of a higher
growth rate on the optimum {I,··,/2··} cannot be readily assessed. It depends on the
parameters of the model. It can, however, be shown that, under the plausible
assumption that cross elasticities of I,· and 12•are not too great, so that the I,· curve
is less steep than the 12• curve, the new equilibrium is characterized by a smaller
optimum stock of goodwill G(O), and consequently a smaller volume of production
y(O) and production labour 11 (for a proof, see Appendix 4.C). This outcome is in
accordance with intuition as a higher growth rate requires larger costs of maintaining
a given stock of goodwill. If the firm therefore selects a smaller initial stock of
goodwill, the marginal returns of production will fall, so that the new optimum for
y and I, will be lower as well.
The change in optimum marketing effort (12) is ambiguous (see Appendix 4.C); on
the one hand a higher growth rate requires a greater input of marketing labour, but
on the other hand the smaller optimum stock of goodwill tends to reduce the need for
12•
In summary the growth rate has the following effects on the optimum strategy
dy dG(O) d/1 d/2
di < 0; c:rr-- < 0; di < 0; di : 0;
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Figure 1.3 Simultaneous optimum for production and marketing
I **,










Finally, given this relation between optimum production and marketing effort and the
growth rate, we are able to establish the determinants of the profit rate corresponding
to this optimum. Writing 7r as a function of the given variables i, W, ,p, Z and its
growth rate Z (=DZ/Z), we obtain
7r = 7r(i, W, ,p, Tw' Z, Z) (1.11 )
Since in marketing-production optimum a7r/a/, and a7r/a/2 are zero, it can be found
for the partial derivatives
y IF. yK
(I-Tw)( -y ·T· a - W.I;) < 0P G
7rw= I, + 12 + 13> 0
7r;=
y Iz
7rz= (I-Tw){ y/IG YG - yz)} > 0
y IF. Z
1'z= (I-Tw) -y ·T· aYz > 0P G
As to the signs of these derivatives it may be recalled that yp<Oand Iz<O, and all other
effects >0. Note that the growth rate has an unambiguously negative effect on the
profit rate (7r ;<0) because of the marketing cost (the first term) and the organizational
cost (w.I;). These effects represent the Marris and Penrose relations respectively.
Further, the profit rate depends positively on the volume and growth of market
demand and the constant wage, depreciation and tax rates. The consequences of this
function to the firm's strategy are discussed in section 4.3.
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Appendix 4.A SHAREHOLDERS' OPTIMUM
The optimum strategy from the point of view of shareholders is the strategy which
maximizes the q ratio. Absent the growth stock paradox q can be written as
q = 0 + (l-a)p - (x-ar) (A.I)
Given the relation for the discount rate (eq. 4.3) the first order conditions for I, a and
o are
aq aq a1r
al a1r al =0 (A.2)
aq q2 aps
aa - {p - r - (I-a) -} = 0 (A.3)o s aa
aq q2
-{(l-a)p - (z--ar) - (l-a)ou ') = 0 (AA)
ao 02 s s
The solution for i is implied by the simultaneous optimum for 0 and a. The first
condition (A.2) determines the optimum technique of production. The other
conditions yield the optimum debt ratio and pay-out rate. If us' = 0 the discount rate
is independent of 0, so that A.3 determines the optimum of the debt ratio (a)
independently of 0 (see also note 26 in the foregoing chapter). However, in this case
(or if us" = 0) the last condition A.4 cannot be fulfilled for any finite 0; hence us">O,
is a necessary condition for an interior solution to exist for the optimum pay-out rate.
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APPENDIX 4.B MANAGERIAL STRATEGY
The difference between the strategy of the firm and the desired strategy by
shareholders can be established by comparing the first order conditions for y and
those found for q in Appendix 4.A. The optimality conditions for v are
8y 8y 87r
81 = 81r 81 = 0
8y 8p
8a = v2{p - r - (i-a) Fa} = 0
8v 8p




These conditions shall now be evaluated in the optimum for q. First, notice that in
this optimum
8p 8q
F6 = 86(1' = 0 and
After substitution of the results for the maximum of q found in Appendix 4.A, the





2{p - Ps - (l-a)(







These results are discussed in the text (section 4.2).
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APPENDIX 4.C GROWTH AND PROFITABILITY
The effect of a change in the growth rate i on production and marketing equilibrium
can be obtained from the total derivatives of the first order conditions 1.2 and 1.3.
[
..-" 11"12] [dl,] [ lr, i ] ._. + . dl- 0
71"2'"-22 dl2 lr2i (C.I)
where 7I"hj=82lr/81h81j (h,j = 1,2) and lr~.=8271"/aJh8i(iegrowth rate). The determinant
of the ..--matrix is assumed to be positI~e, which corresponds to the assumption that
the l~ curve in figure 1.3 is steeper than the I~ curve. For the direction of the effect
of i on the equilibrium values of I, and 12 equation C.l implies:
(C.2)
After substitution for "-'2 etc. it can be found that
d/,
sign (di ) = sign ("-'G.lr2/G.lGG> < 0 (C.3)
where 7I"h·is the partial derivative of the marginal return of Ih (h = 1,2) with respect
to variabie j (j = y,G,1 ). The influence of a higher i on the volume of production
labour is unambiguousry positive (aJ,/8i>O), but the effect on marketing labour 12
cannot be assessed with certainty. If the own second-order derivatives 1I",y and lr2Gare
greater in absolute terms than the 'cross' derivatives 11"G and 1I"2y and if LG is smaller




The next two chapters investigate the impact of corporate and public debt on the
medium-term and long-term dynamics of a closed economy. The analysis develops
the macroeconomic analysis of chapter 2 and the microeconomic analysis of corporate
growth in chapters 3 and 4. In contrast with the 'steady state' analysis in chapter 2,
in which an exogenous rate of growth and a constant interest and profit rate was
assumed, the present analysis focusses on the underlying dynamics that should ensure
steady state growth. Therefore we shall develop a model which incorporates a dynamic
conception of investment behaviour, a monetary explanation of the interest rate, and
a more sophisticated representation of fiscal policy.
The analysis is built up in two stages: the present chapter examines the medium
period while the following chapter concentrates on the long period. The principal
borderline between the medium and the long period concerns the conception of
income-expenditure equilibrium. Following Malinvaud (1977) and Kuipers (1981) we
assume that the medium period is characterized by a rigid technique of production
and sluggish prices, and by sluggish expectations on prices and aggregate demand as
well. As a result the disequilibrium dynamics of aggregate demand and production
capacity are typical for the medium period. In the long period full capacity utilization
is presupposed; here the analysis concentrates on the interaction between growth,
income distribution, and the accumulation of debt and wealth.
The main objective of the medium-term analysis of the present chapter is to
investigate whether the medium-period dynamics leads to a stable equilibrium with
full capacity utilization, and what impact fiscal policy has on these dynamics. We start
with a discussion of the model which serves as the basis for the medium period as well
as for the long period analysis (section 5.2). Because of the prominent role of the
government budget constraint in our analysis, the representation of fiscal policy will
be discussed at some length in section 5.3. Next, in sections 5.4 - 5.7 the medium
period model is elaborated and analysed with respect to its dynamic properties.
Finally, section 5.8 makes an assessment of the impact of the policy regime on the
stability of the system.
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5.2 THE BASICMODEL
The main features of the basic model are the following:
I. The economy is divided into three sectors: workers, the corporate sector and the
government. Workers receive labour income (wages and unemployment benefits)
as well as interest income on their holdings of government debt and corporate
debt. The corporate sector encompasses all firms and their owners; this sector
receives the profits after payment of debt service to the workers. In order to avoid
the complications connected with the valuation of shares and capital goods (see
section 2.3) it is assumed that workers do not possess shares; all shares are owned
by the conglomerate of the entrepreneurs, (top)-managers and the large
shareholders who control the corporate sector.' The third sector in this model is
the government which raises income by taxing the income of workers and the
corporate sector. The government spends its income on consumption, transfers and
debt service.
2. Workers have a lower propensity to save from their income than members of the
'corporate class'. For both classes, consumption also depends on the interest rate
and the amount of wealth.
3. Unlike the traditional 'Ricardian' post-Keynesian model considered in chapter
2, the rate of interest is not simply derived from the profit rate but determined
- in a Keynesian fashion - by portfolio equilibrium. The portfolio consists of
money and bonds only. There is no room for financial intermediaries; if they
exist they are simply included in the corporate sector. Government debt and
private debt are perfect substitutes. For simplicity, all money is assumed to be
held by workers; firms are supposed to be able to hold all their liquidities in the
form of interest-bearing assets.
4. In each model prices are sluggish in the sense that the level of prices is fixed at
every instant, but that its rate of change (the inflation rate) may vary.
The model uses the following symbols:
a debt of firms (net of holdings of government bonds)
b government debt
c j propensity to consume of income for class j
C j total consumption of class j
1This division between workers and the corporate sector reconciles Kaldor's argument, that differential
saving arises from the corporate structure of the modern economy, with PasineUi's argument that workers
also accumulate wealth. The basic problem with Kaldor's approach concerned the 'vanishing' of retained
earnings (see 2.3). By taking shareholders and firma together we avoid this problem. Retained earnings are
fully taken into account now, but because of the higher propensity to save of the 'corporate class', the
impact of retained earnings on consumption is only small. This modelling is to be preferred to letting




I employment (in efficiency units)
Ie = employment at full capacity utilization
Is labour supply (in efficiency units)
m (base) money supply
md = (base) money demand
p inflation
Pe expected rate of inflation
11" profit rate
r real interest rate (backward looking)
re expected real interest rate (forward looking)
T j taxes of class j
TO tax rate on wage and transfer income
T, tax rate on interest income of workers
T2 tax rate on net returns of the corporate sector
T3 unemployment benefit
u unemployment (= Is-I)
w sum of wages
y production
Ye productive capacity
y9 income of the government sector
y j income after taxes of class j
zj wealth of class j
where j=I for workers and j=2 for the corporate class. All stock and flow variables
are expressed as ratios to capital stock. The basic equations of the model can be
written as follows:
production and income
Ye y(le) y'>O, y"<O (5.])
y W+1I" (5.2)
y, w + T3u+ rta-b) - pm - T, T3~ 0 (5.3)
Y2 1I"-ar-T2 (5.4)
yg T, + T2 - T3u- rb + pm (5.5)
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expenditure relations
y C1 + C2 + g + i
C1 C1(Y1,(l-T,)re,z1)
C2 = ClY2,(I-T2)re,z2)
T1 TO{W+T3U} + T1{r(a+b)-pm}
T2 TllI"-ar)










(5.13)r + p - Pe
budget constraints






Da = -Y2 + i + C2 - i.a
Db + Om = -yg + g - i.(b+m)
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 give the production function and the distribution of production
between wages and profits. As in chapter 2 the income of each class is defined
including interest payments net of inflation losses (eq. 5.3 and 5.4). In addition the
present model also allows for unemployment benefits in worker's income. Equation
(5.5) defines the income of the government sector as tax receipts less transfers and
real interest on debt and money.
Consumption of each class is related to disposable income, wealth and the interest
rate after taxes (eq. 5.7 and 5.8). It may be noted that consumption thus depends in
two (possibly opposite) ways on the rate of interest the actual return on assets (r)
influences consumption through the amount of interest income, whereas the
prospective yield of savings (r e) determines the allocation of income between saving
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and consumption.f Taxes are levied on wages and transfer income (tax rate TO)' real
interest income of workers (1'1) and net income of the corporate class (TZ)·3
Equation (5.11) describes the budgetary regime of the government. This relation
is discussed in detail in the next section. Equation (5.12) defines portfolio equilibrium
with a conventional money demand function (m~. The prospective interest rate re (eq.
5.13), which is relevant to investment and saving decisions, may differ from the actual
interest rate as a result of differences between the actual and the expected rate of
inflation P-Pe' Finally, equations 5.14 to 5.17 define the wealth of both classes and
give the budget constraints for the corporate sector and the government sector.
5.3 FISCAL POLICY REGIME
In the extensive literature on the dynamics of public debt, government behaviour is
modelled in many different ways. One might distinguish two lines of thinking: the
normative approach which investigates the economic consequences of particular
budgetary regimes or rules, and the behavioural approach which attempts to give a
positive explanation of fiscal behaviour. In most theoretical modelling both
approaches lead, however, to some reduced form representation of government policy.
We shall therefore not elaborate on this distinction, and follow common practice in
representing government behaviour by a budgetary regime or rule.
The budgetary regime can be formulated in terms of the instruments (expenditure
and tax rates) (cf. Blinder and Solow 1973, Christ 1968, 1978, 1979, Tobin and Buiter
1976) or in terms of some target such as the budget deficit (cf. Domar 1957) or the
size of public debt (cf. Barro 1979). Moreover, in recent theoretical models more
dynamic ('feedback') rules have been proposed for fiscal policy, relating taxes or
expenditure to the evolution of macroeconomic variables such as unemployment or the
ratio of public debt to national income (cf. Buiter 1986, Van de Klundert and Van der
Ploeg 1987).
As our aim is to examine the consequences of different fiscal policy regimes for
medium-period and long-period dynamics, we shall adopt a general representation of
fiscal policy that encompasses each of the following regimes which are well-known
in the literature:
2 By relating savings to the real interest rate it is assumed that there is no 'inflation illusion' or other
inflationary distortions, for example arising from the tax system or liquidity constraints (due to the 'front-
loading' effect of higher nominal interest rates).
3 By attaching tax rates to real interest income, we implicitly asaume that inflation losses on nominal
assets are taxed at the aame rate as nominal interest income. Although this ia generally not true in practice,
it seems a reasonable simplification in the context of the present analyais. Moreover, there is aome evidence
that positive and negative biasea in the tax syatem more or less offset one another (cf. Tanzi 1984). For an
excellent discussion on the consequencea of inflationary biases in the tax system, see Feldstein (1983).
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a. fixed tax rates and expenditure (Blinder, Solow 1973);
b. fixed tax rates and a fixed sum of expenditure and nominal interest payments
(Christ 1979);
c. fixed tax rates and a fixed sum of expenditure and interest payments net of
taxes (Tobin, Buiter 1976);
d. fixed budget deficit (Domar 1957, ch.II);
e. balanced budget (Buchanan 1978);
f. constant debt ratio (Barro 1979)
In terms of the model developed above, these regimes (named after the authors
mentioned) may be written as:4
a. Blinder & Solow
b. Christ





g + (r+p)b = constant
g + (l-f,)(r+p)b = constant
g - T, - T2 + f3u + (r+p)b = constant
g - T1 - T2 + f3u + (r+p)b = 0
g - T, - T2 + f3u + (r-pjb = (i+p)(b+m)
where (r+p) is the nominal interest rate and (i-p) the nominal growth rate of the
capital stock. In the regimes a. to c. the tax rates are fixed as well.
The first regime is the standard textbook case with exogenous tax rates and
government expenditure. As total outlays consist of interest payments as well as
expenditure the budget deficit in this regime varies with debt service. Therefore,
Tobin and Buiter (1976) suggested that the sum of expenditure and interest payments
might be a better measure of the stance of fiscal policy than expenditure alone. This
approach is followed by Christ, but he uses the sum of expenditure and gross interest
payments while Tobin and Buiter take interest payments net of taxes levied on
interest income. It may be noted that both regimes imply some form of internal
crowding out as government expenditure has to be reduced automatically when
interest outlays grow.
The last three regimes also imply some form of internal crowding out as they
require government expenditure or taxes to be adjusted in order to realize the target
for the budget deficit (regime d and e) or debt (regime f). The case of a constant
budget deficit was originally investigated by Domar, who found on the basis of a
partial analysis that a positive nominal growth rate (i-p) was sufficient for stability
4 We have followed the authors in their interpretation of the government deficit. There exist, however,
some intricate difficulties with respect to the measurement of the budget deficit. See Appendix 6.A for a
discussion of these diffieultiel.
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of the accumulation of public debt. The 'classical' balanced budget regime, which is
in fact a special - zero deficit - case of the Domar regime, is obviously the most
restrictive of the regimes considered so far. This regime seems to have regained some
new advocacy recently (cf. Buchanan et at. 1978). Note that according to this regime
public debt should be negative in the long run. This follows from the budget
constraint (5.17) and the fact that money stock cannot be negative: in the case of a
zero budget deficit the steady state conditions Db=Dm=O can only be satisfied if
(m+b)(i+p)=O; hence b<O whenever the stock of base money m>O and (i+p)~O.
According to the final regime, the government adopts a target directly for the size
of public debt. This regime is suggested by Barro (1979) who also investigated the
proposition that in reality governments aim at a constant ratio between public debt
and national income.I
Now consider our representation of fiscal policy. Equation 5.11 gives a general
formulation of fiscal policy, which relates government expenditure to tax receipts
(if 1,>0), interest outlays (if 12>0), inflationary erosion of liabilities (if 13>0) and the
'real' erosion as a result of income growth (if 14>0). By varying the 1 coefficients this
fiscal policy function can represent all regimes discussed above, and, of course, many
kinds of hybrid regimes as well. The above summing up of regimes can be reduced
to the following parameter settings:
regime go I, '2 13 14
a. Blinder & Solow go 0 0 0 0
b. Christ go 0 1 0 0
c. Tobin & Buiter go 0 I-T, 0 0
d. Domar go 1 1 0 0
e. Buchanan 0 1 1 0 0
f. Barro 0 1 1 1 1
S.4 THE MEDIUM PERIOD MODEL
The model considered so far leaves several loose ends. Nothing has been said about
the monetary regime, nor about the determination of prices and income distribution.
As the medium period is characterized by sluggish prices and disequilibrium between
aggregate demand and aggregate supply, we shall assume that the decisive determinant
5 See also Kremers (1986a, 1986b) for a criticism of Barro and an alternative (macroeconomic)
modelling of government behaviour. For a more political explanation of government behaviour cf. Renaud,
Van Winden (1987).
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of investment is the aim to adjust capacity to the expected demand for goods," This
gives rise to a Harrodian modelling of the medium period. In contrast with Harrod
however. we shall take account of the impact of the fiscal and the monetary regime
on these dynamics.
In order to keep the model within manageable proportions we assume that the
medium period is characterized by fixed technique of production and fixed profit
share (1r/Y). For the moment we shall also neglect the accumulation of corporate and
public debt. This can be motivated by the fact that public and corporate debt are slow
variables in relation to the medium-term dynamics of aggregate demand and
investment. The analysis of the accumulation of public and corporate debt is
postponed till the long-period analysis in the next chapter. This does not mean.
however. that the distribution of wealth is neglected in the present analysis; on the
contrary. it will be seen below that the size of public and corporate debt has an
important impact on the stability of the system in the medium period.
The essential element in the dynamics of this model concerns the interaction
between investment and aggregate demand. In order to concentrate on the basic
relationships. we neglect financial factors and postulate the following simple
Harrodian investment function where the desired rate of investment i* depends on the
growth of demand (Ye)7 and the utilization rate (h=y Iy c), In accordance with Harrod
it is further assumed that investment adjusts only gradually to the desired level8:
i* .* "1 (Ye' h)
~2(i* - i)
~. ~O ; i*(h=l)=Ye ; i*(h=O)=-oo (5.18)
(5.19)Di
The desired rate of investment i* is positively associated with the growth of demand
and the utilization rate. If capacity is fully utilized i*, and thus the desired growth of
capacity. is equal to the expected growth of demand. If, in the limit, utilization falls
6 See Kuipers (1981) and Van Ewijk (1982) for a discussion of the microeconomic foundation of this
proposition.
7 te = (DYIY)e' where Y standa for real production or demand in absolute eerms.
8 In a comment on Kuipers (1981) we analysed a similar model. In contrast with the present analysis
disequilibrium between capacity growth and demand growth in that model was caused by lagged
expectations on demand growth rather than by slow adjustment of capacity to the desired level as in the
present model (Van Ewijk 1982b). It can easily be seen that this alternative approach eventually produces
exactly the same equation for Di. Assume the following adaptive expectations function:
where ge stands for the growth of expected demand (DYe/Y ) which must be distinguished from the
expected growth of demand (DYIY)e (Van Ewijk 1982b, p.l08r. Now assuming that capacity is at every
instant fully adjusted to expected demand, it i. found that i=io=g8. Substitution in the adaptive
expectations function alao yields eq. 6.28. A difficulty with reapect to this approach is, however, that the
modelling of expectations does not satisfy the weak consistency axiom (as it allows for discrepancy between
y and Ye)' while the present approach doe. (Tumovsky and Burmeister 1977).
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to zero desired (h=O) investment tends to -00. This is obvious because at zero demand
for their products firms want to close down all existing capacity. In the following
analysis we shall adopt the following explicit function which satisfies these
characteristics
i* = Ye + 1?,(l-l/h) (5.18')
In order to ease our analysis, we shall further use a linear version of the consumption
functions (5.7 and 5.8), thus
for j=1,2 (5.20)
Statics
Before analysing the dynamics we shall look in more detail at the static solution of the
model. After substitution for C" C2 and g we obtain for aggregate demand Yd
where
Co c,o + c20 + go + c'z(a+b) + c2z(l-a) + (c,-"Y,)(l-To)T31s
cy C,(l-TO)(l-1r/y) + cil-T2)1r/y - (l-c,-1,)(l-To)T31clyc + C,{To(l-1r/y)+T21r/y)
c, c,(l-T,)b + {c,(1-T,)-cil-T2)}a - 12b + "Y,{T,b+(T,-T2)a}
cre = c'r(l-T,) + C2r(l-T2)
cp = -C,(l-T,) - 1,T, + 13
Equation (5.21) brings out that aggregate demand is positively associated with
autonomous expenditure co' investment i and income y (cy>O), and negatively with
the prospective interest rate (cre<O). The impact of the actual interest rate (cr) is,
however, uncertain: it depends on the distribution of wealth among the three sectors
of the economy, and on the fiscal reaction to changes in interest outlays and tax
receipts. As normally ae-O,a higher interest rate generally leads to a redistribution of
income in favour of workers, which causes aggregate consumption to rise. Further,
if be-O, the higher interest rate also leads to a redistribution of income from the
government to workers. The impact of this income shift on aggregate expenditure
depends on the budgetary regime: if government expenditure and taxes are
autonomous <12=0), as in the Blinder-Solow regime, aggregate expenditure will rise
as workers spend more (cr>O). However, if 12>0 as in all other regimes, the higher
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consumption of workers may be compensated by lower expenditure by the
government; hence aggregate expenditure may fall (cr<O).
Note that if cr>Oand cre<Othe overall impact of the interest rate is uncertain. If
the distributive effects are strong relative to the 'substitution' effect of a higher
prospective interest rate (cre), a higher interest rate might well lead to a larger
aggregate demand. It can be established from the above aggregate demand function
that the occurrence of such a reverse interest effect9 becomes more likely if (see 5.21)
1. the debt of the government and the corporate sector is larger,
2. the marginal propensity to consume of workers is higher,
3. the government reponds less to changes in debt service.
The impact of inflation (p) on demand is given by
Inflation leads to a redistribution between the government and the workers through
the erosion of real balances. Just as in the case of the interest rate, the overall effect
of inflation on spending (dyc/dp) thus depends on these sectors' reactions to the
change in income (the first term in the equation above). As far as inflation Wso
affects the real interest rate on public and corporate debt the ensuing redistribution
will affect spending as well (the second term). The overall effect may thus again be
negative as well as positive. The occurrence of a positive effect of prices on demand,
or a reverse Pigou effect (cf. Tobin 1980), is more likely as '13 is higher; that is if the
government takes better account of the erosion of its liabilities through inflation. This
is particularly the case if it adopts some target for its debt, as in the Barro regime.
A simple Harrodian model
If we follow Harrod and neglect any feedback from the monetary sector, this model
can be shown to exhibit the well-known knife-edge dynamics. Thus assuming the
interest rate and the inflation rate to be fixed, and neglecting the impact of the real
money stock on demand, aggregate demand becomes a simple linear function of
income and investment
(5.22)
where cy is given above and Yocomprises all other factors. Since for a constant capital
output ratio
9 In analogy with the discussion on the Pigou effect (d. Tobin 1980), one might call this positive
interest effect a reverse Keynes effect.
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y = i + Dh/h
Noting that h=y /y c' and assuming y=y d and naive expectations (Ye = Y), we obtain
after some manipulation
(5.24)
Provided that the speed of adjustment of investment t?2 is not too large (so that
t?2<(l-cy)YiO, this result entails a positive relation between Di and i and therefore
the well-known knife-edge characteristics of the warranted rate of growth."
This model hinges, however, on strong assumptions about the monetary sector.
In fact, it totally neglects the role of money which may be expected to have a
dampening impact on the disequilibrium dynamics. Therefore we shall now consider
a more sophisticated model which takes account of the feedback from the monetary
sector.
5.5 MONETARY FEEDBACK
Now let price formation and money growth be represented by the following relations:
p t?3(h-l) + Po
Po + t?4(P-Po)
t? >p '23 0 (5.25)
(5.26)
(5.27)Dm= m(m - i - p)
where Pe=(DP/P)e represents the expected rate of price change and m the nominal
growth of money stock (in absolute terms). Equation 5.25 relates inflation to the rate
of utilization h and core inflation po.H Note that the modelling of inflation and
investment is 'Keynesian' in the sense that for low utilization rates investment adjusts
10 If "2>(1-cy)y c it can be seen that - evaluated in the equilibrium (Di=O) - the second order effect
of Di exceeds the initial effect, so that the sign of the total effect is revened. Although the differential
equation becomes stable now, nevertheless the solution can therefore not be regarded as a stable equilibrium
(see also Van Ewijk 1982b).
11 The warranted growth rate is given by i=(l-Cy}Yc-Yo where Di=O. Remembering that i is equal to
the growth rate of production and that Yc is the reciprocal of the capital coefficient the similarity between
this result and Harrod's is obvious.
12 This condition ensures that inflation becomes negative for low utilization rates.
13 This function is akin to that of Christ (1979), but instead of hi. exogenous expected rate of inflation
Pe we have included core inflation Po in this function and introduced a distinct function for expected
inflation depending on core inflation and actual inflation.
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faster than inflation (i-.-oo but P--+(Po-"3) if h!O) while at high utilization rates
inflation reacts relatively sharper than investment. The modelling of inflation
expectations (5.26) implies a partial adjustment of expected inflation to actual
inflation. This equation satisfies the weak consistency axiom, as there is no difference
between the expected and the actual level of prices at the present moment. However,
as we do not assume perfect myopic foresight with respect to the change in prices
(Pe#p), the strong consistency axiom is, of course, not satisfied (Burmeister and
Turnovsky 1976). Further, note that these equations together yield a consistent
medium-term equilibrium at h=1 characterized by P=Po=Pe' Equation 5.27 for the
change in money supply (in relation to capital stock) follows simply from
differentiation of m with respect to time.
As for the moment we neglect changes in nominal public debt, we may for
convenience choose the following function for the money demand
which implies in case of portfolio equilibrium (m=md)
r = p.(y 1m) - p + r0 (5.28)
This function has the attractive properties that limlit'o r = 00 and limlll'""r = r 0-po The
first characteristic implies that the interest rate can in principle be pushed up
infinitely by monetary contraction; the second characteristic represents the liquidity
trap.
After substitution for p, rand re (eqs. 5.25, 5.26, 5.28) in aggregate demand
(5.21), the utilization rate can be solved in terms of i and m:
h m. (5.29)
where
h,= c'z - cp("3-Po)
h2= Co + cr(ro-po+"3) + cre(ro-po+"3D4) + (-)'2-13)(D3-Po)b
h3= (l-cy)yc + (cr+D4cre)D3 + b2-13)M3
For economic reasons it is assumed that h>O and that the numerator must be positive.
This latter requirement represents the conventional assumption that the impact of y
on aggregate demand should be less than unity. Hence
(5.30)
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Given this condition it can be seen that the utilization rate is a positive function of
the rate of investment provided that (1+"Y4(m+b»0),thus as long as the government
does not overcompensate the change in i by an opposite change in its expenditure g.
As this can occur only if government liabilities are very negative (m-b-en), we shall
leave this exceptional case out of consideration. Also money supply normally has a
positive impact on the utilization rate (hn?0). However, in the case of a reverse
interest effect (cr+cre>O)a rise in money supply, and thus a fall in interest rate, might
well lead to lower utilization of capacity.
Dynamics
After substitution for i* (5.18) in the Di function (5.19) and for p in the equation
for Om (5.27) the model yields the differential system
(5.31)
where h is the known function of i and m (5.29). First, note that the steady state
solution of the system (Om=Oi=O) is characterized by full capacity utilization (h=l),
core inflation (p=p ) and a rate of investment equal to the growth of real money stock
A 0
(i=m-po). As to the dynamics, the following scheme illustrates the essential causative
links (the scheme is made up for the case with a normal interest effect on demand):
(I)~?l+ (Ia) + + A)Di <: Ye\
"(5)+ ++T





The fundamental destabilizing causation arises from the positive linkage of OJ to i
through the utilization rate (linkage la in the scheme). This is the typical Harrodian
causation from higher investment to larger demand and thereby to a further
stimulation of investment. In the present model the effect of utilization h on demand
is magnified by the induced rise in inflation p and the consequential fall in the real
interest rate r (linkage 2). The monetary sector seems to have a principally stabilizing
influence on the system, on the one hand through the negative linkage of Dm to m
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(3), but more importantly, through the negative feedback of a higher growth rate i
and higher inflation p on the growth of money stock Dm (linkages 4 and l b).
The dashed lines give the additional effects arising from the impact of Di on the
growth of (expected) demand, and thereby on investment again. On the one hand this
may reinforce the destabilizing impact of investment through the positive feedback
of higher investment growth on demand growth (linkage 5); on the other hand it also
exerts a stabilizing influence as it makes the impact of money on investment stronger
(linkage 6).
The phase diagram
As a first approximation of the dynamics of this model, we shall concentrate on the
role of the utilization rate, and thus neglect for the moment the influence of expected
demand growth on investment (linkage 5 in the scheme). In terms of the model we
therefore set ~Z.~1=~(>0) and ~z.=0. The dynamics of this system can be seen from the
phase diagram (figure 5.1) which depicts the Di=O and the Dm=O conditions in the
{i,m} plane. In order to bring out the essential features of the system the {i,m} plane
is projected on an infinite horizon (cf. Jordan, Smith 1987). As m>O only the positive
hemisphere needs to be considered.
In order to ease our argument we restrict our analysis to the case with cp=O, which
means that we neglect the impact of inflationary erosion on consumption. Together
with the plausible assumption that h3>0 this allows us to neglect the constraint of a
positive denominator of h (see 5.30). The conditions Di=O and Dm=O conditions can
then be written as the following functions F and G for i:
Di=O if i=F(m) where
-c1zm - (cr+cre)(J,ly/m+ro-po) - Co + (I-cy)yc + <'YZ.-13)Pob
F(m)= I + 14(m+b) (5.32)
Dm=O if i=G(m) where
2. .
c1zm + J1m + Jz.
G(m) = ~
3 h3m - (Cr+Cre)J,lYc+ ~3{l+14(m+b)}m
(5.33)
where j1 = -co - (cr+cre)ro + m(Cr+~4cre) + (1z.-13)mb +
+ (~PO+~3)(1-Cy)YcN3 + cre(l-~4)Po
jz. = -(~po +~3)(cr +cre)J,lY/{}3
and h3 is given above (eq. 5.29). Note that the denominator of G(m) is equal to the
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denominator of the utilization rate h except for the last term. Since this term is always
~ 0 we can conclude that the denominator of G is positive for all m as well.
First, concentrating on the case of a 'normal' interest effect (cr+cre<O) we are able
to establish the following characteristics of these functions (Fmand Gm denoting the
first derivatives with respect to m):
F(m) : 0; Fm(m) <0 for all m
F(O) = 00· Fm(O) =-00,
F(oo) = -Cl/14; «0) Fm(oo) =0 if 14>0
or F(oo) = -00; Fioo) = -clz «0) if 14=0
G(m) : 0; Gm(m) : 0 for all m
G(O) " : 0= m-Po+~3 (>0); Gm(O)
G(oo) = -Cl/14 «0); Gm(oo) = 0 if 14>0
or G(oo) = -00 Gm(oo) = -Clz «0) if 14=0
Since h is positively related to investment it can further be seen from (5.31) that
Di > 0 <=> i > F(m) and Dm < 0 <=> i » G(m)
The shape of the Di=O curve in figure 5.1 follows directly from the above
characteristics. Starting from the upper left corner {00,0} this curve slopes gradually
downward. For the Barro regime where 14>0 (or if clz=O) it reaches the horizon at the
m-axis as the F-curve becomes parallel to this axis at infinity. For all other regimes
(where 14=0) the Di=O curve reaches the horizon below the m-axis. The shape of the
Dm=O curve is less straightforward, but it is at least certain that it starts at a finite
value on the i-axis and reaches the horizon at the same point as the F-curve.
Further, it can be established that, for the case with a normal interest effect, the
steady state condition h= l always yields one positive and one negative solution for
m.14 Hence we can conclude that there always exists a unique steady state solution in
14 For h=l one obtains the following quadratic expression for m
(c1Z+'14i)m2 + {hl-h2+(1+'14b)i}m + (cr+Cre)I£Yc = 0
Excluding a negative steady state growth rate (hence i ~ 0) this equation always yields one positive and one
negative solution for m when the interest effect on expenditure is negative (cr+cre<O). If the interest effect
is reversed this equation will yield either two positive solutions or two negative solutions, or no solution at
all. This case will be considered in the next section.
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the relevant hemisphere (me-O).
There is yet another condition which must be taken into account, namely the
condition of a non-negative utilization rate (h~ 0). This condition is satisfied if (see
eq.5.29)
(5.34)
It can easily be seen that this lower boundary has a negative slope in the {i,m} plane.
In the limit, when m--+oothe slope becomes equal to 0 (or -c1z if 14=0); this implies
that this curve reaches the horizon at the same point as the Oi=Oand Dm=O curves.
Further, it can be seen that the Oi=Ocurve lies above this boundary for any m>O.If
i approximates this lower boundary curve the utilization rate becomes zero, so that the
desired rate of investment and hence Di tend to -00. This h=Oboundary thus operates
as a sort of 'black hole' which absorbs all phase paths that come too close to it.
On the basis of these global results we can make several inferences. Intersection
S of these curves is an equilibrium point which mayor may not be stable. If it is
stable it can, however, only be locally stable; there always exists some area around the
h=Ocurve from where the system can never return to S. Thus S is at best stable within
a certain zone. This means that after small shocks the system will return to S, but that
large disturbances may push the system beyond the critical 'stable' zone, so that the
system gets unbalanced for ever. As the point at {00,0} can be shown not to be stable
it can be inferred that the system cannot move upward for ever.15 Therefore it can be
concluded that any path outside the stable zone must sooner or later come into the
'attraction zone' of the h=Ocurve.
These results indicate that the introduction of monetary feedback has a stabilizing
impact on the Harrodian model; a stable equilibrium (the warranted rate of growth)
15 By expressing the model in polar coordinates we get the following equation for the radius r:
After substitution for h it can be seen that for a sufficiently larif r (and thus large m and i) the sign of Dr
is determined by the sign of the term -t73'"14m3i/h3(or -t73m (i+h1ml/h3 if '"14=0) Since hl,h3>0 this
implies that there exists a finite circle around the origin where the sign of Dr is negative for any positive
i and m; that is, at a sufficiently wide circle around the origin every path in the first quadrant crosses this
circle bending towards the origin. Therefore we can conclude that a path tending towards { "',O}, and thus
moving upward for ever, cannot exist.
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Figure 5.1 Phase diagram
m
may exist, but only within certain boundaries. Although the monetary feedback
appears to provide a sufficient check in an upward direction, there still always exists
some zone along the h=Q boundary where the system gets destabilized; starting from
a point in this zone the system will fall into a Harrodian process of accelerating
decline in demand and reduction of investment. Note that these overall dynamics
correspond remarkably well to what Leijonhufvud (1969) called the 'corridor'
characteristic which in his view is typical of Keynesian dynamics.
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Local stability
Now let us look somewhat closer at the stability of equilibrium point S. Therefore
consider the linearization of the system (5.31) evaluated in the steady state {ms,is}:
(5.35)
where hm and hi stand for the first derivatives of h with respect to m and i. From




Still confining our analysis to the case with a normal interest effect (cr+cre)<O, so
that always hm>016, it can be seen that the first condition (RHl) is decisive for
stability. Unfortunately RHI yields no neat algebraic solution. Nevertheless, it is
evident that the reaction speed of investment t?is a crucial determinant of the stability
of S. This result is straightforward as the 'acceleration' factor is known to be the
principal factor in the instability of Harrodian models. The first condition (RHl)
brings out that a critical value of this parameter exists beyond which the system
becomes unstable. Denoting this critical value by t?maxwe find
(5.37)
For any t?<t?maxthe equilibrium is (locally) stable, and for any t?>t?maxit is unstable.
In other words, whenever prices show some flexibility (t?3>0) the equilibrium may
be stable if t? is sufficiently low, that is, if investment does not react too sharply to
deviations in the utilization rate.17
Hop/ bifurcation
Further characteristics of equilibrium point S can be derived from figure 5.2. This
figure shows the Routh-Hurwitz conditions in relation to t? This figure brings out
that S is a stable node for low values of t?; as t? becomes larger (but still <t?max)the
16 The exact condition for hm>Oevaluated in h=l i. cIZ-(cr+cre),.y c/m2+,,/ 4i>O. For any is>O this
condition implies that hm>Owhenever cr+cre<O. Only in the cue of a strong reverse effect of the interest
rate on consumption might ~ be negative.
17 Note that the .teady .tate .olution i. independent of" (eq. 5.28). It does however depend on "3'
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Figure 5.2 Characteristics of equilibrium S
RH2
stable node unstable node
RHI
equilibrium becomes a stable spiral. If tJ rises above tJmax S becomes an unstable spiral
and eventually an unstable node.
The critical case with tJ=tJmax may represent a centre or spiral. If it is a spiral the
system is characterized by a Hopf-bifurcation. In that case it is known that a limit
cycle will exist around the equilibrium point S, the radius of which will vary with
tJ (Jordan and Smith 1987, 327-329). Unfortunately the system is too complex to
determine the characteristics of this critical point algebraically. Therefore we shall
proceed with some numerical simulations for plausible parameters of the model.
Unstable limit cycle
The above inferences about the characteristics of S are corroborated by figure 5.3
which shows the simulation of the adjustment trajectories from a given starting point
(0.05,O.5) for different values of tJ (0.01; 0.1; 0.2). For the parameters on which these







As in this case tJmax = 0.15] the phase paths for tJ=O.OI and tJ=O.l are stable (viz. a
node and a spiral) while the phase path for tJ=0.2 produces an unstable process, which
eventually collapses onto the h=O boundary.
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Explanation: This figure is based on the following numerical values'8 ro=0.02;
po=0.02; g/ycO=0.22; TO=T,=T2=0.2; T3=0.3; b/yc=O.5; a=O.5;c,=O.9; c2=0.6; c'r=-l;
c~r=-l; c'z=0.05; c2z=0.05; c'0=-0.015; c20=-0.01; ~ =0.1; Is=0.33; -U3=O.2; -U4=0.2;
m=0.07; w=l; yc=0.38; ,8=0.8; 1,.'12,'13,'14=0.The simulations are based on an
approximation of the differential system by the Runge-Kutta method (cf. Cohen
1973)
Further this numerical example can be seen to produce an unstable limit cycle around
S when -U<-UmaX• This cycle is unstable because whenever the system starts from a point
inside this cycle it will eventually tend towards the equilibrium point S, but when it
starts outside the cycle the trajectory will recede from the cycle for ever. The size of
this cycle varies with -U. This implies that the system becomes more stable, i.e. the
limit cycle becomes wider, as the reaction speed of investment is less. This is
illustrated by figure 5.4 which shows the limit cycles for three different values of -U
18 In the next chapter ",e ahall aive a motivation for thue parameter values.
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0.5 ~ 0.7 . __ m
tJ=0.145 »>/ Dm=O------- ---_--- tJ=0.14
Explanation: see figure 5.3 above.
close to tJmax (0.140; 0.145; 0.150). For tJ>tJmax the limit cycle vanishes completely so
that S becomes unstable globally as well as locally. It is evident that for tJ's close to the
critical value (for example tJ=0.150), where equilibrium S is still stable locally, even
a small displacement from S may be sufficient to push the system beyond the limit
cycle and lead it away from S for ever.
5.6 SOME EXTENSIONS
Reverse interest effect
Figure 5.5 gives a phase diagram for the case with a reverse interest effect (cr+cre»O.
As the interest effect becomes dominant for low m (when the interest rate is high) the
Di=Ofunction approximates the y-axis now at - 00. As a consequence the system has
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either two solutions or no solution at all in the positive hemisphere. The figure
illustrates the case with two solutions (Sl and S2). Both solutions, of course, entail the
same equilibrium for the growth rate (i=m-po)' but different solutions for the stock
of money. The figure brings out that only one of these solutions may be stable (S2);
the other solution (S1)is evidently a saddle point, and thus unstable. Therefore we can
conclude that if S2 is locally stable again, some zone must exist around S beyond
which the system is unstable. If S2 is not stable, there is no stable finite solution at all.
In this case we should also take account of the condition that there be a positive
denominator of h (eq.5.30), which implies a lower boundary for money stock
(m>(cr+cre)y/h3). If the system approaches this boundary it can be seen that h-+oo
and thus Di/Dm-+O. This means that the economy comes into an upward spiral of ever
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increasing demand and inflation. Hence we can conclude that, in contrast with the
case of a normal interest effect, the system may be unstable in an upward as well as
a downward direction.
Demand expectations
So far we have neglected the impact of demand expectations on investment (~2=0).
Figure 5.6 exhibits the phase diagram for the same numerical example, but now with
partial adjustment of investment to expected demand growth (~2=0.5). For simplicity
it is assumed that entrepreneurs have naive expectations with respect to demand
growth (Ye=Y).Although the steady state position is not changed, this figure brings
out some remarkable changes. In the first place the Di=O curve is no longer a
monotonic decreasing function. Instead it bends forward in the region above the
Dm=O curve. This is due to the positive impact of Dm on demand growth and thereby
on desired investment. A second remarkable difference is the appearance of a new


















lower boundary where Di-s -ee. This boundary represents the condition that the
secondary effect of demand growth on Di (linkage 5 in scheme 4.1) should not exceed
the primary effect. This new lower boundary can always be shown to be more
restrictive than the h=O condition; hence this boundary lies above the h=O curve for
all m>0.19
Apart from these differences, the dynamics exhibits basically the same
characteristics. At the given parameter values the equilibrium is stable, so that there
exists a critical zone around this equilibrium. The figure shows two trajectories, one
starting within the critical zone at {i=O;m=O.5) and the other starting outside it at
{i=0;m=0.8}.
5.7 FISCAL POLICY AND STABILITY
In order to asses the impact of various (policy) variables on the stability of the system
table 5.1 gives the partial effects of these variables on ~max (eq.5.37). As we have
established above, this parameter has a clear cut impact on stability while it does not
change the equilibrium position. If a variable has a positive effect on this critical
value, ~max' we may conclude that it has a stabilizing impact on the system.20 A
negative effect corresponds to a destabilizing impact. All effects are given in relation
to the reference case given in figure 5.4 above.
A general conclusion that emerges from these results is that all factors raising
autonomous expenditure improve the stability of the system. Further, these results
corroborate our earlier inference that the system becomes more stable as the monetary
feedback is stronger: the sensitivity of the interest rate to money and income (JJ) as
well as the interest effects on consumption (c1r,c2r) and the degree of price-flexibility
(~3) have significant positive effects on ~ x: In addition, the system becomes more
" ma
stable as money growth (m) is faster, core inflation (po) higher and the autonomous
interest rate (ro) lower. At the given parameter values the effect of demand
expectations on investment (~2) is to reduce stability. Also a larger corporate debt
tends to destabilize the system, which is obvious as the ensuing distribution effect
weakens the negative feedback of the interest rate on expenditure.
19 Since ye=i+Dh/h=i+(hi/h)Di+(hm/h)Dm we can find from (5.18 and 5.19) that
Di="2{(hi/h)Di+(~/h)Dm}+"1"2(1-1/h).
Now requiring that the secondary eCCect"4(hi/h) <1 weobtain the condition i>"2-(h1m+h2)/{1+'l4(m+b)}
whereaa the condition for h>O waa i> -\h1m+h2)/{1+'l4(m+b)}. For any "2>0 this boundary thus lies
above the h=O boundary for any m>O.
20 This concerns only the local stability of the system. For an indication of the impact on the global
stability one should obtain some meaaure of the change in the area within the limit cyde. All, this entails
a very laborious computational procedure we confined our analysis to the above meaaure of local stability.
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Table 5.1 Partial effects on t?El(
go 0.076 c, -0.008
'1, -0.004 c2 0.055
'12 0.021 c'2 -0.083
'13 -0.0002 c2r -0.083
'14 -0.028 clz -0.164
TO -0.055 c2z -0.099
T, -0.039 c'o 0.199
T2 -0.145 c20 0.199
T3 0.004 a -0.025
p. 0.015 ro -0.266~
m 0.198 Po 0.073
t?2 -10.08 w 0.015
t?3 0.754 Is 0.043
b -0.025 yc -0.084
Explanation: all effects are measured with reference to the steady state given in figure
5.4 above The effect of the '1 coefficients have been corrected for the impact effect
on government expenditure. One should be careful to compare the absolute effects
because an equal change in each variable may produce quite different impacts in
absolute amounts.
With regard to fiscal policy these results indicate that the system becomes more stable
as autonomous government expenditure and unemployment benefits are higher and
taxes are lower. The Christ regime, with '12=1 and the other '1 coefficients equal to
zero, clearly emerges as the best policy regime to choose for the medium period. This
conclusion proves to be robust for different parameter sets in the neighbourhood of
our reference set. This is not really surprising as the '1,,'13 and '14 parameters relate
expenditure to pro-cyclical variables (tax receipts, inflation erosion and real erosion
of liabilities) whereas '12attaches expenditure to nominal interest outlays, which vary
counter-cyclically.
This is corroborated by table 5.2 which gives t?maxfor each of the regimes
considered. This table brings out that the Christ regime performs best, closely
followed by the Tobin-Buiter regime. The Barro regime, aiming at a constant debt
ratio, is apparently the most procyclical; it yields the lowest t?max.
Finally consider the impact of public debt on the system's stability. It is obvious
that this impact is closely connected with the policy regime, especially with the
reaction coefficient with respect to interest outlays ('12). If '12 is small, government
debt will have a destabilizing impact as it increases the interest income of the private
sector, thereby making consumption more pro-cyclical. However, when '12 is large,
a larger public debt will stabilize the system. This is illustrated in figure 5.7 which
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Explanation: see table 5.1 above
gives ~max in relation to government debt for 12=0 (as in the Blinder-Solow regime)
and 12=1 (as in most other regimes). If 12=0, the maximum ~ decreases as b goes up.
At b=6.1 it even becomes zero, which implies that for any b>6.1 no stable steady state
can exist whatever the adjustment speed of investment ~. If 12=1 the maximum for
~ proves to rise with b. In this case b should not be too low (b>-IO) for a stable
solution to be feasible.
Figure 5.7 ~..x in relation to public debt
-10 -5 o 5 10 b
5.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have examined the medium-period dynamics which is governed by
disequilibrium between aggregate demand and supply and a 'Harrodian' interaction
between demand growth and investment. It was shown that the introduction of
monetary feedback may in principle stabilize the system, but only within a certain
region, or 'corridor', around the equilibrium point. Numerical simulations bring out
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that if the equilibrium is stable there may exist an unstable limit cycle; starting from
a point within this cycle the system recedes to its equilibrium position, but whenever
it starts from outside the cycle it will sooner or later come into a cumulative spiral of
declining demand and investment.
Whether a stable solution exists depends primarily on the strength of the monetary
feedback, the degree of price flexibility and the sensitivity of investment to changes
in demand. Also fiscal policy proved to have a significant impact on the system's
stability. In general, the system appears to be more stable as fiscal policy reacts more
strongly to changes in debt service ("(2 high), and less strong to changes in tax
receipts, unemployment benefits and the size of public debt. Therefore the Barro and
the Blinder-Solow regimes prove to be less stable then other regimes. The Christ
regime emerges as the most stabilizing regime.
Besides, a small fiscal response to changes in debt service might also give rise to
a reverse interest effect; in this case a higher interest rate leads to higher aggregate
demand, as the result of a distribution effect in favour of workers. It is obvious that
this effect may seriously undermine the stabilizing feedback of the monetary sector.
The impact of public debt on the system's dynamics depends on the fiscal policy
regime. If the fiscal response to changes in debt service is small the system becomes
less stable as debt is larger. Beyond some critical value the system proves to be
unstable however low the accelerator factor of investment, and however high the
flexibility of prices. Thus, although public debt is a slow variable in comparison to
the demand variables that dominate medium-period dynamics, it may have an
important impact in the long period. Gradual growth of public debt may sooner or
later affect the stability of the system, and turn it from a (locally) stable system into
an unstable system; that is, it may give rise to a 'catastrophe.'
In the next chapter we shall examine the dynamics of growth and asset
accumulation from a long-term point of view. In contrast with the present chapter.
the analysis will then concentrate on the dynamics of income distribution and the
accumulation of public and corporate debt.
APPENDIX S.A MEASUREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICIT
In our discussion of the alternative budgetary regimes in section 5.3 we followed the
authors in their interpretation of the government budget constraint. There exist,
however, several important conceptual difficulties with respect to the measurement
of the budget deficit, especially with respect to the measurement of the real burden
of debt. In its conventional definition the deficit on cash basis is given by
deficit (A.I)
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Note that this deficit is not equal to the excess of expenditure g over income yg'





The difference between the deficit and (g-y g) is the inflationary erosion of
government liabilities, or the 'monetary correction' (Tanzi, Blejer, Teijeiro 1987).21
The difference with the change in the ratio of government liabilities (Dm-Db) given
by the government budget constraint (GBC) consists of the inflationary erosion and
the 'real' erosion of liabilities as a result of growth of real income.
These results indicate that for a proper account of the burden of debt one should
take nominal interest outlays net of devaluation of outstanding liabilities through
inflation. In much IS/LM modelling of the GBC this problem is avoided as the price
level is assumed to be fixed anyway (cf. Tobin, Buiter 1977 and Christ 1978, 1979).
In a more complex analysis one cannot, however, neglect this problem.
Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, when modelling actual government
behaviour it may be doubted whether the real or the nominal burden of debt offers
a more relevant measure of the burden of debt. Politicians often seem to be more
impressed by the nominal interest payments than by the less ~parent benefits of
devaluation of current liabilities (public debt and base money2 ) through inflation.
This is further stimulated by the conventional 'book-keeping' methods used for
accounting and budgeting. Especially in times of fiscal restraint the use of cash
accounting methods, sometimes even in the form of explicit cash limits (cf. Rau
1985), favours a nominal bias in the budgetary regime.
Besides changes of the value of money, changes in the market value of public
debt may also affect the real burden of debt. When the general level of interest rates
falls or adverse shifts occur in portfolio-preferences towards public debt, the market
value of outstanding public debt goes up, thereby raising the true burden for the
government. This leads to very intricate difficulties with respect to the discount rates
and time horizons of the public and the government.23 In the present analysis we
neglect these difficulties by assuming that all government debt has a fixed nominal
value and a variable interest rate. Since it is further assumed that public debt and
private sector debt are perfect substitutes, we may neglect portfolio shifts as well;
there is only one homogenous sort of debt and one interest rate.
21This inflationary erosion of government debt does not occur when the debt is indexed, or when the
debt is nominated in foreign currency. Sometimes this erosion is considered as a form of amortiution (d.
Tansi, Blejer, Teijeiro 1987). Of course, these considerations do not apply to the erosion of money stock.
22 Deficit finance is assumed to be the only source of base ('high powered') money.
23 See Buiter (198S) and Tansi, Blejer and Teijeiro (1987) for comprehensive accounts of these
problems.
CHAPTER 6
LONG-PERIOD DYNAMICS OF GROWTH AND DEBT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Despite these critical results with respect to medium-period stability, income-
expenditure equilibrium with full-capacity utilization is taken as the starting point of
the long-period analysis. This is necessary to concentrate on the dynamics of growth
and asset accumulation, in particular the role of the government budget constraint in
the long-term dynamics of the economy. As in the foregoing chapter we shall assess
the stability of the system for different regimes of fiscal policy.
Since the seminal papers of Christ (l963) and Blinder and Solow (1973) many
studies have been published on the dynamics of growing public debt and interest
payments (cf. Tobin and Buiter 1976, Infante and Stein 1976, Turnovsky 1977, Christ
1978, 1979, Calvo 1985, Rau 1985, to mention but a few). Although these studies
focus primarily on the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies, they have also
yielded important results with respect to the stability of public debt and interest
payments. One of the main conclusions common to these studies is the basically
unstable nature of public debt when the deficit is financed by issuing interest-bearing
debt.
The essential destabilizing element in this process is the interest payment on
outstanding debt which has to be financed too, thereby further increasing the debt
and so on. For the process to be stable it is required that other factors sufficiently
neutralize this destabilizing tendency. In most models this is accomplished only if the
income and wealth effects of the growing public debt on private expenditure are so
strong that the resulting increase in tax revenue eventually exceeds the rise in interest
payments. Since the income-effect of interest paid on public debt will never be
sufficient to produce such an increase in tax receipts, it is evident that stability in
these models hinges on the strength of the wealth effect of the growing public debt.
In the present chapter we shall challenge this negative view on the stability of
public debt for a growing economy. In our view the studies mentioned above are not
really suitable for answering the question of stability because they are restricted to a
basically stationary ISjLM framework, in which autonomous expenditure, labour
supply and often even the capital stock 1 are taken as fixed. Although there may often
1 Cf. Blinder and Solow (1973) in their fint model, Turnovsky (1976, 1977), Nguyen and Turnovsky
(1979, 1983), Christ (1978, 1979), Calvo (1986), Rau (1986).
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be good reasons to avoid the "complex issues of disequilibrium growth theory" (Rau
1985, p.214), we believe that for assessment of the stability of public debt it is
indispensable to take account of the inter-relationship between the accumulation of
public debt and the real growth of the economy. Confining the analysis to the
(arbitrary) zero growth situation is in our view too restrictive; it obscures the basic
factor determining stability, namely the growth rate of real income relative to the real
interest rate.2
Some authors have in effect attempted to generalize the analysis for steady growth
states, but so far little attention has generally been paid to the dynamics of public debt
accumulation; either the analysis is restricted to the case of monetary financing
(Infante and Stein 1980), or it focusses on the comparative statics of steady growth
equilibrium (Tobin and Buiter 1980, Tobin 1980, 1982). In the recent literature there
appears to be a tendency to evade the stability problem by assuming 'feedback' rules
for government behaviour which make fiscal policy subordinate to a stable evolution
of public debt from the outset (cf. Buiter 1986, Van de Klundert, Van der Ploeg
1987).
A more or less explicit account of the significance of growth for the dynamics of
debt accumulation is given by Turnovsky (1978). For the case of money financing
Turnovsky (p. 12) in fact concludes that the condition for (local) stability "is more
likely to be met for a growing, rather than a stationary, economy." However, for the
case of bond financing in which we are interested, his analysis is rather unsatisfactory,
as for the stable system an increase in government expenditure should always lead to
a reduction in public debt. According to Turnovsky (1978, p. 18) this "seemingly
perverse" result is "largely a consequence of the fact that pure bond financing gives
rise to continuously accumulating interest payments, thereby creating a highly
destabilizing influence." In the present analysis it will be argued that in a growing
economy a bond-financed budget deficit is not necessarily destabilizing at all.
Moreover it will be shown that an increase in government expenditure may lead to a
new stable equilibrium without any 'perverse' effects.
The analysis starts from the basic model given in the foregoing chapter. Section 6.2
completes this model for the long period and introduces a macroeconomic investment
function based on the microeconomic analysis of the growth of the corporate firm in
chapters 3 and 4. Section 6.3 analyses the long-term dynamics of public debt and
income distribution for a reduced (two-dimensional) model concentrating on the
accumulation of public debt and income distribution, while section 6.4 discusses the
fully dynamic model including the interaction between investment and corporate debt.
2 Of course, the incorporation of growth in the model haa ita price too; in order still to be able to
establish the determinants of stability we must adopt rather .tringent restriction. on the modelling of
demand dynamics and expectations. This haa in fact been the baaic motivation for the division of the
analysis into the medium period and the long period.
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6.2 THE LONG-PERIOD MODEL
As the medium-term analysis of the foregoing chapter has raised serious doubts with
regard to the 'automatic' equilibrium restoring mechanisms, we shall assume that
medium-term equilibrium is achieved by discretionary monetary policy which ensures
that the money supply is always sufficient to generate full capacity utilization.3
The basic model is given by equations 5.1 to 5.17 in the foregoing chapter (section
5.2). For the long-term analysis it is completed as follows. First, notice that medium-
term equilibrium, as we have seen, implies that capacity is fully utilized and that
expectations on prices and demand are always fulfilled
y = yc (6.1)
(6.2)
As regards investment we shall now concentrate on the long-term determinants
discussed in the chapters 3 and 4. It emerged from this microeconomic analysis that
in the presence of imperfect markets for risk sharing, investment can be conceived
as a function of the supply of internal savings and the desired debt ratio. The amount
of internal savings is determined by the profit rate, the interest rate and the net pay-
out to shareholders. The basic determinants of the desired debt ratio were found to
be:
1. the probability distribution of profits and the interest rate;
2. the time preference and risk aversion of shareholders;
3. the preference towards growth and risk of managers;
4. the discretionary power of managers vis-a-vis shareholders.
In the present macroeconomic model shareholders and managers are taken together in
the corporate class. This class owns all capital stock and reinvests its savings in the
corporate sector in the form of equity. Workers are supposed to own no shares; they
invest their savings in public or corporate debt (with a variable interest rate). This
implies that in the present model internal savings of the corporate sector are equal to
total sector income less consumption (Y2-C2)' Hence investment can be modelled as
Y2-C2 a*-a
i*= -- + n--I-a I-a 0>0; a,a*<l (6.3)
where
3 As an alternative, fiscal policy can also be assumed to take care of demand equilibrium. In that case
government expenditure or taxes should always be such that the budget deficit precisely compensates the
excess of savings over investment by the private sector at the prevailing rate of interest. As this case is very




The first term in the investment function (6.3) represents the rate of investment
compatible with a constant debt ratio", As in chapter 3 this factor implies that the
interest rate may have a positive influence on internal savings, and thus on investment,
when the firm has a net creditor position. However, besides this income effect the
interest rate also has a substitution effect on investment as it will probably change the
desired debt ratio a* in the second term. This second term represents the impact of
the desired change in the debt ratio, modelled as a linear relation of the difference
between the desired debt ratio a* and its actual value a.5
In accordance with our non-'Modigliani-Miller' analysis of chapters 3 and 4 it is
assumed that there exists a unique optimum for the debt ratio a*, which is dependent
on the profit rate and the interest rate (eq, 6.4). The state of risk and the preferences
of shareholders and managers, as well as the discretionary power of managers are
taken together in the exogenous factor ~.6 Following Robinson (1962) this factor,
which determines the locus of the investment function, can be interpreted as the
'animal spirits' of entrepreneurs. The maximum a* is of course 1. In the numerical
analyses following we shall use as a function for a*:
(6.4a)
This equation states that a* is positively related to the profit rate 11" and 'animal spirits'
~, and negatively to the interest rate r. Entrepreneurs are thus supposed to accept a
larger risk as the profit rate is higher and the interest rate lower. Equation (6.4a) has
the plausible characteristics that Iim1r....,a*=1and lim1rl1rOa*=-oo, where 1I"0=(£2r-1)/£,
represents the minimum for 11". If the profit rate approximates this critical rate,
entrepreneurs decide to invest all their wealth in financial assets (government bonds)
and close down productive capacity.
Finally, we shall again adopt a linear modelling of the consumption function (see
equation 5.20 in the foregoing chapter) and an explicit function for the interest rate7,
4 This follows from the budget constraint (6.16).
5 Notice the similarity between this function and KaJecki's function based on his principle of increasing
risk (see section 3.2).
6 Corporate taxes are assumed not to affect the optimum debt ratio. This requires all components of
income of firms/capitalists to be taxed at the same rate. See also section 3.3.
7 This equation for the interest rate follows from the demand for money function:
md = P2Y /llog{(r+p-ro)/ Pl}-P3b). This function implies that money demand increases if the interest rate
falls and public debt rises.
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(JJ2y/m + JJ3b)
r = ro + JJ, e - P (6.5)
This function has the attractive properties that r-+oo if m!O or b-+oo, and that r falls
into a liquidity trap (r ro-p) if m becomes very large or b very low (<<0).
At a given production y and inflation p the interest rate can be manipulated freely
by monetary policy. Although the total amount of government liabilities (m+b) is
given at any moment, monetary authorities can instantaneously vary the mix of (base-
) money and debt. The sum of money and debt (m-b) only changes as a result of the
government budget deficit.8 For simplicity, we do not distinguish an independent
central bank, but include the central bank in the government sector. Monetary policy,
aiming at equality between demand and capacity, takes place through open market
policy, that is through changing the mix of m and b.9 This is a consistent modelling
of the relation between the government budget constraint and monetary policy within
the context of our analysis.
Now the static part of the model is completed. For momentary equilibrium the stocks
of corporate debt (a) and government liabilities (m-b) as well as the unemployment
rate (u) and wages (w) are given. Then production is determined by the existing stock
of capital and the optimum technique of production. Monetary policy manipulates the
mix of total government liabilities and the interest rate in such a manner that
aggregate demand always equals capacity.
Dynamics
The dynamics of the system is determined by the budget constraints of the
government and the corporate sector (hereafter abbreviated as GBC and CBC
respectively) and by the evolution of the wage rate and the rate of unemployment. Let
z represent total government liabilities (=m+b), so that the GBC reduces to
Dz = - y9 + g - i.z (6.6)
The CBC was already given in the foregoing chapter (eq. 5.16),
Da = -Y2 + i + C2 - i.a
8 As monetary policy must maintain equilibrium between demand and supply, the mix of debt and
money is an endogenous variable in the present model unlike in most (medium-term) analyses of the GBC
which generally assume a specific rule for the money-debt mix.
9 In reality monetary policy may also be pursued by regulations or by manipulating the tariffs on central
bank facilities. As in most theoretical analyses we take open market policy as the typical instrument of
monetary policy.
130 CHAPTER 6
As monetary policy ensures demand equilibrium and a constant inflation (po) it is
natural to assume that the evolution of real wages depends on labour market
disequilibrium:
Dw» f(Du, u-uo) f(O,O)=O;f1,f2~ 0 (6.7)
where u = unemployment rate; Uo is the unemployment rate compatible with a
constant income distribution.l'' The change in unemployment (Du) is found by
differentiation of u with respect to time:
Du = (I-u)(n - 1 - i) Ocu-cl (6.8)
where n stands for the growth of labour supply (in efficiency units) and 1 for the
change in labour intensity. Before further discussing the dynamics of this full model,
we shall as a first approximation look at a reduced, two-dimensional, version of this
model.
6.3 LOCAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the model we shall concentrate on the
dynamics of two state variables: income distribution (represented by the profit rate
11") and government liabilities (z). For the moment corporate debt and labour intensity
are taken to be constant. Also the dynamics of the unemployment rate is neglected.
Therefore we assume that no unemployment benefits are paid, so that the budget
deficit is independent of u, and that the dynamics of income distribution is given by
D1I" = ~w(n - i) (6.7a)
According to this function the profit rate falls when the labour market tightens, and
rises when unemployment increases. Together with the GBe (eq. 6.6) this equation
determines the dynamics of this reduced model.
Unfortunately the model is still too complex to handle on an analytical level.
Therefore, we shall proceed with some numerical exercises for a plausible parameter
set. The analysis which folows is based on this reference set of parameters:
10This rate is neither the natural rate of unemployment nor the Keynesian equivalent, the NAIRU (Non
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, cf. Cornwall 1983), but the unemployment rate which is
compatible with a constant distribution of income, i.e. constant shares of wages and profits, or in 'new
speak' economics: the 'CIDRU' (Constant Income Distribution Rate of Unemployment).
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ro=0.02; po=0.02; g/y=0.22; '0="='Z=0.2; '3=0; 1,=0; 1z=0; 13=0; 14=0; a=O.5; c,=0.9;
cz=0.6; c'r=-l; cZr=O; C'z=0.05; cZz=O; c,0=-0.016; cZo=O; r=l; f,=fz=12; ~,=0.0001;
~Z=~3=1; 1=0.3; .8=0.8.11
The basic properties of the long-period model with these parameters can be
established from the following partial effects:
Table 6.1 Some sensithities
wealth effect on aggregate savings:
profit effect on aggregate savings:
interest effect on aggregate savings:
interest effect on investment:
profit effect on investment:
money elasticity of interest rate:








Explanation: These effects have been evaluated at the steady state solution to be
discussed below: 11"=0.11;b/y=0.58; m/y=0.17: n=0.05; r=0.04
where aggregate savings (S) are defined including government savings (thus S=y-C,-
Cz-g). These results are in line with general empirical evidence.V As we have already
observed in the foregoing chapter the effect of the interest rate on savings is very
sensitive to the budgetary regime, especially to the reaction coefficient with respect
to interest outlays <'(2), Moreover, it varies with the size of public debt (and thus
interest-income of the private sector). This is corroborated by table 6.2 which gives
the numerical results for a Blinder-Solow regime <'1,,1z=0) and a Domar or Barro
regime <1,,1z=l) for varying ratios of public debt.
In the case of the Blinder-Solow regime <'1,.1z=0) the interest effect on savings
proves to fall as debt grows. For a large debt (in the present example bs-I) the interest
effect even becomes negative; a higher interest rate then leads to an increase in
consumption rather than a decrease. This is due to the distribution effect which
becomes stronger as the flow of interest payments from the government to the private
11 As for the corporate class savings are a means of increasing the size of the capital stock rather than
deferring consumption, it is difficult to assess the wealth and interest elasticity of consumption. This should
be based on a fully-fledged microeconomic analysis of simultaneous consumption, investment and portfolio
behaviour of the corporate class. This is, however, beyond the scope of the present analysis. Therefore we
have chosen to neglect the impact of the interest rate and the profit rate on the consumption of the
corporate class, and to include them in the functions for investment and desired debt.
12 Following Modigliani (e.g. Modigliani 1971), the wealth effect on consumption is remarkably often
found to be -0.05 (for the Netherlands see e.g. the quarterly model of De Nederlandsche Bank 1986). The
result for the money elasticity of the interest rate implies a semi-interest-elasticity of money demand of -
0.26 which is in accordance with empirical evidence (c!. Judd and Scadding 1982).
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Table 6.2 Interest effect on aggregate savings (in points)











sector are larger. For the Domar or Barro regime (12,1,=1) the interest effect proves
to be practically constant, only increasing slightly as b goes up. In this case the
distribution effect is much weaker: the positive effect of higher interest payments on
private consumption is now offset by the simultaneous reduction of government
expenditure.
The non-Ioglinear modelling of portfolio equilibrium (eq. 6.5) implies a variable
elasticity of the interest rate with respect to money and debt. The numerical results
in table 6.3 indicate that the impact of public debt on the interest rate becomes
stronger as the size of debt increases. This is in accordance with the empirical notion
that the influence on the interest rate becomes significant only for a large debt. As a
corollary the impact of money on the interest rate also becomes stronger as debt is
larger in relation to the money supply.
Table 6.3 Semi-elasticities of the interest rate
public debt (b) -I 0 2 4
dr/Idm/rn) -2.2 -3.5 -4.6 -5.2 -5.5
dr/(db/b)13 -0.4 0.001 0.8 1.9 4.0
Dynamics
The steady-state solution of this system is found at d1f=O, and thus i=n , and Dz=O.
This latter condition requires that the government budget satisfies
(g-T) + z.({(1-12)-(l-1,)T,}r - <12-13)P - (1-14)i -
- {(l-'12)-(1-1,)T,}(p+r)m/z] = 0
13 For negative debt the elasticity ill, of course, negative.
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The first term in this equation represents the primary deficit (g- T) and the second
term the impact of the interest rate and the growth rate on Dz. For a 'normal' solution
with a positive primary deficit and a positive steady state value of z, it can be seen
that the term between square brackets should be negative. For the Blinder-Solow
regime (all "I'S zero) this would require -(i-(I-r,)r}+{l-1',)(r+p)m/z>O, and thus if m
is sufficiently small in relation to z: i-(I -1' ,)r>O. This result that the growth rate should
exceed the real interest rate net of taxes is, however, not valid in general. It can easily
be seen that, for example, the Christ regime <'12=1) yields (for a small m): i+r ,r>O
which is satisfied for any positive i and r. This makes it clear that no simple
conclusions can be drawn concerning the relation between the growth rate and the
interest rate in steady state equilibrium. We shall therefore not dwell on the steady
state too long, and now turn to the primary interest of this analysis: the dynamics that
follows from the differential equations for z and 11'.
First consider the determination of Dz by 11' and z. After substitution for y9 in
equation (6.6) the GBC becomes
Dz = g + (l-r,)rz - 1',y - (1'2-1',)(1I'-ra) - (l-r,)(r+p)m - i.z (6.6a)
If we neglect the consequences of possible differential taxing of profits and wages
(1'2=1',) it can assessed that the overall effect of the profit rate 11' on Dz depends on




/ (la) +()- (3) + \
11' r r~s/l- (4) -
First, a higher profit rate leads to a higher growth rate (i) and thereby to a smaller
change in the liability ratio z (linkage I in the scheme); this negative 'real erosion'
effect is larger in absolute terms as z is larger. This effect is, however, weakened by
the rise in the interest rate associated with the increase in investment (linkage 1a).
Secondly, a higher 7r increases savings (distribution effect) and thereby lowers the
interest rate; this reduces the burden of interest payments and pushes the growth rate
up, both factors leading to a lower growth of z (linkage 2). Note that the effect of the
lower interest rate is reinforced by the corresponding rise in money stock, and thus
fall in debt, which also reduces debt service (linkage 4).
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As the real erosion effect of the higher growth rate (linkage 1) becomes stronger
as z increases while the other effects are independent of z, it can be concluded that
the overall effect of 'II" on Dz will always be negative for a sufficiently large z. Hence
there will exist a critical size of liabilities Zo for which
aDz/a'll" > 0 for z < Zo and aDz/a'll" < 0 for z » Zo
Next consider the impact of the amount of liabilities z on its rate of change Dz. The
overall impact consists of the following effects 14(all effects are discussed for a deficit
position and a given stock of money m):
1. scale effect: the impact of a given budget deficit on the growth rate of z is
smaller as the initial size of z is larger (the term -i.z in equation 6.6a);
2. budgetary effect: a larger z increases debt service and thereby the budget
deficit. This effect is mitigated by higher tax receipts on the interest income
of workers and by the adjustment of government expenditure in reaction to
the higher interest payments (if 1z>0). The overall effect of a change in z on
the budget is, after substitution for g, equal to [{1-1z-(l-1,)r ,}r-(1z-13)P+14i]z.
3. income and wealth effects: a rise in z leads to an increase of private
consumption through the increase in wealth and (interest) income. Both effects
push up the interest rate and thus lead to a higher deficit and a larger Dz.
4. portfolio effect: at a given stock of money the larger z leads to a higher
interest rate and thus to a larger Dz.
The two first effects represent the direct effects of z on the government's budget; the
other effects affect the budget more indirectly through their effect on the interest
rate. Since these indirect effects always lead to a larger Dz, it can be concluded that
the direct effects should at least be negative if the overall effect is to be negative.
Therefore
(6.9)
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for aDz/az<O. For the conventional
Blinder-Solow regime (all-r's zero) this condition again yields the requirement that the
growth rate should exceed the real interest rate after taxes (i-(l-r ,)r>O). For other
regimes this condition is considerably relaxed as these entail a negative feedback of
debt service on government expenditure <1z>O).
As the interest rate rises with the volume of government liabilities it can be
14 Rau (1985) distinguishes four effech of public debt: transfer, wealth, money-market and Friedman
effects. His transfer effect corresponds to our income effect, his wealth effect to our wealth effect, and his
money market effect is what we prefer to call the portfolio effect. His Friedman effect (called after Benjamin
Friedman) refers to the positive effect of increasing debt on share prices and thus on investment; this effect,
which arises from imperfect substitution between debt and equity, is neglected in the present analysis as
we have consolidated the corporate sector with ita owners and shareholders.
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established that the overall impact of z on Dz will be positive (and thus de-stabilizing)
for a large z, thus
80z/8z> 0 for a large z
When z is small it is probably negative.
All effects have been discussed with respect to the deficit situation (z.bsO). It is
obvious that when the government is a net creditor the conclusions will be Quite
different, particularly because the scale and income effects change direction. When
b<O a higher interest rate improves the position of the government so that Dz
decreases, etc. As this case is of little relevance from a practical point of view we
shall leave this case as it is, and concentrate on the conventional debtor case.
The phase diagram
Now consider the dynamics of this model. Figure 6.1 presents a phase diagram of this
model in the {1I",z}plane, showing the conditions for stable government liabilities
(Oz=O) and income distribution (011"=0).The steady state growth is found at:
11"=0.11;b/y=0.58; m/y=O.l7; n=0.05; r=0.04
(In order to ease the interpretation of these results, public debt and money stock are
expressed in relation to national income y).
The shape of the Dz curve in the phase diagram follows directly from the
discussion above: for the reference parameter set the critical size of liabilities Zo where
80z/811"=0 is found to be negative.P This critical Zo is represented by an asymptote in
the figure. As we wish to concentrate on the debtor case we shall not bother about the
region to the left of the asymptote (z<zo)' In the relevant region the Oz=O curve can
be seen to fall for low z when the scale effect is dominant (hence 80z/8z<0), and to
rise beyond some z when the interest rate becomes high (80z/8z>0).
The shape of the 011"=0curve can be explained as follows: As the interest rate rises
with the size of public debt, the profit rate must go up too in order to maintain
growth equilibrium. Hence the positive slope of the 011"=0curve. Further, as the
impact of public debt on the interest rate becomes stronger as debt increases, the
curve becomes steeper for high z's.
15 This is due to the apparently strong distribution effect of 1r which implies that at &=0 higher profits
raise savings more than investment, so that the interest falla. Therefore IJDz/IJ1r<O at &=0, and thus a
critical "0<0.
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Explanation: This figure is based on the reference set of parameters given above.
Figure 6.1 gives the phase diagram for a Domar regime (11'12=1). In the given range
this model yields only one solution, which can be seen to be stable within a fairly
wide area. The figure also exhibits a lower boundary for the profit rate at 11'"=-0.09.
This arises from the bottom in the interest rate function (liquidity trap); if 1r
approaches this boundary the interest rate can no longer fall sufficiently to avoid total
disinvestment of production capacity (i=-oo). In the shaded area at low z (<<0) no
momentary equilibrium can be found because of inconsistency between saving and
investment for any possible monetary policy. In this region private income has become
so low and government income so high (as a result of the large interest payments by
the private sector to the government) that savings exceed investment even at the
16 Throughout the following analysis we assume that the government haa no inflation illusion and treats
inflationary effects on debt and money stock on the lame footing aB nominal interest payments, hence
"'3="'2'
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lowest possible interest rate.'7
In the figure two curves for D7I'=0are shown, one for a natural growth rate n=0.05
and one for n=O.IO. The latter curve lies, of course, above the first as a higher growth
rate of course requires a higher profit rate. The Dz=O curve is independent of n. The
figure brings out that a higher natural growth rate yields a higher steady state profit




This general stability may change drastically for other budgetary regimes. Figure 6.2
presents the results for the Blinder-Solow regime with fixed government expenditure
<'Y,,12=0) in fig.a, and for an intermediate regime (1,=0;12=0.5) in fig b. Comparison
of these figures brings out that, although neither the steady state nor its local stability
changes, the system is considerably less stable when the fiscal response to interest
payments (12) is low. Especially for initial positions with high debt and low profits
there is a great risk of a cumulative process of growing debt and interest payments.
This figure further brings out that there may exist a second restpoint. This
solution is, however, characterized by a saddle-point configuration, and is thus
unstable. Therefore, if the system starts from the left of the dashed A-A curve it
tends to the stable solution (S), but whenever it starts at a point at the right of this
separatrix it falls into an unstable spiral of ever rising z and 1r.'8
Note that the two solutions practically coincide for the Blinder-Solow regime
<1,,12=0) if the natural growth rate is 5%. In this case the system is thus stable only
for upward disturbances in 71' and for downward disturbances in z. A significant fall
in 71' or rise in z will lead the system away from the equilibrium for ever.
Finally, the figure demonstrates that the stability of the system is improved when
the natural growth rate is higher. Although the basic asymmetrical instability remains,
the region within which the system is stable is considerably larger if n=IO% than if
n=5%. If the growth rate falls below 5% the steady state solution even disappears
altogether. These results show that the dynamics is very sensitive to the height of the
natural rate of growth. Therefore there exists some critical minimum for the growth
rate below which the system changes from a (locally) stable system into a totally
unstable system.
17 Further increases in money supply do not resolve this inconsistency as total private sector wealth
does not change; an open-market purchase reduces public debt by the same amount as it increases money.
As a result, interest income of the private sector falls even further so that it may even lead to a rise in
aggregate saving. In this situation only fiscal policy can resolve the inconsistency by increasing government
expenditure or by raising private sector income through higher transfers or lower taxes.
18 This process must sooner or later lead to a breakdown of the system as 1t' cannot rise infinitely
(contrary to what is implied by the linear function for DII' (eq. 6.7)}.
138 CHAPTER 6







2 3 4 z




-2 -1 0 2 3
-0.05
4 z
fig.b <1,=0,12=.5) --0.1- - - - - -- -- - - -
Explanation: see figure 6.1 above.
i=-oo
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Catastrophe manifold
Itmay be noted that this minimum growth rate represents the bifurcation point of the
catastrophe manifold of this system.19 This is shown in figure 6.3. In fact, this figure
depicts the equilibrium points for z in relation to n. As we have seen above, the
equilibrium points on the upper branch are unstable and those on the lower branch
stable. For n<nminno equilibrium exists.













As before we can use this critical value of n to assess the impact of different variables
and regimes on the (local) stability of the system. The results for a selection of the
variables of the model are presented in table 6.4. A variable is stabilizing if it reduces
the critical n and destabilizing if it raises the n required for a stable equilibrium.
As might be expected higher propensities to save and a lower autonomous part of
the real interest rate (ro-po) lead to a more stable system. As in the case of in chapter
2, the wealth effects on consumption turn out to reduce the system's stability, in
contrast with most IS/LM based models where, as already mentioned, strong wealth
effects are essential for stability. With regard to fiscal policy we find that stability can
be improved by raising taxes on wages and the interest income of workers. A rise in
taxes on profits, however, worsens the system's stability. This is obviously due to the
19 This is a catastrophe manifold for a 'fold catastrophe' which - as we have seen in chapter 2 -
produces a rather smooth catastrophe, unlike, for example, the more typical 'cusp catastrophe' which
produces a sort of jump of the system.
140 CHAPTER 6



















Explanation: all effects are measured with reference to the intermediate regime given
in figure 6.2. The effects of the 1 coefficients have been corrected for their impact
effect on government expenditure. One should be careful to compare the absolute
effects because an equal change in each variable may entail quite different impacts
in absolute terms.
negative impact on the growth rate. Also autonomous government expenditure proves
to have a strong destabilizing impact. With regard to the budgetary regime it can be
seen that the reaction coefficient with respect to interest payments (12) has a
stabilizing effect, while the other fiscal reaction coefficients tend to reduce the
system's stability. Although the magnitude of these effects may change, the pattern
of signs of the effects proves to be robust for other numerical simulations in the
neighbourhood of the reference model.
All these partial effects have been measured with reference to a single
intermediate regime with partial adjustment of government expenditure to changes
in interest payments (12=.5). Another way of looking at the determinants of stability
is to compare the alternative regimes. Table 6.5 gives the minimum growth rates for
each of the regimes considered:










stable for any n
Explanation: see table 6.4 above.
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These results corroborate our inferences above: a strong budgetary reaction to changes
in interest payments as in the Christ regime and, to a lesser degree, in the Tobin-
Buiter regime improves the stability of the system. The Blinder-Solow regime is the
least stable. The Barro regime is stable for any growth rate, which is hardly surprising
as it presupposes that the government aims at a constant debt.
6.4 LONG CYCLES
In addition to the dynamics of income distribution and government liabilities the fully
dynamic model takes account of the dynamics of unemployment and corporate debt
as well. For generality the model also incorporates the possibility of slow adjustment
of investment and government expenditure. Then choosing explicit functions the full
dynamic system becomes:
Da = -yz + i + C2 - La
Dz = -y 9 + g - i.z
Du = (l-u)(n - 1 - i)
D1r = (11.,Du + 11.2(u-uo)}/u








where now a**, g* and i* are given by the equations for desired a", g and i (eq, 6.4a,
5.11 and 6.3) above. The first two equations restate the budget constraints for the
corporate sector and the government (eq, 5.16 and eq, 6.6). The third equation again
gives the differential equation for the unemployment rate (eq. 6.8).
Equation (6.10) relates the change in income distribution to the evolution of the
unemployment rate. For 11.,=0 and 11.2>0 this function is akin to the relation Goodwin
(1972) uses in his famous model of the Marxian business cycle. The modelling of this
relation is such that D1r tend to infinity when u becomes zero. This is in accordance
with Goodwin's 'ideal function' (1972, p.444), although at variance with the linear
approximation function he uses in his actual model. We prefer the non-linear 'ideal'
function; moreover, it has the convenient implication that it excludes the possibility
of absolute labour shortage (u-dl).
The change in the desired debt ratio a* is now modelled by a second order
differential equation in accordance with our view that norms on proper debt ratios
change only very slowly (eq. 6.11). If l1a1=0 this function implies a second-order
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adjustment, i.e. also the rate of change in a* can only change gradually over time. that
The two last equations are partial adjustment functions for g and i. Because the slow
reaction of wages to labour market imbalances is the prime cause of unemployment,
the choice of technique is only of secondary importance to the dynamics of our model.
For simplicity it is therefore taken to be constant in our numerical exercises below
(hence 1=0).
At the given parameter values of the reduced model considered above, the fully
dynamic model yields a basically similar steady state solution: m/y=0.17; b/y=0.77;
11"=11.0%;r=4.8%. The minor differences arise from the fact that the desired debt ratio
is endogenous now with a steady state value of 0.43 instead of the arbitrarily chosen
rate of 0.50 in the reduced model above. In order to gain some insight into this
complex model we shall discuss some numerical simulations of this model. All
simulations are made with reference to the Christ regime as this regime ensures the
dynamics to be stable. It needs however little imagination to understand that other
regimes, especially the Blinder-Solow regime, may produce trajectories that lead away
from steady state equilibrium for ever (these unstable trajectories prove to be very
similar to the trajectory shown in figure 2.6 of chapter 2).
A real cycle
By way of reference, first consider a simulation of a 'real' Goodwin-like cycle (with
11.-yO) where the interaction between the labour market and income distribution is the
basic cyclical mechanism.20 In order to isolate this cycle from the financial dynamics
to be considered below we shall assume that desired debt is exogenous (1181,1182=0).
Figure 6.4 shows the evolution of public and corporate debt (fig.a) and profit, growth
and interest rate (fig.b) after a combined shock at t=5. This shock represents on a very
abstract level the rupture in economic growth of the 1970's which was caused by
I. a fall in profits, as a result of wages claims and oil price rises;
2. a decline in the natural rate of growth, through the slow-down of productivity
growth (and population growth);
3. an adverse shift in business confidence {'animal spirits') leading to more prudential
financial policies, as a reaction to the growing uncertainty and the 'over-optimism'
of the 1960's.
This combined economic shock caused a structural slow-down of investment and
economic growth. In our model this shock is represented by a discrete fall in 11"by 4
points, a permanent decline in n from 5% to 3% and a once and for all fall in r by
20%. This latter shift in 'animal spirits' implies a discrete fall in the desired debt ratio
a** from 0.43 to 0.28.
20 See Van der Ploeg (1983) for a sophisticated analysi8 of the Goodwin cycle in a continuous time
model.
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Explanation: in addition to the parameters of the reduced model this figure is based
on: 0=0.1; t?=0.5; t? =0.3; t? 1=0.05; t? 2=0.01; t? 1=0; t? 2.=0.As to the policy regime it
is assumed that '12.=Yand all other '1's'"are zero tthe C6'nst regime). The simulation is
based on a numerical approximation of the differential system by the Runge-Kutta
method (see e.g. Cohen 1973).
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The figure shows the evolution of each variable as (absolute) deviation from its initial
steady state value. It can be seen that the shock gives rise to a (dampened) cyclical
movement, eventually leading to a larger government debt and smaller corporate debt,
and a lower growth rate and profit rate. The difference between the new steady state
and the initial equilibrium are summarized below



















After the shock at t=5 growth declines because of the fall in profits and the adverse
shift in 'animal spirits.' As a result unemployment starts to grow and wages to fall;
after some time profitability therefore recovers leading to a new expansion of
investment and employment. Sooner or later this expansion will be checked by the
tightening of the labour market as a result of which wages rise again and profits fall.
This is the basic cyclical mechanism of Goodwin's Marxian cycle. Unlike the original
Goodwin model, the present model incorporates a cyclical movement of the interest
rate too, which obviously has a dampening influence on the cycle.
As regards corporate debt it can be seen that the fall in profits at t=5 initially
leads to a rise of corporate debt, because investment does not adjust instantaneously
to the lower internal savings. Thereafter, as investment falls and profits recover,
corporate debt declines and tends cyclically to its new (lower) steady state level. At
the same time public debt grows to a higher structural level, corresponding to the
lower natural rate of growth.
Regarding the duration of these processes one may note that this cycle refers to
the long 'Kuznetz' cycle, or even the Kondatrieff cycle, rather than the conventional
(short) business cycle. The Kuznetz cycle, or 'long swing' is generally thought to have
a length of 10- I5 years whereas the conventional (American) cycle has a length of
only some 5 years. The (non-existingj/" Kondratieff wave even has an alleged
duration of some 40-60 years.
21 This emerges from most of the empirical research on the Kondratieffcyc1e (see e.g. Van Ewijk 1981,
1982a). Nevertheless, some investigations seem to yield more favourable results with respect to the existence
of this long wave, see e.g. Metr; (1984), Reijndera (1988).
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A financial cycle
As an alternative to this 'real' explanation of the business cycle, our model also offers
a 'financial' explanation, i.e. a cycle arising from corporate policies with regard to
finance and investment. In order to concentrate on the financial dynamics now let
~1'2=0, thus eliminating the 'Goodwin' propagation mechanism.
First, note that the ultimate effects of the combined shock are practically the same
for the financial cycle as for the real cycle given above. The steady state is now found
at n=3%, 1("=8.1%, r=2.9%, a=0.22, m/y=0.19 and b/y=1.34. Only the result for the debt
ratio (a) is significantly different; this is obvious as for the real cycle a* was assumed
to be fixed.
Next consider the adjustment process. Just as in the real cycle above, corporate
debt rises initially after the shock, as investment adjusts slowly to the lower internal
savings. Only after some time, when investment is cut down sufficiently, does the rise
in the debt ratio (a) turn into a decline. In the meantime the desired debt ratio (a*) has
fallen considerably. While investment and actual corporate debt are still falling,
desired debt starts to increase again as a result of the lower interest rate and the
higher profit rate (due to the growing unemployment). Thereafter, when corporate
financial policy is relaxed, investment and growth will recover too. After some time
the growth rate rises again above the (lower) natural growth, so that the labour market
starts tightening again. This leads to a fall in the profit rate, thereby pressing down
the desired debt ratio again, inducing more restrictive corporate financial policies and
thereby lower investment, etc.
This interaction gives rise to a clear cyclical pattern in the actual and the desired
corporate debt ratios. The financial cycle may thus be interpreted as a succession of
waves in the readiness to take risks and incur debts ('animal spirits'), or in
Schumpeterian terms, by waves in business optimism and pessimism. Eventually the
debt ratio will tend to a lower long-term level corresponding to the structural fall in
growth and the shift in 'animal spirits.' As can be seen in the figure this process
causes the growth rate to oscillate towards its new (lower) steady state value of 3%.
The interest rate moves more or less parallel; the profit rate appears to lead by a
couple of years.
Now consider the evolution of government liabilities. As a result of the slow-
down in economic growth, government liabilities begin to grow, at first largely in the
form of money (due to the expansionary monetary policy necessary to maintain
sufficient demand), but later mainly in the form of debt. Eventually z tends to a new
steady level of 1.54. This higher government debt is the natural consequence of the
slow-down in growth.22
22 For other regimes, or other parameters sets, the system may, of course, be unstable. Then,
government liabilities keep growing for ever.
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Explanation: ".,=0; ".2=0.02; "8,=0.5; "82=0.1 and all other parameters as in figure 6.4
above.
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The appearance of this 'financial' cycle is not really different from the real cycle
above. There is, however, a qualitative difference as regards the causation of the
cycle: in the real cycle the principal propagation mechanism arises from labour market
disequilibrium and income distribution, while the financial cycle is governed by the
discrepancy between the actual and the desired corporate debt. Of course, no model
is exclusively valid: both models clarify a certain aspect of the true dynamic system.
Steady state effects
Finally, consider the steady state effects of government expenditure and taxes for the
above model (table 6.5). These results refer again to the stable (Christ) regime
1,=0;12=1. The change in go is I per cent of total income y, and the changes in the tax
rates are such that they produce an equivalent impact effect on the government's
budget. As might be expected the rise in government expenditure leads to a higher
interest rate and larger public debt. In order to maintain the rate of growth the profit
rate must rise as well. Because of the higher interest rate the corporate debt ratio
declines a little.
Table 6.5 Steady state effects of a stimulus of 1% of y for different fiscal
instruments
instrument effect on
b m a 11' 1) r')
go 0.152 -0.002 -0.009 0.28 0.56
'0 0.151 -0.001 -0.009 0.31 0.53
" 0.176 0.001 -0.001 0.05 0.08
'2 0.153 -0.001 -0.020 -0.08 0.04
') effects in percentage-points.
The ultimate increase in government expenditure is less than the initial increase,
because the larger debt service leads to some internal crowding out of expenditure
(because 12=1). Furthermore, the final increase of government expenditure occurs at
the expense of private consumption. This is accomplished by the higher interest rate
and the shift in income distribution in favour of profits. In this model with a fixed
technology and a given rate of growth there is no long-term crowding out of
investment. There will, of course, be some crowding out in the short run through the
higher interest rate, but eventually this negative effect on investment will be offset
by a higher profit rate. It is obvious that if the technology is endogenous, the higher
profit rate will lead to a decline in the desired capital-output ratio, and thus to some
crowding out of investment too. This effect will not, however, qualitatively change
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our results above.
The steady state effects of a reduction in taxes on wages (TO) are practically
identical to those of the rise in go. A reduction in tax on the interest income of
workers (T,) has smaller effects on the profit rate and the interest rate, but gives rise
to a sharper increase in public debt. Obviously, the reduction in T, not only raises the
budget deficit directly, but also weakens the mitigating feedback of rising interest
payments on tax receipts, and thereby on the growth of public debt. In contrast with
the other cases, a reduction in taxes on net corporate returns (T2) leads to a fall in the
profit rate. This is because less profits (before taxes) are necessary to keep up growth
when taxes are lower. The steady state effects on public debt, the money stock and
the interest rate are basically similar to those of the other fiscal policy instruments.
6.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have investigated the dynamics of growth and asset accumulation
from a long-term point of view. With regard to income-expenditure equilibrium it
was assumed that the monetary authorities have sufficient time to find the right
policy to maintain full utilization of capacity. Therefore demand dynamics is
shifted into the background; instead the interaction between asset accumulation and
income distribution emerged as the principal mover of economic development. For a
plausible numerical model we have established that the stability directly depends on
the natural rate of growth; the lower this growth rate the less stable is the system.
Beyond some minimum growth rate (the bifurcation point of the catastrophe
manifold) the system loses its stable solution altogether. Just as in the medium term
the system proved to be more stable in an upward than rather than in a downward
direction.
The fiscal policy regime proves to have a great impact on the system's stability,
especially the budgetary reaction to changes in nominal interest payments <'12). The
rigid Blinder-Solow regime with 12=0 emerges as the least stable regime, and the
Barro regime, which adopts a target for a constant debt ratio, as the most stable. The
scheme below gives a comparison of the ranking of the regimes for the medium
period and the long period. These rankings bring out that it can be concluded that,
although the Barro regime seems best from a long-term point of view, it performs
worst in the medium period. The Blinder-Solow is the least stable from a long-term
point of view, and after the Barro regime, the least stable in the medium period as
well. A more attractive regime seems to be the Christ regime which performs best in
the medium period and, after the Barro regime, best in the long period as well, closely
followed by the Tobin-Buiter regime. Each of these regimes implies automatic
reduction of government expenditure when interest payments increase. In the medium
term this 'internal' crowding out of government expenditure produces an anti-cyclical
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movement of expenditure; in the long term it mitigates the cumulative spiral of
increasing debt and interest payments.
Note that whether a regime leads to a stable system or not depends on the model
as a whole, and especially on the natural rate of growth. Therefore, any structural
change in the economy may turn a stable system into an unstable one. Furthermore,
it is important to note that large shocks, especially downward disturbances, may lead
to a displacement of the system from a 'stable' region, from where it will always
return to its steady state, into an 'unstable' region, from where it recedes further and
further from steady state equilibrium. These observations lead to the conclusion that
there is no automatic rule or regime for fiscal policy which guarantees stability under
all circumstances. Rules need to be reconsidered regularly.
CHAPTER 7
STABILITY OF PUBLIC DEBT IN AN OPEN AND GROWING ECONOMY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we shall generalize the foregoing analysis for the open economy.' It is
remarkable that research on the dynamics implied by the government budget
constraint is generally restricted to the closed economy. This concerns the IS/LM
oriented studies in the tradition of Blinder and Solow (1973) as well as earlier studies
on the role of public debt in growth models (cf. Domar 1957, Modigliani 1961,
Diamond 1965).2 Notable exceptions are the contributions of Turnovsky (1976) and
Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979). In this chapter it will be shown that the dynamics of
growth and asset accumulation is essentially different from those of the closed
economy. In order bring out these differences as clearly as possible, we shall
concentrate on the extreme case of a small open economy, which is a price-taker on
the international commodity and financial markets.
The basic ingredients of the present analysis are the following: First, as mentioned,
we focus on the open economy. The government budget constraint (GBC) is treated
in the tradition of the IS/LM based studies mentioned above, allowing for bond
financing as well as for money financing. The modelling of the relationship between
the balance of payments constraint (hereafter abbreviated as BPC) is akin to that of
the small open-economy models of Domar (1957), Hamada (1966) and Neher (1970),
but with two important modifications. First, in order to bring out the specific role of
saving from interest income the present analysis assumes a 'Kaldor' differential
savings function. Secondly, the domestic interest rate is not determined by the
international interest rate alone, but is dependent on the net international creditor or
debtor position as well. Finally, the present analysis takes account of the dynamic
relationship between asset accumulation and income distribution by incorporating a
simple 'conflict' model of income distribution.
The chapter is organized as follows. After some preliminary considerations on the
determination of growth and income distribution in an open economy in section 7.2,
1 This chapter is largely based the article "Interest payments and the stability of the government budget
deficit in an open and growing economy" in De Economist (Van Ewijk 1986a). An earlier and more extensive
version of this article was circulated as a research memorandum (Van Ewijk 1985).
2 The neglect of the open economy aspects may be related to the fact that research on the stability of
public debt is geographically concentrated in the United States,
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we shall develop the 'static' part of the model describing the instantaneous equilibrium
relationships which are required to hold continuously (section 7.3). Then, sections
7.4- 7.6 analyse the dynamics of the model which arises from the GBC, the BPC and
the interaction between growth and income distribution. Section 7.7 deals with the
characteristics of the steady state equilibrium. Finally, section 7.8 examines the
consequences when it is assumed that the government adopts a target for the balance
of payments on current account instead of some fixed budgetary target.
7.2 GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE OPEN ECONOMY
Before developing the open economy model we first have to discuss some problems
which arise when the post-Keynesian model, which is typically designed for the
closed economy.I is applied to the open economy. One of the basic theorems of post-
Keynesian theory, as we have discussed it in chapter 2, is that income distribution is
solved from the side of demand for output. Assuming a differential propensity to save
from wages and profits, it is argued that discrepancies between aggregate demand and
supply are solved by shifts in income distribution. As has been discussed in chapter
2, the adjustment in income distribution is achieved by changes in the price level
while nominal wages are relatively rigid.
In this theory the nominal wage rate plays only a minor role. Apart from the
special situation in which the economy is driven towards the inflation barrier (see
chapter 2), nominal wages function primarily as the numeraire, fixing the general
level of prices. In an open economy this 'neutrality' view of nominal wages is no
longer warranted. In the presence of international competition on the commodity
markets a change in nominal wages affects the competitive position of domestic firms
vis-a-vis foreign competitors. As a consequence changes in money wages cannot
simply be passed on in prices without affecting the competitive strength of domestic
firms. In this environment money wages may therefore have a decisive influence on
real wages and the profit rate.
This has important consequences for the standard post-Keynesian model.
International competition on goods markets seriously impedes the possibility of
restoring equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply through the re-
distribution of income. In the extreme case of full arbitrage on the goods markets (law
of one price) there is no room for this redistribution mechanism at all: the profit
margin and real wages are completely determined by domestic nominal wages and the
3 See e.g. Robinson (1956,1962), Kaldor (1956,1961), Pasinetti (1974), Kregel (1975) and Harris (1978).
It is illuminating that Harris (1978, p.VIII) when summing up the omissions of his textbook does not even
mention the total neglect of the international aspects of growthl Some contributions on particular aspects
of the international theory of growth and distribution have been made by Kregel (1975), Steedman (1979),
Steedman and Metcalfe (1979) and Pasinetti (1981).
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international price level at the given exchange rate. The well-known post-Keynesian
causation from investment to prices and income distribution breaks down in this case."
In principle the effect of a change in money wages may be offset by an equivalent
change in the exchange rate. This, however, requires the monetary authorities to
accommodate passively any change in the domestic price-level. As this is not very
plausible, we shall leave this possibility out of consideration. This does not necessarily
imply that the exchange rate must be fixed. It may vary, but it is independent of
(changes in) the domestic level of wages.
Now imagine a rise in aggregate demand, caused, for example, by an increase in
investment. In the case of a substantial price elasticity of the foreign supply of goods,
the rise in demand leads to a increase in imports - when domestic capacity is fully
utilized - rather than a rise in domestic prices. Hence, the link between demand and
income distribution is now replaced by a link between demand and the balance of
trade. Thus in the long periods discrepancies between ex ante savings and investment
are not resolved by redistribution of income as in the closed economy, but are
reflected in the balance of payments on current account.
The post-Keynesian position on these matters is not very clear. For the long term
it is generally recognized that foreign prices exert a significant influence on domestic
prices; however, on the strength of this influence opinions appear to diverge.
'Ricardian' post-Keynesian authors such as Steedman and Metcalfe (1979) and
Pasinetti (1981) tend to accept that prices are fully determined by international prices.
More 'Keynesian' post-Keynesians, as for example Kregel, hold on to the proposition
that, although foreign prices may indeed have some influence, domestic factors still
have a significant impact.
International equalization 0/ pro/it rates
Now consider the determination of the profit rate. As we have seen, post-Keynesian
theory explains the profit rate in a closed economy by the savings propensities and the
rate of growth. It needs little argumentation to see that in the presence of international
capital mobility this explanation can no longer be sustained. On the contrary, it may
be expected that competition on international financial markets produces a tendency
towards the international equalization of profit rates.
4 Robinson (1962, p.70) mentions that foreign competition may raise problems with respect to the
distribution mechanism, but gives it no further consideration. Kregel (1976, ch.12) pays more attention to
this subject, recognizing that foreign competition 'may limit the ability of domestic producers to set the
prices they desire,' but fails to give a clear account of the long-term implications of the openness of the
economy for the determination of income distribution.
5 Kalecki (1934), however, analyses a similar link between the balance of trade and demand, and
therefore profits with a reverse causation. In his fixed-price short-term model the balance of payment on
current account provides an additional (external) source of demand besides investment and government
expenditure. In the long period, however, when capacity is fully utilized, the causation runs from demand
to the balance of trade.
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Overviewing post-Keynesian theory it appears that, although most authors
recognize the tendency towards equal profit rates,6 it is generally treated in a
ambivalent manner. For example, Steedman (1979) recognizes that capital mobility
would imply equalization of profit rates, but subsequently excludes this possibility by
postulating strict immobility of capital. Steedman and Metcalfe (1979) do allow the
money rate of interest to be determined internationally, but relate the profit rate
exclusively to domestic factors; the interest rate only functions as a minimum below
which the profit rate cannot fall. Also Pasinetti (1981) is ambiguous on this point;
while he explains sectoral profit rates in a traditional post-Keynesian fashion by the
(sectoral) rates of expansion, he nevertheless assumes profit rates to be equal
internationally too. However, this is not explained by international capital mobility,
but follows from Pasinetti's assumption "for simplicity" that growth rates for each
sector are equal in every country (Pasinetti 1981, p.246).7
In the model to be developed in this chapter we shall adopt the Ricardian position
and assume complete price arbitrage on commodity markets. With respect to the
equalization of profit rates we shall develop a more dynamic view which allows for
international differences in real interest rates and profit rates, despite full
international mobility of capital.
7.3 THE MODEL
In order to be able to concentrate on the basic 'laws' governing the accumulation of
financial assets the real side of the economy is represented by an elementary model
of steady growth. It is assumed that capacity is always fully utilized, that technical
change is purely labour augmenting and that the capital-output ratio is constant.
Hence the growth rates of production and employment (in efficiency units) are equal
to the growth rate of capital stock (i). The discrepancy between this rate and the
(exogenous) growth rate of labour supply (the 'natural' rate of growth) determines the
evolution of unemployment. Further, we shall adopt the small open-economy
framework. which implies that the economy is a full price-taker on both the
international financial and the commodity markets.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the model in this chapter we shall not
distinguish between the corporate sector and workers. but adopt a Kaldorian
6 Note that Kregel (1975) does not pay any attention at all to this tendency.
7A third problem with respect to the post-Keynesian for the open economy concerns the determination
of relative prices. If one follows Sraffa and assume. that relative prices are determined by income
distribution and fixed technical coefficients, international competition on goods markets will lead to full
specialization of production in each country. In macroeconomic models this is often neglected by adopting
a one-sector model (cf. Steedman and Metcalfe 1979). Pasinetti solves this problem by introducing
decreasing returns to scale on the sector level. In Van Ewijk (1983) we discussed these matters more in
detail. In the following analysis we shall avoid this problem by assuming homogeneity of goods.
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consumption function which distinguishes between wages and property income. If it
is taken into account that the property income of the private sector consists of profits
from domestic production as well as real interest income received on financial
wealth,8 the income identities of the model can be written as follows (all stocks and
flows are expressed in ratios to capital stock):

















The first equation divides domestic production between wages and profits. The second
one defines private property income as the sum of profits and interest income; it has
been assumed that no nominal interest is paid on money.
The expenditure relations are straightforward. In order to bring out the specific
role of spending from property income the consumption function distinguishes
between the propensity to consume from disposable wage income c1 and from
disposable property income c2. This simple Kaldorian function is modified by







I + e + b + m (= total private wealth as a ratio to capital stock (= I»
consumption
tax-rate on wages
tax-rate on property income
8 These latter components of private sector income have been neglected in most earlier studies on public
debt. Cf. Domar (1957), Diamond (1965) and Christ (1968).
9 It has been assumed that consumera are not ultra-rational in the sense put forward by Barro (1974)
and others, that they fully capitalise the effect of current iS8ue8of public debt on future taxes (see for a
critique of this so-called 'Ricardian doctrine', Tobin 1980).
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and c1 and c2 denote the first order derivatives of c with respect to net wage income
and net property income respectively. With regard to taxes no distinction is made
between the different components of property income. This implies that inflationary
losses on nominal assets are taxed at the same rate as nominal interest income.
Although this is not wholly realistic, it does not seem an unreasonable simplification
at the present level of abstraction.
In a price-taking economy the rate of investment, and thus the growth rate of
production should be related to the profit rate z, the interest rate r and the tax-rate
on profits 1'2 and a term r representing all other (psychological) factors like the
optimism and the readiness to take risks, or, in Keynes' words, the 'animal spirits' of
entrepreneurs.
(7.4)
As regards the budgetary regime we shall for the moment follow Blinder and Solow
(1973) and take government expenditure (g) and tax rates (1',,1'2) to be fixed. Later we
shall consider other regimes as well.
Then with given c, i and g and it can be assessed that the balance of trade (f)must
be equal to the gap between domestic production (y) and aggregate expenditure,
f = y-g-c-i (7.5)
where f = balance of trade. This equilibrium will be ensured by the fact that in a
small open economy with perfect competition on international markets, domestic
producers will be able to sell all goods produced at capacity level at the prevailing
international prices.
The financial sector
So much for the real part of the model. For the financial sector straightforward
relations will be chosen. The small-open-economy assumption entails that prices
always satisfy purchasing-power parity. The nominal interest rate (R) is assumed to
be equal to the international interest rate (Rf) plus the (expected = actual) rate of
depreciation (Deja) plus a factor (0') measuring the risk premium on domestic assets
for international portfolio-holders. Following a suggestion by Hamada (1969, p, 684)
this risk premium is assumed to be related negatively to the foreign creditor position
(e), or equivalently, positively to the volume of foreign debt. All other factors
determining 0' are assumed to be constant in the present analysis. If it is finally
assumed that demand for money (M) is a simple homogeneously linear function of
domestic production (Py), the financial sphere can be modelled as:
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P = 6,Pf
R = R, + D6j6 + o(e) 0'<0
M = m.Py m = constant
where P = price level
6 = exchange rate
R = nominal interest rate
0= (risk)premium on domestic currency
M= money stock
The suffix f denotes foreign variables. It is well-known that these equations reduce
to the following relations in real terms:
r = rf + o(e)
DMjM= p + i
(7.6)
(7.7)
where r f is the foreign real interest rate. This result leads to the familiar conclusion
in these kind of models that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon and that the
real interest rate is given by real factors. As to the regime of monetary policy the
government can choose for either fixing the growth of money stock or adopting a
fixed target for the rate of inflation (and thus depreciation) and adjusting money
growth to that target. The difference between those regimes may be important when
the growth rate of production varies. In what follows it will be assumed that the
government chooses the latter option, so that monetary policy is adequately
represented by the target for the rate of inflation.
Now the static part of the model is completed. Its structure is very simple. It
consists of 7 independent equations, 7 endogenous variables (w, Y2' r, c, i, f', DMjM),
4 policy variables (g, T2, T,. p) and 3 state variables (e, b, 11") which are historically
given and will be explained in the next section.
7.4. THE DYNAMICS
The dynamics of the model arises from the GBC and the BPC and the interaction
between growth and income distribution. With respect to this latter process, it will be
assumed that the rate of profit is determined by a conflict model of income
distribution, the common outcome of which is that (in the medium term) the rate of
change in 11" depends in one way or another on the evolution of the unemployment
rate. Since the change in the unemployment rate in turn depends on the difference
between the actual and the natural growth rate, in our model this relationship may,
as in the foregoing chapter (eq. 6.7), captured in the following linear expression:
D1I" = ~.(n- i) (7.8)
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where n = growth of labour supply (natural rate of growth).
The evolution of the financial stocks e and b depends on the GBC and BPC. If one
takes into account that the ratios of money and debt are continuously being reduced
by the rate of inflation and the growth rate of production, these budget constraints
are given by
BPC: De y - g - c - i + (r+p)e - (i+p)e (7.9)
(7.10)GBC: Db-Dm = g + (r+p)b - T,(y-1f) - T2(1f+rb+re-pm) - (i+p)(b+m)
where r+p = nominal interest rate. According to the first equation the change in the
foreign lending position depends on the balance of payments on current account
(=f +(r+p)e) less the reduction in e through nominal production growth (i-p) '0. The
second equation states that the change in public debt and money stock is equal to
government outlays (including interest payments) less tax revenue and less the
reduction in band m through nominal production growth. Since the ratio of money
to national product is assumed to be constant (hence Dm=O) the fundamental causal
relationships resulting from the GBC and the BPC can be illustrated by the following
scheme:
+ + +
public debt (b) ) interest payments ~ budget deficit -----~) Db
+ +1 /+,ax ,even!.
private property income
+r ~consump,;on
t forei () +. . + ~ne oreign assets e Interest received -current balance -----~) De
""-- +/
~interest rate ., growth rate
+
10 It has been assumed that the net stock of foreign reserves is nil, so that the balance of payments on
current account must be fully financed by interest bearing debt.
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This scheme, in which for expository reasons the effects of lr have been disregarded,
shows that greater public debt leads to greater interest payments to the private sector
and thus on the one hand to a larger budget deficit and on the other hand to larger
private property income. This larger property income increases tax receipts, thus
mitigating the increase in the government's budget deficit, and consumption, thereby
worsening the balance of payments on current account. This is one line in the scheme.
The other runs from the net foreign position (e) to interest received from abroad and
thus to the current account and via property income to tax revenue and the budget
deficit. In addition e influences the system through its impact on the interest rate and
thus on interest payments and the growth rate.
The impact of the profit rate on Db and De - not shown in the scheme - is a
rather complex one. In the first place a higher lr leads to a higher growth rate and thus
to a reduction in the absolute magnitude of Db and De. On the other hand a higher
growth rate induces larger investments and therefore a decline of the trade balance.
Finally, a change in lr will change income distribution and thus tax revenue and
consumption. Under the plausible assumptions that T2>T1 and cZ<c1 a higher profit
implies higher tax revenue (thereby reducing Db) and lower consumption (thereby
increasing De).
Local stability
Whether or not this system is (locally) stable around its steady state solution (es' bs'
11"5) can be established from the linearized system based on equations (7.8), (7.9) and
(7.10).
[E] (7.11)
where h1= r - c2(l-T2)r - Cz - u'(cr+c2(I-Tz)(b+e)-ir(l+e)-e}
hz= C2(l-T 2)r + Cz
h3= Tzr + u'(T2(b+e)+ir(b+m)-b}
h4= (l-Tz)r
hs= i (l+e) - (C1(l-T1)-cz(l-TZ)}
h6 = i (b-m) + (T2-T1)
This system is stable if the real parts of the characteristic roots of the state matrix
(subsequently denoted as the H matrix) are negative, or by the modified Routh-
Hurwitz conditions if
I. Trace (H) < 0
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II. Det (H) > 0
These conditions are difficult to deal with on an analytical level. Therefore we will
start with a somewhat simpler specific case in which the real interest rate is
independent of the net foreign debt, q'=O. In this manner we will be able to trace
some of the basic determinants of stability. Thereafter we will return to the general
model and check whether the characteristics found for the specific case are also valid
if the assumption q'=O is dropped.
7.5 A SPECIAL CASE: EXOGENOUS INTEREST RATE
When q'=O the real interest rate is simply given by the international interest rate and
thus exogenous to the present model. This considerably simplifies the solution of the
conditions for stability. From equations (7.11) and (7.12) it can be found that the
Routh-Hurwitz conditions now reduce to
I. (7.13a)
II. "1'i1'{(n-h,)(n-h4) - hzh3} > 0
III. (2n-h,-h4){(n-h,)(n-h4) - hzh3 + "1'i1'(2n-h,-h4-"1'i1')} > O.
If both conditions (I) and (II) are satisfied, it can easily be seen that the third
condition can only be fulfilled if" 1'i.,>Oand (2n-h,-h4»0. This implies that the above
conditions can be reduced to
I. (7.13b)
II. (n-h,)(n-h4) - hzh3 > 0
III. "1'i1'> 0
This result is interesting for it implies a kind of dichotomy in the stability conditions.
That is, these conditions would also have been found if the dynamics of growth and
income distribution on the one hand and the accumulation of financial assets on the
other hand were considered separately. Condition (III) is conclusive for the stability
of income distribution and growth, and given a certain growth rate the conditions (I)
and (II) determine the stability band e.
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Conditions (I) and (II) can be reduced by substituting for the h's
n-r>O (7.14)
Since 0~ cz ~ I, 0~ TZ ~ I and Cz ~ 0 it can easily be seen that the first condition is
conclusive to stability for any r ~ O.This is a very simple and clear-cut result. Since
the interest rate is given internationally it means that the domestic growth rate n is the
principal determinant of stability. Slowly growing economies will therefore be much
more liable to unstable asset accumulation than similar economies with rapid growth.
In a stationary economy (n=O) instability proves even to be inevitable, unless the real
interest rate is negative. This confirms the pessimistic view on stability emerging from
studies based on stationary IS-LM models, as mentioned in chapter 6. In our model
this proves even to be true irrespective of the wealth elasticity of consumption cz.
In addition to this main point we should make two other observations. First, the
stability of the system is independent of the rate of inflation, and thus of the rate of
depreciation. This implies that monetary policy cannot - in the long run - alter the
stability of debt accumulation. This contrasts with the conclusion of Blinder and Solow
and many others that the model will be less unstable as the degree of money financing
is greater. In the present model even tax policy is ineffective with respect to stability
or instability. This does not mean, however, that the monetary and fiscal policy are
not important at all. Below we shall see that they may have some impact on stability
when other policy regimes are chosen. Furthermore these policy instruments will be
shown to have an important impact on the steady state values of band e (section 7.4).
Secondly, it must be pointed out that for other fiscal policy regimes less stringent
conditions for stability are found. So far we have followed Blinder and Solow in
taking government expenditure (g) as the relevant exogenous policy variable. As we
have discussed in chapter 5, several alternative regimes have been put forward in the
literature, viz.
a. fixed expenditure including interest payments net of taxes (Tobin-Buiter);
b. fixed expenditure including gross interest payments (Christ).
c. fixed budget deficit (Domar);
d. balanced budget (Buchanan);
e. fixed debt ratio (Barro)
The results for these policy regimes are presented in table 7.1 below. Since p cannot
be less than -r (otherwise the nominal interest rate would be negative) the conditions
for each alternative regime prove to be less stringent than in the original case with
fixed g. This is obviously due to the fact that these regimes imply g to decline
endogenously as interest payments rise. It should however be noted that this automatic
'crowding out' is bounded by the condition that government expenditure should not
become negative.
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Table 7.1 Conditions for stability under alternative policy regimes"
regimes conditions
a. Blinder-Solow : fixed g n-re-O n-(l-cz)(l-r z)r+cz>O
b. Tobin-Buiter : fixed g'= g + n-r +
(l-rz)(r+p)b (l-rz)(r+p»O n-(l-cz)(I -r z)r+cz>O
c. Christ : fixed g"= g + n+p>O n-(l-cz)(l-r z)r+cz>O
(r-pjb
d. Domar : fixed deficit n+p>O n-( l-cz)(l-r z)r+cz>O
e. Buchanan : zero deficit n-( l-cz)(I-r z)r+cz>O
f. Barro : fixed b n-(l-cz)(l-r z)r+cz>O
• In all regimes it is assumed that the target is achieved by adjusting g. A proof of
these results is given in Appendix 7.A.
These results show that under each regime the condition n-(l-cz)(l-r z)r+cz>O is a
necessary, though not always a sufficient condition for stability. It is evident that
whenever this condition is conclusive, the government has a powerful instrument for
ensuring the system's stability, namely the tax rate on property income rz. The
conditions in the first column turn out to be different for each regime. For the
Domar, Tobin-Buiter and Christ regimes, they imply that monetary policy may
contribute to stability by ensuring that the inflation rate is not too low (ps--n in
regime c. and d., and p>(rzr-n)/(l-rz) in b.). Thus unlike the reference regime these
alternative regimes leave considerable room for fiscal and monetary policy to
influence the stability of the system.
Another interesting feature of the alternative regimes is that the system may be
stable even in the absence of real growth. Provided that pe-O(in regime c. and d.) or
p>r zr /(l-r z) (in regime b.) the evolution of debt will be stable if the wealth elasticity
of consumption is sufficiently large; that is, if cz>( l-cz)( l-r z)r. This corroborates the
basic conclusion of the stationary IS/LM models that a positive wealth effect is an
essential prerequisite for stability of public debt, but is, of course, in contrast with
the conclusions of the foregoing chapter.
7.6 THE GENERAL CASE
Returning to the general case it can first be shown that the conclusion on the decisive
role of the growth rate and the interest rate is also valid when (7'<0. Solving the
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Routh-Hurwitz conditions (7.12) it is found that
I. 2n-h1-h4+~.i?O
II. ~.i.{n-h1)(n-h4)-h2h3} + ~A(1'{h2h6-(n-h4)h5} > 0
III. (2n-h1-h4)(n-h1){(n-h4)-h~3 + ~.i.(2n-h,-h4+~.i.)}
- ~~r(1'{h2h6+(n-h1)h5+~ ~.,.h5} > 0
Provided that ~~.>O it can be seen that condition I is a positive linear function of n,
condition II a positive quadratic function of n and condition III a cubic function of
n with a positive first term. This implies that the system will always be stable
whenever the growth rate is sufficiently high. In a similar way it can be established
that stability is also ensured if the real interest is sufficiently low.11
Since these conditions are difficult to handle in more detail on the analytical level
it may be useful to present some numerical results for plausible values of the
parameters. A convenient device for assessing the stability characteristics of the model
is to calculate the growth rate that is at the minimum required for stability. nmin (see
section 6.3). Then, the lower this minimum growth rate is the more unlikely it will be
for the system to be unstable.
Figure 7.1 presents the results for nmin in relation to the net creditor position e for
the case with zero wealth elasticity and for the case with high wealth elasticity
(cz=O.I). For all growth rates in the area above these curves the system is stable.
In both cases the Blinder-Solow regime with fixed g proves again to be significantly
more restrictive than the other regimes. especially when the wealth elasticity is high.
Further these figures bring out that the system in general becomes more stable if ely
is larger. This means that a country with large foreign debts will be more liable to
instability than a net creditor country. This general rule is. however, violated for a
certain interval with high v's under the Tobin-Buiter regime (fig. a).
Further it may be noticed that in jig. b the Domar regime yields Demar's original
condition for stability. namely that the nominal rate of growth should be positive
(hence n>-p and thus n>-4%). Finally. a remarkable result of the present analysis is
that for the Blinder-Solow regime a high wealth elasticity of consumption turns out
11 Denoting the Routh-Hurwitz conditions by RHl, RH2 and RH3 it is obtained by differentiation that
dRHl/dr = - 1 - (l-cz)(l-,.z) < 0
dZRH2/drz = 2""i,,(l-cz)(l-,.z) > 0
d3RH3/dr3 = - 6(1-cz)(1-"z){1-(1-cz)(1-,.z)) < 0
These results imply that RHl is a negative linear function of r, RH2 a positive quadratic function of rand
RH3 a cubic function of r with a negative first term. These characteristics ensure that all conditions will
be satisfied for sufficiently low (possibly negative) value. of r.
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fig. a. (cz=O) fig. b. (cz=O.l)
Explanation: This figure is based on the following parameter values: y=0.5; c2=0.2;
c,=0_9; '2=0.4; ~=0.3; c =-0.2; 0'=-0.01; i.=O.5; ir=-O.5; m/y=O.I; b/y=0.5; f} =0.25;
p=0.04; r=0.04. The resu[ts for the Buchanan regime are similar to those for the bomar
regime. For the Barro regime with c =.1 (fig. b) the critical growth rate varies from -
7.1% if e/y=-7 to -10.5% for e/y=7~
to make the system less stable. This confirms the conclusion of the foregoing chapter
(as well as chapter 2). For other regimes, however, our results seem to confirm the
usual findings.
How the minimum growth rate depends on the other variables can be seen from
table 7.2, which presents the partial derivatives of nmin for the reference regime at
three alternative levels of e in relation to domestic production y_ The signs of most
coefficients conform with what might intuitively be expected. Yet several observations
may be made. First, it is important to note that a change in r leads to a practically
one-for-one change in nmin. Secondly, unlike in the case with a purely exogenous
interest rate, fiscal policy now appears to have some influence on the system's stability
through the tax rates '2 and ',. However, the coefficients are very low. If, for
example, T2 is raised by 10 percentage points the minimum growth rate falls by only
0.24 points (if e=O]. Monetary policy turns out to be totally ineffective again. Finally
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Table 7.1 Partial derivatives of D.in
e/y=-2 e/y=O e/y=2
r 0.993 0.968 0.939
p 0 0 0
ely -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
b/y 0.005 0.005 0.005
m/y 0 0 0
T, 0.019 0.Ql8 0.017
TZ -0.005 -0.024 -0.042
cz 0.004 0.012 0.011
t'J1l 0 0 0
Explanation: The parameter values are the same as in figure 7.lb.
these results confirm our observations from figure 7.1 that nmin goes down as e
increases (and b decreases) and that a higher wealth elasticity pushes nminup.
A somewhat remarkable result is that the speed of adjustment of the profit rate
(t'J1l) does not seem to influence nmin.In our numerical example this is due to the fact
that the second Routh-Hurwitz condition, which is independent of t'J
1l
, is conclusive
to stability. Only when t'J1l becomes very small does it appear to have an impact on
nmin·This suggests that the interaction between growth and income distribution is a
relatively 'fast' process in comparison to the dynamics of debt accumulation. This does
not at all mean, however, that t'J1l is unimportant; it can be shown to have an important
impact on the shape and the duration of the adjustment trajectory. This is
demonstrated in figure 7.2, which is based on a simulation of the adjustment process
starting from an initial situation characterized by a profit rate 5 percent points below
its steady state value "'s'
This figure brings out that the profit rate adjusts fairly rapidly to its steady state
value. However, because during the first period the growth rate is below its
equilibrium value government debt moves away from its steady state level reaching
a peak of nearly 15 per cent (of domestic production) above bs' That the accumulation
of net foreign assets is much less affected, is due to the fact that the lower profit rate
and the growth rate have opposite effects on the balance of payments. Whereas the
lower profit rate tends to create a deficit on current account because it increases
consumption, the lower growth rate mitigates this effect because investment will be
less. With the given parameter values, the first effect proves to be somewhat stronger
so that the lower profit rate leads to a modest worsening of the international debtor
position. When '" approaches its steady state level the growth of public debt and
foreign debt levels off, whereafter a long phase of steady decline of band e sets in.
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Explanation: This figure is based on a dynamic simulation of the linearized system
(equation 7.11) starting from e-e =0, b-b =0 and 71"-7I"s=-0.05.The natural growth
rate is 6% and the interest rate 2%. All otlter variables have the same values as in
figure 7.1a.
In the case of a higher speed of adjustment of 7r (~y=O.5) the profit rate and the
growth rate recover much faster, so that the amplitude of the movements in sand e
are less wide.
7.7 STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM
Along the steady growth path all financial stocks must grow by the same rate as
domestic product. As the growth of assets must be provided for by the government
budget deficit and the surplus in the balance of payments on current account, these
accounts will in general not be in balance. In nominal terms these accounts must
satisfy





Where PK is the nominal capital stock, and B, M and E the nominal stocks (in
absolute terms) of public debt, money and foreign assets.
Christ (1979) has pointed out for the closed economy that in the stationary fix-
price models of Blinder-Solow and Tobin-Buiter equilibrium must be characterized
by a balanced budget. But if one allows for inflation as in Christ (1978, 1979) this
result is modified since then real stocks of financial assets need to be constant. This
requires the government budget to show a deficit in order to satisfy the growing need
for nominal assets due to inflation. It will be evident that in a growing economy the
GBC must satisfy the increase in demand for nominal assets due to inflation as well
as to real growth.
For an open economy the same reasoning can be applied to the BPC. In a zero
growth, zero inflation economy (cf. Turnovsky 1976), the current account must be
balanced. In a zero growth economy with inflation (cf. Nguyen and Turnovsky 1979,
1983), the current account must show a surplus when e>Oor a deficit when e<O to
supply the growing need of foreign assets or liabilities due to inflation, while in a
growing economy it must supply the need due to real growth as well.
How the financial stocks and income distribution are influenced by the other
variables in this model can be established from the total differential of equations
(7.8), (7.9) and (7.10) subject to the steady state condition Db=De=D1r=O,which
gives12
o (7.1 Sa)
where H is equal to the H-matrix in equation (7.11), x a vector representing all other
determinants of the system and A the corresponding matrix of partial derivatives.
Rewriting equation (7.1Sa) we find the steady state effects
12 In short-term analYlil it il sometlmea suggested that the so-called McKinnon-Oates condition il
sufficient for equilibrium in the case of perfect capital mobility and (1'=0. This condition states that - (or
stationary equilibrium - the deficit in the government's budget should equal the deficit in the balance of
payments on current account. Turnovsky (1976) has pointed out rightly that this condition is in fact a
sufficient condition only in some very specific cases. More generally, conditions are required to hold (or both
variables separately. This is confirmed by the present analysis. This can be shown as follows. In our model
the proper equivalent of the McKinnon-Oates condition appears to be De+Db=O. Since also D1r=Oand all
other variables are assumed to be constant, it can be seen from equation (1.11) that this condition is fulfilled
only if both De=O and Db=O or if the H matrix satisfies
[
-1 ] [ -1 ]1 = -H. 1
o d1r/db
On closer view this latter possibility should, however, be discarded for it is found to be satisfied only if n-
r=-1, which is not only very unrealistic, but also in contradiction with the first order conditions for stability
above.
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(1.15b)
In discussing this relation we shall follow the same procedure as before, first
restricting the analysis to the simpler specific case with (7'=0and thereafter dealing
with the general case on the basis of some numerical results. In addition, the analysis
will be confined to the impact of the instrument variables of the government g, 1" 1Z
and p.











If the system is stable (hence Det(H) > 0 and n-r > 0) and ra ~ r, it can be assessed
that the structure of these matrices is
[





and for the product matrix'3
[
des] [- + + + ]dbs = + - - -
d1rs 0 0 + 0
13 For des/d1'2 it is obtained that
des/ dr 2= (n -h4)c2Y2+h2Y2-hZ (1'z -"l)i~/i" - {c 1(1-1' l)-cZ( 1-1' Z)}(n -h4)i ../i"
Since n-h4.hZ'YZ>0 and 1'~1'l this expression must always be >0. Similarly it is found for db·/d1'Z that
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Thus both tax rates TZ and T1 and the 'inflation tax' p have a positive impact on es
and a negative impact on bs' Government expenditure has just the opposite effects.
These results are quite straightforward and need little further comment. An interesting
result is that none of these instruments except TZ affects the steady state profit rate 1I"s'
This is due to the fact that the interest rate is given, so that 1I"sonly depends on the
natural growth rate, the given interest rate and the tax rate on profits.
A similar structure of the product matrix is found for the general case with 0'<0
for plausible values of the parameters. For n=6% and r=4% 14 it is obtained that
(expressing e and b now in ratios to y)
[
de/y] _ [-33.2 _24.2 _5.2
dbs/y - 43.5 33.7 9.0









All coefficients have the same sign as in the 0'=0 case above. The principal difference
concerns the last row, which now shows positive effects on the profit rate of
government expenditure g and tax on property income T 2 and negative effects of T 1
and p. These effects arise from the impact of these variables on e and thereby, since
(1';'0, on the interest rate. Apart from this indirect influence T2 has a direct effect on
11", for at a higher T2 the (gross) profit rate needs to be higher in order to maintain
growth equilibrium.
It should be noted that the absolute size of the coefficients in the product-matrix
is strongly influenced by the growth rate and the interest rate. For instance, if the
interest rate is 2% instead of 4% a change in g by 0.01 would have led to an increase
in public debt of only 0.06 instead of 0.44 as in the matrix above. And if the growth
rate is 8% instead of 6% the change in public debt would reduce from 0.44 to 0.24.
7.8 A CURRENT BALANCE REGIME
In all the foregoing analysis it was assumed that the government adopts a certain
target for its fiscal policy irrespective of the outcome for the balance of payments. In
this respect we followed the tradition of most GBC literature. However, this
assumption does not seem very realistic, as in most countries the position of the
balance of payments on current account is an important guideline of fiscal policy. For
example, until the end of the 1970's budgetary policy in the Netherlands was formally
directed at a structural norm of a one percent surplus in the balance of payments on
current account. Besides, it is well-known for many countries, that the urge for fiscal
14 All parameter values are the same as in figure 7.1a. Further it is assumed that ,,"=0.10 and
i,.=-0.06.
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restraint is, in practice, much stronger in the case of a deficit in the current account
then when it shows a comfortable surplus.
In this final section we shall examine the (extreme) case in which fiscal policy is
fully directed at maintaining equilibrium in the current account. Assuming that the
initial net stocks of foreign assets is nil as well, this policy constraint implies that f=O
and De=O. If the government achieves this target by varying its expenditure g it can
be seen from equation (7.5) that g must satisfy
g=y-c-i (7.17)





(I+b+m)iT+{(I -c,)( l-T,)-( l-c2)(I-T 2)}
The Routh-Hurwitz conditions of this system are
I. Trace (H)= -(n-h,) - t?~T < 0
II. Det (H) = (n-h,).t?TiT > 0 (7.19)
which implies after substitution for h, that
n-(I-c2)(I-T2)r + Cz > 0
t?TiT> 0
(7.20)
From these results it can be concluded immediately that under this balance of
payments regime the system is more stable than under the original budgetary regime
which required nc-r (eq, 7.14).
The dynamics of this case is iIIustrated in the phase diagram below (figure 7.3)
The (Db=O) curve is discontinuous at 11"=11", because at that profit rate the growth rate
just equals the minimum growth rate nmin. The locus of the vertical (D1I"=0)curve is
determined by the profit rate at which the corresponding growth rate is just equal to
the natural growth rate n. As in that case the rate of unemployment is constant the
income distribution will be constant as well. From the investment function (eq. 7.4)
it can be inferred that the steady state profit rate 11"5 depends on n, r, T2 and ~. As
regards the stability of the system it can easily be seen that the system is stable if
11"5>11", and hence n>nmin (fig. a) and unstable if 11"5<11", (fig. b).
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On a very abstract level this model may illuminate some of the recent experiences
with fiscal policy in the Netherlands and other European countries. As was described
in the foregoing chapter, in the mid 1970's these countries were confronted by several
(external) shocks that on the whole had a serious destabilizing effect on the growth
of public debt. In addition, in the beginning of the 1980's the real rate of interest
rose along with the international level of interest rates under the influence of a
changed mix of monetary and fiscal policy in the United States. The overall outcome
of these stocks may be discussed with reference to figure 7.4. Let us assume that the
economy was originally in its stable steady state equilibrium (bs,1!"s).Then, as a result
of the fall in r and the rise in r, the {Db=O}curve shifts to the right as higher profit
rates are necessary to ensure Db=O. The effect of the changes in r, rand n has a
negative impact on 11"s' while the changes in rand r tend to raise 11"s' For simplicity let
us therefore assume that these different effects neutralize each other, so that the
{D1I"=q} curve is unchanged. As finally the exogenous fall in 11" implies a movement
away from the original equilibrium, the initial position of the system after the 'shocks'
is characterized by point A right of the original equilibrium.
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Provided that the system is still stable (1I",<1I"s) the adjustment trajectory is described
by the A-B curve, which shows that after a period of rising debt the system will
eventually tend to a new stable equilibrium where the profit rate was recovered back
to its original level and public debt has reached a higher but stable level. The specific
shape of the adjustment trajectory can be explained as follows. As a result of the
shocks the growth rate and thus the volume of investment fall to a lower level. Then.
in order to avoid the emergence of a surplus in the current account the government
has to raise its expenditure discretely. Because of the lower growth rate and the higher
expenditure public debt starts to increase sharply. Later, as the profit rate and the
growth rate recover this rising tendency is mitigated and may even turn into steady
decline.
Next imagine that the rise in r and the fall in n are such that the system becomes
unstable. In figure 7.4 this is shown by a further shift of the {Db",O} curve to the
right. Then the adjustment process will follow the explosive A-C path. Although
along this path the profit rate again tends to its stable level (11"5)' public debt keeps
growing till infinity. It may be noted that for government expenditure this trajectory
entails the somewhat paradoxical result that after the initial discretionary increase in
public expenditure, the government has to bring down its expenditure continuously.
This follows from the balance of payments target which implies that as private
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Explanation: this figure is based on a dynamic simulation of the linearized system
(eq. 7.18). Before t=Osteady state equilibrium is characterized by n=2%, r=40/0,T2=0.4
and all other variables as in fig.la. At t=O, r rises to 5% thereby making the system
unstable (n=2% < nmin=2.4). If 12 is raised to 0.6 stability is again restored (n=2% >
nmin=1.6%).
investment and consumption rise (because of the growing interest income), public
expenditure must be reduced equivalently. Since debt grows without any limit it can
easily be seen that sooner or later public expenditure will become fully 'crowded out'
by the rise in private expenditure, and thereafter should even have to become
negative, which is of course impossible.
How is this unstable process to be stopped? There are several options. The first
and by far the most attractive option would be to raise the natural growth rate to
such a level that the system becomes stable again. However, it is obvious that this
option may be hard to achieve in reality. A second option is to raise taxes on wages.
This may temporarily mitigate the 'crowding out' of government expenditure by
shifting the burden to wage earners, but since it does not cure the instability of the
system this cannot provide a permanent solution. A third option is to raise taxes on
private property income. This is a much more attractive option, for it not only relieves
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the burden of the government but also reduces the instability of the system. If the tax
rate is raised above the critical level T2=1-(n+cz)/{I-c2)r} (equation 7.20) the process
will even become stable again.
Although this last option is most effective from a long term point of view, it is
doubtful whether it will also be a politically attractive option because it leads to a
lower growth rate of production and thus maybe even to a steeper rise in public debt
in the short term.15 This is illustrated in figure 7.5 which shows the adjustment
trajectory after an increase in r for the case in which T2 is left unchanged (T2=0.4), and
for the case where T2 is raised to 0.6 in order to restore stability. As this figure brings
out the second (stable) alternative implies lower growth and higher debt in the 'short'
run. The duration of this short run depends mainly on the difference between the
growth rate and the interest rate and on the speed of adjustment of the profit rate
(t?T)' If t?T is low this 'short' run may be quite long (as is shown by the figure). But
even for higher t?T'S the short run seems to last decades rather than years; this may be
too long for governments with a really short time horizon (for example because of
periodic elections).
7.9 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have analysed the dynamics of growth and debt for a small open
economy. The conclusions of the present analysis are most clear-cut for the case of
a purely exogenous interest rate «7'=0). Then stability requires for the reference
regime (Blinder-Solow) simply that n-re-O. This result implies that neither fiscal nor
monetary policy can influence the long-term stability or instability of the system. This
rather pessimistic result is modified in the more general case with an endogenous
interest rate «7'>0), but even then fiscal and monetary policy instruments prove to
have only a very small impact or no impact at all on the system's stability. The growth
rate and the interest rate emerge again as the fundamental determinants of stability.
In general for other policy regimes less stringent conditions for stability were
found. A necessary condition common to all alternative regimes was that n must
satisfy n-(I-c2)(l-T 2)r+cz>0, which implies that the government has at least one
important instrument by means of which it might effectively influence the stability
15 The impact effect of 1'2on b is obtained by differentiation of the GBC:
If the sensitivity of i for 1'2 is substantial this impact might well be positive. The long term effect of 1'2on
b· is found to be
Since i,. is probably much smaller then i" in absolute terms, this long term effect will generally be negative.
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of the system, namely the tax rate on property income T2.
All policy regimes which are commonly considered in the GBC literature focus on
norms for government outlays, or taxes, irrespective of their consequences for the
balance of payments. In this chapter we have argued that this is inappropriate, because
in practice the balance of payments on current account is an important guideline for
fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore we have examined a regime with a zero
current balance target. The conditions for stability were found to be "~1r>Oand n-
(l-c2)(I-T 2)r+cz>O,which implies that in this regime the stability can be influenced
effectively by the government through manipulation of the tax rate on interest income
T2. Monetary policy, aiming at a certain target rate of inflation or depreciation, is once
again ineffective in this case.
APPENDIX 7.4 ALTERNA TIVE REGIMES
This appendix establishes the stability conditions for the alternative policy regimes
given in section 7.4. In all other regimes it is assumed that the target of fiscal policy










g= T,W+T2Y2+ (i+p)(b+m) - (r+p)b
These functions have the following consequences for the elements of the first two
rows of the H matrix.
new Buchanan Oomar Tobin- Christ
coeffi- Buiter
cient
h,' = h,-T2r + h,-T2r+ h, h,
+u'(b-T 2b-T2e) +U'(b-T 2b-T2e)
h2' = h2+T2r+(r+p) h2-( I-T 2)(r+p) h2-(r+p)
h3' = 0 h3 h3
h4' = -p h4-( I-T 2)(r+p) h4-(r+p)
hs' = hs+(T2-T,) hs+(T2-T,) hs hs
h6' = h6-(12-1,) h6 h6
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The stability conditions for the regimes a.- c. are obtained by substituting the above
new coefficients in the Routh-Hurwitz conditions, which yields for the Domar regime
and for the Christ regime
(I) n-p > °
(II) n-(l-c2)(I-T2)r+Cz> °
and for the Tobin-Buiter regime
(I) n-T2r+(1-T2)p > °
(II) n -(l-c2)(I -T 2)r+cz > °
In the balanced budget regime (d.) the growth of public debt is given by
Db = -(n+p)(b+m)
which implies that in the steady state (b-m) must be zero and thus b=-m. This reduces
the model to two independent equations. For the specific case with u'=O this regime
is found to require for stability
n-h,-T2r> °
or after substitution for h,
n -( l-c2)( l-T 2)r+cz > °
besides, of course, the stability condition for income distribution t9.i?O.
For the Barro regime where b-constant the system reduces to two dimensions. The
new elements of the H matrix are now
h,' = h, - T2r + u'{T2(b+e) + (b-mji, - b}
h5' = h5 + T2-T, + (b+m)i.
while h2, h3, h4, h5 are now equal to zero. For the reduced model with u'=O this
implies the condition h,'-n>O, thus again
n-(1-c2)(1-T 2)r+cz>0.
These results are presented in Table 7.1 in the text.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This book investigates the dynamics of growth and debt on the basis of a post-
Keynesian model of growth and income distribution. Particular attention is given to
the dynamics implied by the government budget constraint.
The dynamics of government finance is usually analysed on the basis of a
neoclassical-Keynesian IS/LM model. This model which concentrates on income-
expenditure equilibrium neglects the distribution of income, and is essentially suited
for short-period analysis. The evolution of public debt is, however, typically a long-
period phenomenon. Therefore it is more appropriate to analyse the GBC dynamics
in the context of a growth model. Moreover, this model should also take account of
the accumulation of debt and wealth in the private sector. In this book the dynamics
of public debt is examined in relation to the distribution of wealth and debt between
two distinct classes in the private sector. This last chapter also investigates the
relationship of the dynamics of public debt with the growth of foreign debt and
wealth.
8.1 POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY
Starting from a simple generalized Pasinetti-Kaldor model with two social classes
(workers and capitalists), chapter 2 shows that the introduction of the government
budget constraint raises serious difficulties with regard to the long-period solution of
this model. In the presence of a government sector the steady state solution proved
either to be unstable or to be characterized by a net creditor position of the
government and the disappearance of the capitalist class. Apparently the traditional
(linear) post-Keynesian model is too rigid to provide a reasonable description of the
long-term dynamics of the economy. Therefore it was necessary to develop a more
sophisticated model.
Differential saving
Despite the fact that the proposition of differential saving is, according to Malinvaud
(1986), accepted by most macroeconomists, it still lacks a rigorous theoretical
explanation. There seem to be two opposing views on this subject among post-
Keynesian economists. According to Kaldor the higher savings propensity from profits
arises from the 'nature of business income', while Pasinetti explains it by the stronger
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tendency of the rich to plan for inheritance. Thus in Kaldor's view differential
propensities to save are attached to the different types of income, while Pasinetti,
following the classical approach in this respect, relates them to the different
preferences of social classes.
Kaldor's view is supported by Malinvaud (1986), who emphasizes that changes in
business income have a smaller impact on consumption than equivalent changes in
wage income because of informational imperfections and liquidity constraints. These
are, however, essentially short-period factors. In our analysis we follow the 'classical'
view of Pasinetti that differential saving is a class related phenomenon.' Nevertheless
we agree with Kaldor that differential saving has something to do with the
organization of business. However, this is not because people cannot see through a
'corporate veil', but because there exists a 'class' of owners and (top- )managers of the
corporate sector with a distinct role in the economy and who therefore have different
interests with respect to saving and wealth. While for workers saving is primarily a
provision for their old age, for members of the 'corporate class' it is essentially a
means of increasing their wealth, and thereby their status and power.
Our analysis therefore adopts a savings function which distinguishes between two
classes, workers and a 'corporate class' of large stockholders and managers of firms.
Workers are assumed to be risk averse and to save for their old age and inheritance
only. For simplicity, it is assumed that workers do not own shares and invest all their
wealth in interest-bearing debt. All shares are owned by the corporate class which
bears the risks of enterprise and appropriates the profits. For this class, which as a
whole owns and governs the capital stock and the productive capacity, saving and
wealth is an aim in itself.
Of course, this division of the economy into two classes is schematic. A further
improvement would be to disaggregate this corporate class into several sub-classes.
This would, however, have significantly complicated our analysis. As our focus was
on the macroeconomic dynamics rather than on the precise relationship between the
ownership and the control of firms, this elaboration was beyond the scope of our
analysis. On the (microeconomic) level of the firm it is shown that the strategy
towards growth and finance can be explained by the conflicting interests of managers
and shareholders, and the discretionary power of the management vis-a-vis the
shareholders.
Thus our analysis distinguishes four sectors, or agents:
1. workers who receive labour income, transfer-income from the government and
interest-income on their accumulated savings. This class is risk averse, does not
own shares, and saves for old-age and inheritance only;
1 In chapter 7, which adds the foreign sector to the model, we have for practical reasons adopted a
Kaldorian savings function with differential propensities to save related to types of income rather than to
classes. This was necessary in order to reduce the dimensionality of the model.
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2. the corporate class, which encompasses all entrepreneurs, shareholders and
(top)managers of firms. This class is risk-taking, it owns all shares and
appropriates the profits after payment of interest on debt to the workers and taxes
to the government.
3. the government sector which receives taxes levied on labour income. interest
income and net returns of the corporate sector. It finances its deficit by issuing
money and interest-bearing debt.
4. the foreign sector which pays interest on its debt to domestic sectors, or receives
interest if the country is a net debtor. The deficit or surplus in the balance of
payments on current account is financed fully by interest-bearing debt. There is
no net flow of official reserves. The monetary authorities are assumed to adjust
the money supply to the demand for money at the given rate of inflation, and
depreciation.
Manageriai growth
The determinants of growth and investment are investigated on the basis of a model
of an individual. equity-rationed, firm. Chapters 3 and 4 show that in the presence
of financial constraints, arising from imperfect markets for risk-sharing, investment
can be explained in terms of internal savings and the desired rate of indebtedness.
Thus investment depends on profits in two ways: as a source of finance (through the
flow of internal savings) and as an incentive for taking risks (through the desired debt
ratio).2
In many respects our analysis follows the managerial or corporate approach to
growth. An interesting feature of this approach is that it distinguishes between the
interests of managers and the interests of shareholders of the firm. It is generally
assumed that managers are mainly interested in the expansion of the firm3 in contrast
to shareholders who desire a maximum market value of their shares. The actual
strategy of the firm depends therefore on the discretionary power of the management
vis-a-vis the shareholders. We have considered two ways to model this conflict of
interests, one focussing on the shareholders and the other on the managers. For
shareholders the discrepancy between the managerial strategy and the strategy which
maximizes the valuation of shares provides an incentive for monitoring. As the cost
of monitoring must be subtracted from the net pay-out of profits, the optimum
monitoring effort is found where the marginal benefits in terms of a more
'shareholders minded' strategy are offset by the marginal cost of monitoring (section
3.6).
2' In this respect our model i. broader than Malinvaud (1980), who concentrates on the incentive role
of profits: "The main concern has been profitability aa a precondition for risk taking by entrepreneurs; the
model cannot do much more than explore the consequences of such a precondition, Othe.r8will have to study
the role of financial constraints," Malinvaud (1980, p. 101).
3 Or in perquisites, Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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The second approach starts from the point of view of managers and emphasizes
the role of the market-valuation of shares as an indicator of the risk of intervention
by shareholders or take-over by others. Following Odagiri (1981) it is assumed that
this risk increases as the discrepancy between the actual market-valuation and the
maximum valuation becomes greater. Then, by discounting this risk in the managerial
optimization procedure it is possible to establish a unique optimum growth strategy
for the firm depending on the preferences of managers and shareholders, the chance
of intervention by shareholders or take-overs, and the mean and the variance of
profits, taxes and the interest rate.
8.2 THE METHOD OF THE MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
For the analysis of the macroeconomic dynamics we have adopted a sequential-
analytical approach. According to this method the analysis is divided into different
levels corresponding to the different lengths of the periods (cf. Malinvaud 1980,
Kuipers 1981). Our analysis concentrates on the medium period and the long period.
The medium period is conceived as a (continuous) sequence of short-period
('momentary') equilibria, and the long period as a sequence of medium-period
equilibria.
The models constructed are in general simple non-linear models. Our main
challenge has been to construct models that are consistent not only in the
neighbourhood of equilibrium but also for positions farther away from equilibrium.
This is necessary to determine the global dynamics of the system. This is relevant
unless one believes that the economy is always in or close to its ('natural') equilibrium.
An additional complication of non-linear systems concerns the uniqueness of
equilibrium. Our analysis shows that even simple and natural non-linear systems may
yield more than one solution. As a consequence the actual evolution of the economy
becomes critically dependent on its initial position. Moreover, it can no longer be
assumed that after a shock the system will always return to its original equilibrium.
It might well tend to another equilibrium, or develop into an unstable process which
does not lead to a new equilibrium at all.
Because of the complex nature of non-linear dynamic systems, it is necessary to
keep the models simple. The dynamics of two-dimensional systems of differential
equations (quadratic functions) is reasonably well-established, but even three-
dimensional (cubic) systems soon become hard to deal with mathematically. As our
main concern was the theory and not the technique of modelling non-linear systems,
we have constructed our models in such a way that, although they often could not be
solved explicitly, they remained transparent from an economic point of view.
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8.3 THE DYNAMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
Short period
Although we have not explicitly modelled short-period dynamics, it is shown that the
distribution of wealth and debt may also have important consequences for short-
period equilibrium. It is well-known that a change in the price-level changes the
distribution of wealth between debtors and creditors, and will therefore have an
impact on aggregate demand. Tobin (1980) pointed out that this may give rise to a
reverse Pigou effect: that is, a general price rise causes expenditure to rise rather than
to fall. Similarly our analysis suggests that also a change in the interest rate may have
a reverse impact on expenditure and savings. This is due to the redistribution of
income from the debtor sectors (government and the corporate sector) to the creditor
sector (workers). Especially in the presence of a large public debt this may lead to a
reverse Cambridge effect: that is, a higher interest rate leads to a decrease of aggregate
savings. If this distribution-effect is stronger than the conventional effect of the
interest rate on investment, a higher interest rate may even yield a fall in aggregate
expenditure (this may be called a reverse Keynes effect).
It is evident that these distribution effects may seriously affect the equilibrium
restoring role of the price level and the interest rate, and will therefore have a strong
impact on the stability of short-period and medium-period dynamics.
Medium period
The medium period is characterized by sluggish prices and disequilibrium between
aggregate demand and supply. In this context the decisive determinant of investment
is the aim to adjust capacity to demand. This gives rise to a Harrod type of dynamics.
Our analysis in chapter 5 shows that the 'knife-edge' instability of Harrod's model is
mitigated significantly if one takes account of a certain degree of price-flexibility and
feedback from a non-accommodating monetary sector. Nevertheless, even if this
feedback leads to a stable equilibrium, it turns out to be stable only within a certain
zone around this equilibrium, that is, it is locally stable but not globally. Numerical
experiments indicate that this zone may take the form of an unstable limit cycle.
Starting from a point inside this cycle the system will return to its equilibrium, but
if it starts outside the cycle the system will recede from it for ever.
In economic terms this gives support to Leijonhufvud's proposition that Keynesian
dynamics is characterized by a 'corridor': within this corridor the system is self-
stabilizing, but beyond it the disequilibrium, or 'deviation-amplifying', forces become
so strong, that the system will never return to equilibrium by itself.
Whether a locally stable solution, and thereby a corridor, exists depends primarily
on the response of investment to discrepancies between demand and capacity. If this
acceleration factor is too strong the solution becomes unstable, locally as well as
globally. There thus exists a critical value for the adjustment speed of investment
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beyond which the solution becomes unstable. In technical terms this critical parameter
value represents the bifurcation point of the catastrophe manifold of the system
(section 6.3). We have used the critical value of this parameter in order to asses the
impact of different variables on the stability of the system.
Long cycles
The long-period analysis concentrates on the dynamics of growth, income distribution
and the accumulation of debt and wealth. As the medium-period results were not very
encouraging as regards the intrinsic stability of the system, it is assumed that in the
long period equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply is continuously being
ensured by monetary policy. In the long period monetary authorities are thus assumed
to have enough time to find the right policy to achieve full capacity utilization. The
long-period dynamics is governed therefore by the interaction between labour market
disequilibrium and the distribution of income, on the one hand, and the accumulation
of assets ensuing from the budget constraints of the government, the workers and the
corporate sector, on the other hand.
If the interaction between labour market disequilibrium, wage growth and
investment is the dominant mechanism, it is shown that this may lead to a 'Goodwin'
like cycle. More interesting in the context of our analysis is that financial factors may
also cause a long swing in economic activity. In the presence of financial constraints,
in particular constraints with respect to equity finance, this cycle is governed by the
interaction between investment, internal savings and the evolution of the (desired) rate
of indebtedness. Because investment now depends on the flow of internal savings as
well as the discrepancy between the actual and the desired debt ratio, a shock to the
system, for example a fall in profits, will have a double impact on investment: first,
through the change in internal savings, and secondly, through the change in the
desired debt ratio. The analysis of the adjustment process for an individual firm
(chapter 5) reveals that this second factor especially may give rise to a lasting process
of financial adjustment characterized by initial 'overshooting' of investment.
On an abstract level this may clarify some aspects of the developments after the
oil-shock in the beginning of the 1970's. This shock not only affected the profitability
of investment, but also the general state of uncertainty and thereby the desire for
growth (the 'animal spirits') of entrepreneurs. After the (over-) optimistic 1960's there
has been an adverse shift in business confidence leading to more prudential financial
policies. As a result investment fell not only because of the fall in internal savings, but
because of the desire to reduce the rate of indebtedness as well. Notably this structural
shift in the state of confidence may explain why recovery after the mid-1970's was
so hesitant and why the recovery of investment lagged so much behind the
improvement of actual profitability. These phenomena could not be explained by real
factors alone. One should take account of financial constraints as well.
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Open economy
In an open economy the domestic dynamics of wealth and debt should be considered
together with the evolution of the external debt and wealth of domestic agents. In
addition to the cumulating interest payments on public debt, now net interest
payments on the external position may also produce a tendency towards instability.
Through interest payments creditor countries tend to become even stronger creditors,
and debtors ever larger debtors. Chapter 7 shows that for a small open economy the
growth rate and the interest rate are the primary determinants of (local) stability. If
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, the real interest rate in a small
open economy is fully determined by the international interest rate. Hence, the
stability of public debt depends crucially on the domestic rate of growth. Slowly
growing economies will therefore be more liable to financial instability than similar
economies with a high rate of growth. If, as a result of imperfect substitution, the
domestic interest rate is dependent on the size of the net external position, this tends
to increase the intrinsic instability for debtor countries. For creditor countries the risk
of instability tends to be less".
The analysis of the open economy has been restricted to the small open economy.
It neglects the interaction between growth and asset accumulation in different
countries. In this respect our analysis is still deficient. It would be interesting to
extend the present analysis to a two-country model, or even to generalize it for more
country models. This would require a synthesis of the analysis for the closed economy
(chapters 5 and 6) and the analysis of the open economy in chapter 7. One interesting
feature of an integrated world model is that changes in prices, exchange rates and
interest rates would cause distribution-effects on a world scale as well. As a rise in the
interest rate benefits creditor countries vis-a-vis debtor countries, it depends on the
marginal saving propensities in different countries whether this leads to a rise or fall
in aggregate expenditure.
Obviously, these models will be very complex and hard to deal with on the
analytical level. Nevertheless, it would be very interesting to investigate how these
models would behave in the long term. It is clear that a global steady state solution can
exist only under very restrictive conditions. As steady growth requires all stocks and
flows to grow at the same rate in real terms it is obvious that the net external position
of any country must be zero in equilibrium, unless countries happen to grow at the
same rate. Both conditions are very specific, and no obvious process seems to exist
which would realize either of these conditions.P Hence, it appears that a steady state
4 See also Van Ewijk (1983).
5 'There is no natural tendency toward. a sero net external position. This can be shown as follow•. In
comparison with our model for a small open economy, the two-country case introduces one extra constraint,
namely equilibrium between demand and supply on a world scale, and one extra free variable, the interest
rate. Therefore the model is fully determined for any initial external position. Next assume that one steady
state condition is satisfied, namely the net external position being sero, Then it is evident that this external
position can remain &eroover time only if the balance of payments in current account is sere as well. That
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equilibrium can be realized only in the presence of international coordination of fiscal
policies, i.e. if the fiscal policy regimes are consistent with a zero current account and
a zero net debtor, or creditor, position in the long term.
Determinants of stability
There is an essential difference between the determinants of stability in the medium
period and the long period. In the medium period, which is characterized by the
disequilibrium dynamics between demand and capacity, all factors that tend to
stabilize demand also have a stabilizing impact on the system as a whole. Thus all
factors that raise the autonomous part of spending are intrinsically stabilizing. These
factors include the autonomous inflation and money growth (which determines the
equilibrium rate of inflation). Further, all factors that strengthen the monetary
feedback are stabilizing, in particular the degree of price-elasticity and the sensitivity
of the interest rate with respect to real money stock.
In the long period the natural rate of growth and the equilibrium rate of interest
emerge as basic determinants of (local) stability. Therefore all factors that depress the
equilibrium interest rate tend to have a stabilizing impact on the system. Thus in
contrast with the medium-period dynamics all factors that reduce expenditure and
increase saving are stabilizing.
Wealth elasticity of consumption
A general conclusion of many IS/LM based studies on the stability of the government
budget deficit is that a high wealth elasticity is essential for stability. However, our
analysis, which concentrates on a long-period post-Keynesian world, tends to support
the opposite conclusion, namely that a high wealth elasticity of consumption has a
destabilizing impact on the system. This can be explained as follows. In short-period
IS/LM models, characterized by under-utilization, a higher wealth elasticity enhances
the feedback of public debt on consumption, and thereby on production and income,
and thus finally on tax receipts. Therefore a rise in public debt may lead to a
reduction in the budget deficit if the wealth effect is sufficiently strong. In the long
period when capacity is fully utilized, real tax receipts cannot be increased further
through a rise in income. In that case, a stronger wealth effect only increases the
impact of debt on the interest rate. Therefore a high wealth elasticity is generally
destabilizing in our analysis.
is, if in both countries domestic demand just happens to equal domestic supply at the given international
equilibrium rate of interest. This would, however, be purely accidental, and must be excluded on logical
grounds. Therefore, steady state equilibrium is possible only if the real rate of growth is the same for both




One of the central questions of our analysis concerns the impact of government policy,
in particular fiscal policy, on the dynamic stability of the system. Fiscal policy is
represented by a linear policy function. By varying the parameters this function
encompasses all of the following regimes to be found in the literature:
1. Blinder-Solow regime, with fixed tax rates and fixed expenditure;
2. Tobin-Butter regime, with fixed taxes rates and a fixed sum of expenditure and
interest payments net of taxes;
3. Christ regime, with fixed tax rates and a fixed sum of expenditure and interest
payments;
4. Domar regime, with a fixed target for the budget deficit;6
5. Barro regime, with a fixed target for debt as a ratio of national product.
These regimes have been investigated with regard to their impact on the stability of
the system in the medium period, the long period and for the case of the small-open
economy. In the medium term the Christ regime turns out to be the most stable
regime, closely followed by the Tobin-Buiter regime. Both regimes are clearly
counter-cyclical thanks to the fact that they imply a inverse relationship between
expenditure and interest payments. As the interest rate is low in a depression and high
during prosperity this produces a stabilizing variation in expenditure. The Barro
regime, which aims at a constant debt ratio, performs by far the worst in the medium
period. This is not surprising as this regime links government expenditure to two pro-
cyclical factors: tax revenue and the 'real erosion' of debt. through the growth of
production. As a result a rise or fall in economic activity will be magnified by the
consequential rise or fall in government expenditure.
For the long period the results are different. Now the Barro regime proves to be
the most stable regime; that is, with the smallest risk of a spiral of cumulating debt
and interest payments. The second-best regime is the Christ regime which is obviously
due to the strong feedback of debt service to expenditure. In the long period the
Blinder-Solow, which assumes fixed expenditure as well as tax rates, turns out to be
the most de-stabilizing regime.
The results for the open economy are basically similar to those for the long period.
The precise ranking of the regimes appears to depend on the net external position, but
in general the Blinder-Solow regime performs worst again and the Barro regime best.
These results reveal a sharp distinction between the stability of the budgetary regimes
in the medium period and in the long period. This is especially true for the Barro
regime which is the most stable regime in the long period while the most unstable
regime in the medium period. Therefore it is impossible to establish a unique optimum
regime. Nevertheless it is evident that a regime which links the room for government
6 The Buchanan regime with a zero deficit can be considered as a special case of this Domar regime.
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expenditure to the amount of debt service, has a stabilizing impact on the economy
in the medium period as well as in the long period. Therefore, of the regimes
considered in our analysis the Christ regime, which implies a one for one linkage of
expenditure to interest payments, appears to offer a reasonable 'second best' solution
from the medium-term as well as the long-term point of view.
In an open economy another factor must be taken into account, namely the
evolution of the external position. As the change in the external position depends on
the excess of private savings over domestic investment including the government
budget deficit it may be sensible therefore to direct fiscal policy to a target for the
balance of payments. In fact, the budgetary regime based on a structural deficit norm
employed in the Netherlands from 1961 to the mid 1970's, was based implicitly on a
norm for the balance of payments in current account (Sterks, 1984).
Our analysis has concentrated on the medium-term and long-term consequences of
fiscal policy. No particular attention has been given to policies to cure disequilibrium
in the labour market. As we have seen dynamic equilibrium does not automatically
imply full employment. On the contrary, the rate of unemployment is such that it is
compatible with a constant income distribution. Thus, just as with income
distribution, unemployment depends on the dynamic equilibrium, and therefore on
all factors that are relevant to the growth of the economy.
Although it is attractive, both on political and economic grounds, to adopt certain
rules or norms for fiscal policy, our analysis shows that rules are valid only in a given
structural environment. Analysis of our non-linear models revealed that the dynamics
of the economy may change significantly as the system moves farther away from
equilibrium. In the event of a shock the system might thus be displaced from the
stable area into an 'unstable' area where it becomes subject to deviation-amplifying
processes. Moreover, the dynamics of the system may also change as a result of a
(gradual) evolution of the environment. Formerly stable policy regimes may therefore
turn into unstable regimes in the event of a shock, but also due to a gradual change
of the environment. Rules have therefore to be reconsidered regularly, and
discretionary decisions may be necessary to change them. Thus not only does a change
of the rules lead to a change of the system (Lucas, 1976), but also a change of the
system must lead to a change of the rules.
LIST OF SYMBOLS
(All stock and flow variables are in real terms, and expressed as a ratio to capital
stock, unless stated otherwise).
a corporate debt
b public debt
c propensity to consume
C total consumption
d ratio between debt and net worth
e net external creditor (+) or debtor position (-)
E exchange rate
f balance of trade
g government expenditure
G stock of goodwill
h utilization rate
net investment
j price change of shares
J number of shares
K capital stock (absolute, volume)
m base money
M base money (absolute, nominal)
I employment (in efficiency units)
Ie employment at capacity level
Is labour supply (in efficiency units)
n growth of labour supply (in efficiency units)
p inflation
P price level
q market valuation ratio
r real interest rate
R nominal interest rate




u rate of unemployment
U unemployment (absolute)
v managerial valuation ratio
V net 'worth
w wage income
W real wage rate
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Y net production
Yc productive capacity
y production (absolute, volume)
z wealth
Z total market demand
Ct risk aversion coefficient
f3 labour elasticity of production
1j fiscal reaction coefficient (i=l, ..4)
0 = pay-out of profits
E rate of external financing
r 'animal spirits' parameter
1'/ time preference
tJx adjustment coefficient (x=i,g,1I",..)
() pay-out ratio
e exchange rate
K- cost of monitoring




Tj tax rate (i=1,2,3)
1/J depreciation rate
Dx dx/dt
~e expected value of x
x growth of x (in absolute terms)
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OVER DE DYNAMICA VAN GROEI EN SCHULD
SAMENV AITING
De stagnatie van de economsiche groei sinds het midden van de jaren '70 heeft in veel
westerse landen geleid tot aanzienlijke tekorten op de overheidsbegroting. Ais gevolg
daarvan is de staatsschuld sterk toegenomen; niet aIleen in absolute bedragen, maar
maar ook in verhouding tot het nationaal inkomen. Door de rente, die over deze
schuld moet worden betaald, wordt de overheidsbegroting opnieuw belast. Hierdoor
dreigt er een spiraal te ontstaan van groeiende rentelasten, toenemende tekorten en
daardoor weer verder stijgende staatsschuld. In de jaren '80 is deze tendens versterkt
door de, zeker voor historische begrippen, hoge reele rente.
Deze ontwikkelingen hebben in de macro-economische theorie geleid tot een
verschuiving in de aandacht van de conjunctuurpolitiek op korte termijn naar de
gevolgen van de overheidsf'inancien op de lange termijn. Dit heeft aanleiding gegeven
tot een hef'tig debat over de effectiviteit van begrotingspolitiek indien men rekening
houdt met de f'inanciele gevolgen van het beleid op langere termijn.
Deze studie sluit aan bij dit debat, maar doet dit vanuit een andere invalshoek. In
de eerste plaats staat niet de ef fectiviteit van de begrotingspolitiek centraal, maar de
gevolgen ervan voor de stabiliteit van de economie. In de tweede plaats wordt gekozen
voor een andere theoretische basis dan de gebruikelijke, namelijk het post-
Keynesiaanse model van groei en inkomensverdeling, in plaats van het neoklassiek-
Keynesiaanse model dat zich met name richt op de conjuncturele ontwikkeling op
korte termijn.
Kenmerkend voor de post-Keynesiaanse benadering is de dynamische opvatting
van de economie, en de centrale plaats die daarbij wordt gegeven aan de verde ling van
het inkomen en het vermogen tussen verschillende sectoren, of sociale klassen, binnen
de economie. Deze theorie verschaft een goede basis voor de analyse van de
ontwikkeling van de staatsschuld in relatie tot de vermogensontwikkeling binnen de
particuliere sector en de internationale schuldverhoudingen.
Deze studie is theoretisch van aard. Getracht wordt om op basis van een
theoretische analyse inzicht te verschaffen in de dynamische verbanden tussen de
begrotingspolitiek van de overheid en het spaar- en investeringsgedrag van de
particuliere sector. Met name wordt onderzocht onder welke voorwaarden de
economie stabiel is, d.w.z. tendeert naar een pad van gelijkmatige groei. Vanwege
het complexe karakter van (niet-lineaire) dynamische systemen is het noodzakelijk
om kleine en overzichtelijke modellen te kiezen. De modellen verschaffen derhalve
slechts een gestyleerd beeld van de economie ..
Na de inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) worden in hoofdstuk 2 de uitgangspunten van het
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post-Keynesiaanse model behandeld. De nadruk ligt daarbij op de verklaring van de
diff'erentiele spaarfunctie. Volgens deze spaarfunctie hangt de omvang van de
besparingen in de economie af van de verde ling van het nationaal inkomen over
winstinkomen en looninkomen. In dit hoofdstuk worden de consequenties onderzocht
voor het post-Keynesiaanse model wanneer het wordt uitgebreid met een
overheidssector. Het blijkt dan dat het post-Keynesiaanse model in zijn 'klassieke'
vorm te beperkt is om een goede en consistente beschrijving te kunnen geven van de
ontwikkeling van een economie op lange termijn.
Omdat de ontwikkeling van de overheidsf'inancien nauw samenhangt de
ontwikkeling in de particuliere sector, wordt in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 een
uitwerking gegeven van het investerings- en financieringsgedrag van bedrijven.
Uitgangspunt voor deze analyse is dat er geen perfecte markt bestaat voor risico-
dragend kapitaal (aandelen). Ais gevolg hiervan zijn bedrijven 'gerantsoeneerd' in hun
eigen vermogen. Voor de financiering van hun investeringen zijn zij derhalve
aangewezen op de eigen besparingen (ingehouden winsten) en op leningen door
derden. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat er een afweging bestaat tussen het tempo
waarmee ondernemingen kunnen uitbreiden en het f'inanciele risico dat zij daarbij
lopeno Hoe deze afweging tot stand komt hangt mede af van de machtsverhouding
tussen de managers, die de onderneming leiden, en de aandeelhouders, die formeel
de onderneming bezitten. Dit wordt nader uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 4, waarin tevens
aandacht wordt besteed aan het verband tussen het groeitempo en de winstgevendheid
van ondernemingen. Tenslotte geeft dit hoofdstuk een beschrijving van het
(f'inanciele) aanpassingsproces dat volgt na een verstoring van het evenwicht,
bijvoorbeeld door een verandering van de winstmogelijkheden, of de rente.
Deze (micro-economische) theorie van de ondernemingstrategie dient als basis
voor de analyse van de macro-economische dynamica in de hoofdstukken 5 - 7. De
analyse wordt gesplitst in drie delen. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de dynamica van de
economie op de middellange termijn, hoofdstuk 6 de dynamica op de lange termijn,
en hoofdstuk 7 de dynamica van een economie in relatie tot het buitenland. Op de
middellange termijn staat de wisselwerking tussen groei, investeringen en de
bestedingsontwikkeling centraal. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat de economie gekenmerkt
kan zijn door 'corridor' stabiliteit. Dit houdt in dat de economie stabiel is bij kleine
schokken, maar dat de economie bij grotere schokken buiten zijn stabiele 'corridor'
kan worden gebracht. In dat geval krijgen de-stabiliserende krachten de overhand, en
kan de economie in een spiraal belanden van voortdurend afnemende investeringen
en stagnerende groei. De grootte van de 'corridor' hangt mede af van het gevoerde
begrotings beleid.
In de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 richt de analyse zich op de wisselwerking tussen de
(f'inanciele) ontwikkeling van de overheid, de bedrijvensector (inclusief de eigenaren
van de bedrijven) en de werknemers van de bedrijven op lange termijn. In hoofdstuk
6 wordt aangetoond dat zich een 'f'inanciele' cyclus kan voordoen, waarbij fasen van
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optimisme, waarin bedrijven sterk expanderen en hun schulden uitbreiden, zich
afwisselen met fasen waarin bedrijven een meer behoudende f'inanciele strategie
volgen. Hoofdstuk 7 laat zien dat een open economie een nauwe samenhang bestaat
tussen de schuldontwikkeling van de overheid en de vermogenspositie van het land ten
opzichte van het buitenland.
De centrale vraag in de macro-economische hoofdstukken 6 - 8 betreft de
stabiliteit van de economie. Daarom wordt een methode ontwikkeld om te bepalen in
hoeverre verschillende factoren een stabiliserende, dan wei een de-stabiliserende
invoed op de economie hebben. De theoretisch resultaten worden ondersteund met
simulaties, die worden uitgevoerd op basis van een numerieke invulling van de
modellen.
Op de middellange termijn blijkt de stabiliteit vooral af te hangen van de mate
van prijsflexibiliteit, de invloed van monetaire variabelen op de bestedingen, en de
mate waarin investeringen reageren op wisselingen in de bezettingsgraad van de
produktiecapaciteit. Op de lange termijn hangt de stabiliteit af van een veelheid van
factoren. Opvallend is dat in onze studie het positieve effect van het vermogen op de
consumptie een nadelige invloed heeft op de stabiliteit van de economie, dit in
tegenstelling tot veel andere studies waar een sterk vermogenseffect juist een
essentiele voorwaarde is voor stabiliteit.
In de open economie hangt de stabiliteit met name af van de hoogte van de reele
rente en het groeitempo van de economie. Aangezien de reele rente grotendeels door
de internationale rente wordt bepaald, vormt de economische groei de belangrijkste
binnenlandse determinant van de stabiliteit. Dit betekent, dat in het algemeen het
risico van een instabiele ontwikkeling van de staatsschuld (en de buitenlandse schuld)
aanmerkelijk groter voor een traag groeiende economie dan voor een economie met
een hoog groeitempo.
Met betrekking tot het overheidsgedrag worden verschillende beleidsregimes
onderzocht, zoals die in de literatuur bekend zijn. Deze regimes worden onderscheiden
naar hun doelstelling, zoals een vaste norm voor het financieringstekort, een norm
voor de staatsschuld, een bepaald niveau van overheidsbestedingen en belastingen, of
een norm voor de som van bestedingen en rentelasten. De keuze van het regime blijkt
grate consequenties te hebben voor de stabiliteit van de economie. Het is echter niet
mogelijk om een eenduidige rangorde op te stellen van de regimes naar de mate
waarin zij stabiliserend of de-stabiliserend zijn. De invloed van een beleidsregime op
de economie hangt sterk af van de omstandigheden, en van de termijn die men in
beschouwing neemt. Zo blijkt het regime dat uitgaat van een vaste norm voor de
omvang van de staatsschuld, het rneest stabiele regime te zijn in de lange termijn,
terwijl het in de middellange terrnijn juist het meest de-stabiliserende regime is.
Hoewel het, zowel op politieke als op economische gronden, aantrekkelijk kan zijn
om regels of normen te hanteren, toont deze studie aan dat regels en normen voor het
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voor het begrotingbeleid van de overheid altijd gebonden zijn aan de economische
omgeving, Een verandering in de omstandigheden, geleidelijk of schoksgewijs, kan
voorheen stabiele beleidsregimes veranderen in instabiele regimes. Beleidsregimes
moeten derhalve regelmatig worden heroverwogen, en zonodig worden aangepast.
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